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ABSTRACT
Executory contracts are receiving increased attention, 
primarily because of the current controversy over leases.
The same principles applicable to leases may also be appli­
cable to other types of executory contracts. The accounting 
profession has recognized the existence of the problem posed 
by executory contracts as well as the need to study it. The 
problem centers around the question of whether or not data 
on executory contracts constitute relevant, useful financial 
information which should be reported in published financial 
statements.
The research entailed surveying current literature on 
various types of executory contracts to discover their 
present treatment in accounting practice and theory. No 
extensive empirical research was undertaken. This study 
explores five major problems, or attempts to accomplish five 
major objectives as follows:
1. To determine the present theoretical treatment 
of executory contracts and to trace the develop­
ment of this theory. In this regard, unperformed
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portions of executory contracts are not recognized 
currently as assets and liabilities in financial 
statements. This principle is derived from the 
writings of early authors who were concerned with 
only two forms of executory contracts, i.e., 
leases and purchase commitments. While executory 
contracts are not considered to be assets and 
liabilities, accountants have recognized that 
information on such contracts is highly relevant 
financial information which must be presented to 
users of financial statements.
To examine the adequacy of the current treatment 
of executory contracts when generally accepted 
accounting principles are applied to various con­
tracts. The present practice of not capitalizing 
executory contracts is based primarily upon the 
concept of performance which, as presently defined 
and understood, has no less than seven major weak­
nesses, and is probably an inadequate theoretical 
basis. Footnote disclosure alone appears to be an 
inadequate method of reporting executory contracts, 
while the use of schedules seems to be a most use­
ful reporting device.
To determine the objective of financial reporting 
and how executory contracts relate to that objec­
tive. The objective is to communicate to the 
interested user those elements of economic and 
financial information vital to his decision. Thus, 
the usefulness of ’the data is the primary cri­
terion for determining what information should be 
reported in financial statements. On the basis 
of the usefulness of the data, executory contract 
information should be reported in financial state­
ments . The method of reporting is, however, another 
matter.
To derive a consistent theoretical foundation 
which might accomodate executory contracts if they 
are capitalized. This is accomplished by adopting 
the concepts of assets and liabilities put forth 
by Sprouse and Moonitz in Accounting Research 
Study No. 3. Modification of the transactions 
concept and the concept of service potentials is 
necessary before these asset and liability con­
cepts will accomodate executory contracts.
To investigate the effect of capitalization of 
executory contracts on selected financial ratios
as well as discussing briefly valuation problems 
and means of reporting such contracts other than 
by capitalization. Research indicates that 
replacement costs and price level changes can be 
applied to executory contracts with no special 
problems being created that are not already 
present when these concepts are applied to other 
assets and liabilities. Utilization of replace­
ment cost for valuation of executory contracts 
has the unique advantage of further refining 
measurements of holding gains and losses. It is 
difficult to recommend capitalization of executory 
contracts, other than leases, on the basis of 
increased usefulness in the ratios studied. At 
the same time, however, the informational value 
of executory contracts dictates that they be 
reported, probably in separate schedules to finan­
cial statements.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A brief survey of accounting literature reveals that 
little attention has been directed to the broad area of 
"executory contracts." This has also been true of particu­
lar types of executory contracts, with the exception of lease 
contracts. The literature and research on leases in recent 
years have been voluminous. Conclusions of this research 
seem to indicate that some (and perhaps all) leases, in 
spite of their executory nature, should be reflected in the 
accounts and financial statements of lessees with correspond 
ing adjustments on the books of lessors. This treatment, 
often referred to as the capitalization theory, appears to 
be gathering substantial authoritative support and was, in 
fact, partially adopted in Accounting Principles Board Opin­
ions No. 5 (September, 1964) and No. 7 (May, 1966) . .
In spite of this support, there seems to be a reluc­
tance on the part of many members of the accounting
2profession to adopt such a treatment without first investi­
gating the nature and importance of other types of executory 
contracts. This reluctance is noted in the comment of 
Walter R. Staub in Accounting Research Study No. 4:
I do not believe that these other contracts can 
be ignored in deciding whether or not to adopt 
the conclusions in the study, since to do so may 
lead to differing accounting practices where the 
same logical considerations appear to be appli­
cable. 1
An investigation of the broad area of executory con­
tracts is necessary in order to (1) decide whether or not 
the theoretical structure used to support capitalization of 
leases is also applicable to other types of executory con­
tracts, and (2) aid in the development of a general theory 
of executory contracts.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study does include an investi­
gation of the capitalization theory of leases and the 
applicability of lease theory to other forms of executory
^Comments of Walter R. Staub included in John H. 
Myers, Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements, Account­
ing Research Study No. 4 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accounts, 1962), p. 68.
contracts. However, the primary purpose is not to substan­
tiate or destroy lease capitalization. Such is to be accom­
plished only as an indirect result of this study. In 
addition, the research conducted on executory contracts to 
date must be summarized and the logical extension of the 
conclusions and results of this research must be pursued.
Assuming executory contracts of types other than 
leases are entered into to a large extent, it is of primary 
importance to consider the usefulness of incorporating these 
contracts in the body of the financial statements. It may 
be possible that improved disclosure in footnotes will be 
adequate recognition of such contracts and a simple solution 
to the problem. If the incorporation of executory contracts 
into the body of financial statements will provide useful, 
relevant financial information to statement readers, a 
theoretical structure must be formulated to serve as a guide 
in the analyzing and reporting of such contracts. In this 
connection it seems evident that a host of measurement 
problems will likewise have to be treated if recording of 
executory contracts is to be implemented.
In its first and broadest objective this research 
seeks to investigate the general nature of executory
contracts in an attempt to get some indication of the extent 
of their use by the modern corporation and, most important, 
to assess their importance to readers of financial state­
ments . The importance of executory contracts should be a 
function of the extent to which such contracts meet the cri­
teria for "accounting information" and the extent to which 
such information qualifies as relevant, useful financial 
data. Further, the objective is not to determine what the 
accounting treatment is, but rather what treatment should 
be accorded executory contracts.
After considering what accounting treatment should 
be given such contracts, a second, and directly related, 
objective of this research must be accomplished. This 
objective is the investigation of the adequacy of current 
accounting theory and practice with respect to executory 
contracts. Since current theory and practice do not provide 
for the recognition of executory contracts, the study must 
consider whether current theory and practice can be modified 
to include such recognition. This involves three phases;
(1) deriving a consistent theoretical foun­
dation which will serve as a basis for 
developing the accounting treatment which
5it is determined should be accorded execu­
tory contracts;
(2) deriving new, different or expanded finan­
cial reporting concepts which will incor­
porate or satisfactorily accomodate executory 
contracts;
(3) determining the adequacy of current or 
available measurement techniques to meet 
the requirements of a newly formulated 
accounting theory and practice for executory 
contracts.
Scope of Study
This study is a theoretical investigation of execu­
tory contracts. Inquiry is made into present theory as 
well as the historical development of this theory. Any 
new, different or expanded theoretical concepts and prin­
ciples necessary to support the treatment deemed most useful 
are developed and presented. In short, there are few, if 
any, limitations on the theoretical investigation.
Furthermore, the rights and obligations of both
parties to the contract are discussed. For example, unless 
otherwise indicated, the discussion is from the point of 
view of both the lessor and lessee under a lease contract, 
the purchaser and seller under a purchase or sales contract, 
the subscriber, as well as the corporation, under a stock 
subscription contract, and so forth.
No extensive empirical research on any particular 
types or forms of executory contracts is undertaken. Some 
thought was given to the possibility of making such an 
inquiry, but after some preliminary research on a few types 
of contracts (purchase commitments and construction con­
tracts) , this approach was abandoned. The main difficulties 
are that:
1. There are a tremendous number of contracts into 
which any corporation enters. Collection of original, 
empirical data on all forms is not possible. After consider 
ing the collection of such data, it did not seem to be 
necessary since such data serve to establish the need for 
considering executory contracts. On the other hand, it may 
be taken for granted that modern-day corporations are 
involved in numerous executory contracts, such as leases, 
purchase commitments, stock options, pensions and similar
contracts— their importance or materiality in terms of dol­
lar value is assumed in this- study.
2. Statistical data on few, if any, of these con­
tracts are available. An attempt was made to obtain statis­
tical data (volume and dollar value of contracts) on purchase 
commitments, with little success, except to establish that
such contracts are common and important. Other writers also
2indicate that this type of data on leases is not available. 
Likewise, just as in the case of leases, any attempt to 
derive an overall estimate of the impact of the capitaliza­
tion of executory contracts must, of necessity, be partially 
deferred until reporting of these items becomes more 
extensive.^
3. Even with a particular type of executory contract, 
for example, purchase commitments, the myriad forms which the 
contract might take or the variety of terms which the con­
tract might include, are limited only by man's ingenuity.
2For example, see A. Tom Nelson, "The Impact of 
Leases on Financial Analysis," Occasional Paper Number 10 
(East Lansing, Michigan: Bureau of Business and Economic
Research, Michigan State University), p. 4.
3Ibid., p. 69.
8A few types of contracts could have been selected for 
detailed study and empirical data might have been collected 
on them. However, to investigate in detail two or three 
types of contracts which would be expected to be material 
in amount would have the same failings as the current litera­
ture on leases with respect to' the objective of development 
of a general theory of executory contracts. Contracts which 
are material in amount are somewhat emphasized in the dis­
cussion and are often used when examples are needed to serve 
as a basis for discussion, but the comments and theory are - 
intended to have general applicability.
Organization of Study
Chapter I serves to introduce the topic briefly and 
to present the scope and limitations of the research. In 
addition, a sketch of the order of presentation and the 
organization of the study is set forth.
Chapter II defines the topic in greater detail and 
orients the reader to the main problems presented by execu­
tory contracts. In addition to defining the problem further, 
a brief historical review is presented which traces the devel­
opment of current principles for handling executory contracts.
9In Chapter III, the main task accomplished is a 
demonstration of the need for the study by bringing the 
problems into sharper focus. Such a need is based pri­
marily upon the conceptual inconsistencies or inadequacies 
of the current treatment. Some examples of recent presenta­
tions of executory contracts in annual reports are included 
to give some indication of the materiality of the items 
involved, as well as the manner of presentation.
Chapter IV examines executory contracts in terms of 
what might be called the basic objectives of accounting. 
These objectives include the objective of financial report­
ing and the basic function which the balance sheet and 
income statement should serve. Directly related to the 
function of financial statements is the determination of 
the criteria which should be used in establishing which 
data should or should not be properly termed accounting 
information. Another basic issue treated in Chapter IV 
is the degree or extent of predictability which should be 
contained in financial statements.
Chapter IV seeks to examine executory contracts in 
light of the ends or objectives which accounting is or 
should be achieving. Chapter V, on the other hand, views
10
executory contracts in terms of the means to be used in 
accomplishing these objectives or ends of accounting. Means 
refers to the various basic concepts or principles which 
should serve as guides to achieving the objectives of finan­
cial accounting. Some of the more extensively treated items 
in this chapter are asset and liability concepts, the accrual 
concept, going concern concept, title transfer principles, 
and objectivity. Chapters IV and V are, in short, an 
attempt to show the place which executory contracts should 
hold in financial accounting theory and to present what 
might be called a financial reporting model which accomo­
dates executory contracts.
Although the theoretical and practical need for pre­
sentation of executory contracts in financial statements may 
be demonstrated, there are still a host of valuation problems 
and difficulties of actual presentation which must be encoun­
tered. This is the subject matter of Chapter VI. Possible 
valuation bases are investigated and, in some cases, their 
application to specific contracts is illustrated. In addi­
tion, the effect of executory contracts on general financial 
statement analysis and traditional ratio analysis is 
presented.
Chapter VII, the final chapter, presents a summary 
of what has been said in the previous chapters and draws 
some general conclusions. Also presented in this chapter 
are recommendations for further research needed before the 
general conclusions can be implemented.
Definition of Subject Matter
Basically, the subject matter of this study is con­
tracts. A contract has been defined as "an agreement 
enforceable by law . . . "  or
. . . a n  agreement (expression of mutual assent) 
between two or more competent persons, having 
for its purpose a legal object, wherein each of 
the persons acts in a certain manner Of promises 
to act or refrain from acting in such a manner.^
As is generally understood, a contract is composed of four
major elements:
(1) An agreement which is made up of an offer 
by one party and acceptance by another 
party.
4
Essel R. Dillavou, Charles G. Howard, William J. 
Robert, and Robert N. Corley, Principles of Business Law 
(eighth edition; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Incorporated, 1967), p. 111.
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(2) Consideration which is the price paid by each 
party to the other or what each party gives 
up in the agreement.
(3) Competent parties which means that the parties 
must possess legal capacity to contract, i.e., 
be of legal age and sane.
(4) A legal object or purpose consistent with law 
and sound policy.
More precisely, concern is with executory contracts. 
An executory contract is one that is yet to be performed or 
one wherein a party binds himself to do, or not to do, a 
particular thing. An executed contract on the other hand is 
one in which nothing remains to be done by either of the 
parties or one in which the object of the agreement is per­
formed and everything that was to be done, according to the 
terms of the contract or agreement, is done.
A contract may be partly executed and partly execu­
tory, and may be executory as to one party and executed as 
to another. In other words, the terms executed and execu­
tory may be used to describe different stages of the same 
contract.
It might be stated that executed contracts are not
13
properly contracts at all, since the parties are no longer
5bound by contractual ties. In a sense then, all contracts 
are executory since when they cease to be executory they 
cease to be contracts. Taking this point of view, the sub­
ject matter might be more properly termed "contractual 
commitments" rather than "executory contracts."
To avoid getting involved in legalistic definitions 
and without quibbling over terminology, the subject matter 
will be labeled contractual commitments or executory con­
tracts, using the terms interchangeably to refer to con­
tracts or agreements under which performance is not complete 
by one or both parties.
^John W. Wyatt and Madie B. Wyatt, Business Law: 
Principles and Cases (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company,
Incorporated, 1958), p. 24.
CHAPTER II
RECENT VIEWS AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF EXECUTORY CONTRACT THEORY
Before examining the adequacy of the current theory 
of executory contracts, it will be helpful to define fur­
ther the main problems presented by executory contracts and 
to review some of the recent opinions of current writers con­
cerning such contracts. In addition, a brief historical 
review of the development of current generally accepted 
accounting principles with respect to executory contracts 
will.be helpful in assessing the adequacy of these current 
principles.
Accounting Research Study No. 4_
As was mentioned previously in Chapter I, many mem­
bers of the accounting profession are hesitant to capitalize 
leases without first considering other types of executory 
contracts. For example, Ira A. Schur, a member of the proj­
ect advisory committee, pointed out in Accounting Research 
Study No. 4:
14
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As a matter of theory, I question whether any such 
departure from established principles of balance- 
sheet preparation should be advocated without 
thoroughly considering (a) the theory of commit­
ments in general and (b) the basic function of the 
balance sheet. These two questions are fundamental 
to the question of leases.1
Other writers are also beginning to compare the simi­
larity of leases to other types of executory contracts. Most
of the opponents of lease capitalization attempt to draw .
parallels between leases and other forms of contractual 
commitments. The objective of such a comparative process 
is to show that it is inconsistent to capitalize leases, 
while at the same time ignoring other contractual commit­
ments which possess the same characteristics as leases. Pro­
fessor Myers recognized this problem in Accounting Research
Study No. 4 as one of the five objections to capitalization 
of long-term leases in financial statements. Myers states:
The third objection seems to be a technical 
accounting one. It takes the form of saying 
that balance sheet treatment of lease commit­
ments should be deferred until we have investi­
gated all other commitments to see if and to
what extent they should be disclosed on the
Comments of Ira A. Schur included in John H. Myers, 
Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements, Accounting 
Research Study No. 4 (New York: American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, 1962), p. 68.'
16
balance sheet. On the contrary, however, improve­
ments must be made and recognized if progress and 
evolution are to take place. Commitments under 
bond contracts have long been recognized as ones 
which should be shown on the balance sheet at 
their present (discounted) value— a value which 
on date of issue is equal to cash proceeds 
received. The finance element of lease contracts 
is but little different from a bond contract to 
the going concern. Other commitments have not 
been investigated to any great extent, but- they 
appear to be different in certain essentials from 
lease contracts.^
Some writers would not agree with Professor Myers 
that “other commitments appear to be different in certain 
essentials." In addition, this conclusion would be diffi- 
'cult for Myers to establish since no substantial research 
has been conducted on these other commitments. It should be 
pointed out that Professor Myers was not charged with such 
an investigation of other commitments, nor does he suggest 
that Accounting Research Study No. 4 is such an investi­
gation .
Extension of Lease Theory
Some authors are in direct conflict with Myers'
2 .John H. Myers, Reporting of Leases in Financial
Statements, Accounting Research Study No. 4 (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1962),
p. 7.
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statement concerning the treatment to be accorded other 
types of contractual commitments. Generally# the argument 
seems to be that if it is acceptable to capitalize the con­
tractual right to used leased property then it must also be
3
acceptable to capitalize other contract rights. Thus, it 
would seem to be valid to capitalize the numerous other 
forms of executory contracts. Following this same line of 
reasoning# Alvin Zises, one often-quoted opponent of lease 
capitalization# makes a convincing case for the similarity 
of leases and contracts to purchase electric power. He con­
cludes that there should be little difference in the disclo­
sure of a firm twenty-five year purchase power agreement and
a firm twenty-five year lease on the generating station which
4
produces the power. Zises concludes that capitalization of 
contractual commitments should be approached with extreme 
caution. The implication is, of course# that the subject 
should, in fact# be approached or investigated— the task to be
Charles G. Walker, "Capitalization of Executory Con­
tracts and Commitments#" Louisiana Certified Public Account­
ants Review (October# 1966), p. 49.
4Alvin Zises, "Disclosure of Long-Term Leases," The 
Journal of Accountancy (February, 1961), p. 43.
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taken up in this dissertation.
Shillinglaw, who favors not only capitalization of 
leases, but also extension of capitalization to other forms 
of contractual commitments, goes a bit further than merely 
citing the problem and suggests (1) some guides for determin­
ing which contracts should and which should not be capitalized, 
and (2) some contracts which should be capitalized. In this 
regard Shillinglaw says that:
. . .  if there is a firm contract, giving each 
party valid, enforceable claims against the other 
and if the contract is of a sufficient length to 
make the dollar equivalent of the claims become 
material, then the contract should be capitalized.^
Applying this principle to specific cases, Shillinglaw dis-
6
cusses certain contracts which might be capitalized. They 
include an agreement whereby an employee, after separation 
from a company, agrees not to compete with the company for a 
given number of years, and also a management employment con­
tract, whereby an executive agrees to serve in a given capac­
ity for a specified period of time. Clearly, Shillinglaw's
^Gordon Shillinglaw, "More on Doubtful Areas in Lease 
Capitalization," National Association of Accountants Bulle­
tin (November, 1962), p. 12.
^Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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ideas extend beyond the current generally accepted- account­
ing principles with respect to executory contracts.
Two very interesting articles have appeared subse­
quent to the issuance of Accounting Research Study No.. 4, 
which advocate capitalization of long-term purchase commit­
ments. The purchase contracts are, however, of different 
types. The most recent of these articles makes a strong 
case for capitalizing long-term purchase commitments for 
raw materials that were entered into in an arms-length 
transaction, e.g., an agreement with an unrelated supplier
to purchase a given quantity of coal or gas, and so forth,
7
at fixed prices.
The other article treats commitments between related 
companies to purchase raw materials, power and transporta­
tion facilities where the purchase contracts are used as
primary security to guarantee large investments by outsiders
8in subsidiary corporations. Again/ a convincing case is
^Raymond C. Lauver, "The Problem of Accounting for 
Leases," The New York Certified Public Accountant (May, 
1964), pp. 342-51.
8Joseph S. Burns, Robert K. Jaedicke and John M. 
Sangster, "Financial Reporting of Purchase Contracts Used 
to Guarantee Large Investments," The. Accounting Review 
(January, 1963), pp. 1-13.
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made for the capitalization of such long-term purchase con­
tracts .
Need for Research on Executory Contracts
The preceding discussion clearly indicates that the 
results and conclusions of Accounting Research Study No. 4 
and Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 5 have some 
applicability to other types of contractual commitments. 
Rather than attempting to handle executory contracts on an 
ad hoc basis, the comments of Meyers, Schur and Staub indi­
cate that a broader investigation of executory contracts 
needs to be conducted. In addition/ the 1966 American 
Accounting Association Committee to Prepare a Basic State­
ment of Accounting Theory seems to have recognized the
Q
problems posed by executory contracts.
Although most of the relevant articles to date have 
been primarily concerned with the problem of lease capitali­
zation, research in the area of executory contracts is 
necessary to satisfy a much broader objective than simply
^Committee to Prepare a Statement of Basic Account­
ing Theory, A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory (Evanston, 
Illinois: American Accounting Association, 1966), pp. 32-33.
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substantiating lease capitalization. Or, as one recent
writer stated:
In the absence of a new accounting theory which 
encompasses the entire area of commitments, the 
capitalization of leases will only add confusion 
to financial statements when the objective of 
change should be clarity. Hopefully the dis­
cussion and controversy generated by the lease 
capitalization proposal will be beneficial to the 
accounting profession. This will be true if it 
leads to a thorough study of the entire area of 
commitments.-^®
Rather, an investigation must be made to see if the profession 
should depart from the legalistic concepts so heavily relied 
on in financial reporting and to determine whether or not 
financial reporting should be extended to include executory 
contracts, at least those which are material enough in 
amount to qualify as relevant financial information.
The possibility of recognition of executory contracts 
questions the very basic purposes of financial statements 
and financial reporting and, in addition, may dictate expan­
sion of basic, generally accepted accounting and reporting 
concepts in use today. Other issues underlying this problem 
are, the degree of predictability which financial statements 
should contain and the advisability of basing accounting
•*-0Lauver, pp. cit., pp. 350-51.
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principles on legal concepts. In addition, the problem 
implies, at a minimum, different or expanded concepts of 
assets and liabilities, a new concept of an accounting 
transaction and extension of the accrual concept.
Historical Review
Anyone attempting to look at executory contracts in 
an historical perspective is immediately confronted with 
several difficulties. In the first place, the first offi­
cial pronouncement of the American Institute.of Accountants 
did not take place until 1939. Hence, one must look to 
the unofficial literature to determine the attitude of pro­
fessional accountants toward executory contracts prior to 
that time. Secondly, research confirms that not very much 
has ever been said about executory contracts, per se. Cer­
tainly, there has never been a very comprehensive, theoreti­
cal statement on executory contracts. Rather, the current 
generally accepted accounting principles, with respect to 
executory contracts, seem to be based upon the traditional 
treatment of a few specific items, most notably, purchase com­
mitments. For this reason, one must'look to the theory of 
handling these specific items in order to trace the thoughts
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leading to the current view of executory contracts.
Sprague, in 1910, in his "Philosophy of Accounts," 
was one of the earlier writers to refer to the place of 
executory contracts in accounting. This reference is con­
tained in his definition of assets:
. . . assets comprising the debit side of a balance 
sheet may be considered in one or more of the fol­
lowing ways: 1.) . . ., 2.) . . ., 3.) as incom­
plete contracts, where of our part has been per­
formed in whole or in part; or contractual assets;'^
Further, Sprague indicates that assets and liabilities arise
out of performance under contract:
Rights always arise from uncompleted contracts. No 
man owes you unless there has been a contract, tacit 
or exprest, oral or written, for you to give him 
• something and for you to give him something. If 
one of you has fulfilled his part of the contract, 
that one has acquired a right and the other has 
incurred an obligation.
Arthur Lowes Dickinson, writing in 1913, expressed 
similar ideas on the concept of performance under contracts.
. However, he was speaking in the context of. liabilities on 
contracts for purchase or sale for future delivery:
■^Charles E. Sprague, The Philosophy of Accounts 
(third edition; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1910),
p . 42.
^2Ibid., p. 41.
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. . . those made at fixed prices for future require­
ments of the business . . . are usually ignored • 
altogether, on the ground that the contracts are 
made in the ordinary course of business and that no 
liability really does arise until the other party 
to the contract performs his part of it; and inas­
much as, until performance, the actual value of the 
corresponding asset may usually be taken as equal 
to the liability value, this treatment is safe. Cir­
cumstances might . . . require the creation of some 
reserve or even justify an' asset value in excess of 
the liability.
Writers in the early 1920's seemed to have a good deal 
more to say about purchase commitments and firm sales commit­
ments than did earlier authors. This increased attention 
may have been due to the general economic conditions leading 
up to the market crash of 1929 and what one writer called an
"inventory crisis" that "permanently influenced accounting 
14practice." Apparently, in this inventory crisis of 1921, 
many merchants had forward contracts for both purchases.and 
sales at prices above the current market. With a decline in 
inventory prices they were compelled to perform on their pur­
chase contracts, while on their balancing sales contracts,
13Arthur Lowes Dickinson, Accounting Practice and Pro­
cedures (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1913), p. 147.
•^George O. May, Financial Accounting: A Distilla­
tion of Experience (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1957),
p. 185.
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their choice was to agree to cancellation or to incur a bad 
debt. Those merchants who had only future purchase commit­
ments were in the same predicament. For example, in the case 
of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company in their May 1, 1921 
balance sheet, a reserve of $24,000,000 was made for losses 
on commitments, in addition to an $18,000,000 reduction in 
inventories from cost to market. In view of the circumstances 
just discussed, it is not surprising that during the early
1920's, most writers were concerned with one aspect of purchase
15
and sales commitments, i.e., losses on such contracts.
Kester suggested that goods under firm sales commit­
ments (purchase commitments) should/ (should not) be included
in the "inventory" of the seller/ (buyer) unless title has 
. 16
passed. However, due to the "importance of purchase com­
mitments from the standpoint of financial position," it is 
necessary that they be given some recognition. Accordingly, 
two methods were recommended for treating purchase commitments:
15For example, see Homer N. Sweet, "Treatment of Com­
mitments of Purchasers, etc., on Certified Balance Sheets,"
The Journal of Accountancy (March, 1921), pp. 167-72.
16Roy B. Kester, Accounting Theory and Practice 
(second edition; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1925),
pp. 145-46.
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(1) footnote-disclosure— which Kester preferred 
because it was “less cumbersome," or
(2) bringing the commitments on to the face of 
the balance sheet by debiting "Goods on 
Order" and crediting “Purchase Commitments" 
for a like amount.
In the case of firm sales commitments, similar treat­
ment was recommended, i.e., footnote disclosure or memoran- 
17
dum record. Kester also points out that large manufac­
turers (for example, U. S. Steel and General Electric Company)
always report "bookings" or unfilled orders" as an essential
18part of their periodic statements.
In the case of goods made to_ order, rather than for
inventory, Kester maintains that the "conditions of profit
taking are changed." In this instance he maintains:
. . . the sale has been made for delivery of the 
product at some future time named or left indefi­
nite. While, of course cancellation is possible 
before date of delivery and acceptance . . .
In the case of purchase commitments, when speaking 
of a "memorandum record," Kester meant bringing an asset and 
liability on to the balance sheet. He is not explicit in the 
case of sales commitments.
18Kester, ojd. cit., pp. 146-47.
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cancellation is not possible without incurrence 
of damages or being held to specific performance.
Under these circumstances it is apparent that, 
within reasonable limits, a portion of the profit 
may be taken up in the current period . . . .
In the case of purchase commitments, Kester's reason­
ing is based upon the lega’l principle of passage of title. 
Likewise, in the case of the sales contract, Kester's reason­
ing is based on the legal position of the selling company, 
who having performed under the contract, is, at a minimum, 
entitled to damages for breach of contract or specific per­
formance. In contrast, profits on goods awaiting delivery 
(which had been manufactured to stock) should not be taken 
up until delivery has been made, because of the common
trade practice of allowing cancellations right up to, and
20even beyond, the shipment date.
Canning is more theoretical than previous writers 
with respect to executory contracts. In his asset defini­
tion, he would exclude from assets
. . . income or services expected to accrue under 
contracts wholly executory and unperformed on 
both sides and under the wholly unperformed portions
19Ibid., pp. 415-16.
20Ibid., pp. 417-18.
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of contracts, provided both sides are equally unper­
formed.2^
22
Likewise, no liability would be reflected in this case. 
Canning then makes reference to wholly unperformed execu­
tory contracts. He indicates that an asset must consist of 
not only "rights" to future incomes or services, but, also, 
"enforceable rights." Even then, however, not all enforce­
able rights are assets,
. . . if with the receipt of each increment of 
service there is a concurrent and equivalent 
obligation to render an offsetting service, ac­
countants omit the receivable income from the . 
list of assets. 22
He illustrates the application of this principle by showing
that under a one-year lease for a building, no asset will
ever appear on the lessee's books (unless rent is paid in
advance) and no asset will ever appear on the lessor's books
for rent (unless rent is due but unpaid).
Canning is careful to distinguish wholly executory
contracts where the services to be rendered, in terms of
21John B. Canning, The Economics of Accountancy (New 
Yorkr The Ronald Press Company, 1929), p. 45.
22Ibid., p. 56.
2^Ibid., p. 18.
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both time and amount of value, are not always equal.
Hence, he states that to omit a favorable purchase commit­
ment from assets is to make a "balance sheet show a finan­
cial position less favorable than that which exists" and to 
omit the effect of this same contract from the balance sheet 
of the supplier "allows him to make an unduly favorable 
showing." He distinguishes another "class" of executory 
contracts, i.e., those involving unequal part performance. 
The most common example of this type contract is one where 
delivery of goods purchased on account, has taken place. 
Assets, liabilities and income would be recognized to the 
extent the performance was unequal.
Canning felt it necessary to refer to purchase com­
mitments later in his discussion of liabilities where he 
indicates that:
. . . signs are not wanting, however, to indicate 
that changes in practice may shortly become general 
that will give more inclusive meanings both to 
assets and to liabilities. Sporadic instances are 
found of balance sheets exhibiting such items 
among the assets as:
24
Ibid., p. 18.
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Purchase commitments not yet
filled 
Less contingent loss at 
prices (date)
$10,000
2,000 $8,000
and among liabilities a corresponding item of:
Purchase commitments $10,000
That is to say, some accountants are beginning to 
list, as assets and as liabilities, the services 
to be had and the services to be performed under 
wholly unperformed contracts. This is. especially 
true where, as above, a substantial loss on the 
order for future delivery seems probable at the 
sate of the balance sheet . . . .  There are great 
possibilities of usefulness in the extension of 
this practice.
In the few years immediately after Canning wrote The 
Economics of Accountancy, little seems to have been said about 
executory contracts, per se. Rather the focus of attention 
seems to have been on probable losses on purchase commit­
ments which were not balanced by enforceable sales commit­
ments. The reason for this emphasis is probably contained 
in the following statement by Montgomery, which refers to an 
apparent second inventory crisis.
On December 31, 1929, to 1931, inclusive, many 
concerns had outstanding commitments to receive 
goods and materials at prices much higher than 
the prices current at those times. As it was
25Ibid., p. 57.
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hoped that the downward price trend would shortly 
be arrested, the apparent loss was not taken up by 
most concerns in their accounts at December 31.^®
Montgomery suggests that part of the responsibility
for failing to take up this loss, rests with the United
States Treasury Department’ which promulgated a ruling that
goods could not be included in the inventory of the buyer
27unless title had passed. This situation apparently led 
Montgomery and others to firmly recommend footnote disclo­
sure and make the often-quoted statement that:
It is not general practice to show future commit­
ments (sales or purchases) in certified balance 
sheets, and until it becomes fairly general, it 
cannot be considered good accounting practice to 
insist upon it, but, 'whenever the information is 
essential to the understanding of a true finan-
 cial position,' (emphasis supplied) it must be
done. ®
What might be dubbed the third "inventory crisis" took 
place in the closing months of 1937 and roused concern of 
the Committee on Stock List of the New York Stock Exchange,
26Robert H. Montgomery, Auditing Theory and Practice 
(fifth edition; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1934),
pp. 379-80.
27
Regulations 77, Article 10.
28°Montgomery, ojd. cit., p. 381.
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which, after conferring with the American Institute of
Accountants Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges,
29issued a letter in January of 1938. The letter, addressed 
to the presidents of listed corporations, emphasized that it 
would be desirable for such corporations to advise their 
stockholders as to whether or not the corporation enters 
into commitments which are material factors in the company's 
financial position. In any instance where material losses 
were anticipated on these commitments, a reserve for such 
losses should be set up or adequate disclosure should be 
made.
This letter was probably the forerunner of Accounting 
Research Bulletin No. 29, issued in July, 1949, on Inven­
tory Pricing which states that:
Accrued net losses on firm purchase commitments for 
goods for inventory, measured in the same way as are 
inventory losses, should, if material, be recognized 
in the accounts and the amounts thereof separately 
disclosed in the income statement.3^
29
For a full text of the letter, see "Purchase Com­
mitments" Notes of the Month, The Journal of Accountancy, 
(February, 1938), pp. 99-101.
30
Accounting Research Bulletin N o . 29 is now Chapter 
4 of Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43 (New York: Ameri­
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1961), p. 34.
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Viewing the preceding discussion, it is not diffi­
cult to understand the origin of the current theory of exe­
cutory contracts. The following statements,, according to 
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 5, describe generally 
accepted accounting principles with respect to executory 
contracts:
The question of whether assets and liabilities 
should be recorded in connection with leases of 
this type is, therefore, part of the larger issue 
of whether the rights and obligations that exist 
under executory contracts in general (e.g., pur­
chase commitments and employment contracts) give 
rise to assets and liabilities which should be 
recorded.
The rights and obligations related to unper­
formed portions of executory contracts are not 
recognized as assets and liabilities in financial 
statements under generally accepted accounting 
principles as presently understood. Generally 
accepted accounting principles require disclosure 
of the rights and obligations under executory con­
tracts in separate schedules or notes to the finan­
cial statements if the omission of this information 
would tend to make the financial statements mis-
O 1
leading.
31Accounting Principles Board, Reporting of Leases in 
Financial Statements of Lessee, Opinion No. 5 (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Septem­
ber, 1965), p. 30. The same statements appear in; Paul 
Grady, The Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Prin­
ciples , Accounting Research Study No. 7 (New York: Ameri­
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1965) , 
p. !74.
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Observations on Historical Development
It is interesting to note that the current treatment 
of executory contracts recommended by the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants is but little different from 
that suggested by early writers as far back as Sprague. In 
this sense, little progress has been made with the concepts 
of executory contracts. Admittedly, although a few writers 
currently suggest it, no "official" pronouncement recom­
mends bringing sales' and/or purchase commitments onto the 
face of the balance sheet. Of course, capitalization of 
leases, as executory contracts, was not recommended by any of 
the early writers, as was pointed out previously. Such 
recognition was a later development, officially sanctioned 
in Accounting Research Bulletin No. 38, published in 1949.
In addition, the theory of executory contracts, both 
past and present, is expressed very much in terms of leases 
and purchase commitments. That this is the'case is further 
supported by the fact that even long-term construction con­
tracts have been discussed historically, in terms of the 
amount of profit to be recognized on them, rather than as 
executory contracts. The only note in connection with
35
construction contracts is that, according to present, as
well as past writers, profit is to be recognized on the
32
basis of performance or the portion completed.
The theory of executory contracts, both past and 
present, is heavily influenced by the legal concepts of per­
formance and title passage. This influence is probably the 
result of attacking specific problem areas rather than 
attempting to solve specific problems by derivation of 
general theoretical solutions. This ad hoc approach is still 
recommended by some writers as a way to solve the problem of 
which executory contracts should be capitalized. In other 
words, it is recommended that accountants look at the more 
important contracts in a vacuum and derive a solution con­
tract by contract, rather than deriving a general theory of 
executory contracts which will be ready for application to 
all contracts as their importance increases.
The main conclusion of this brief review of history 
is that the case of executory contracts is one wherein 
accountants have been faced with the dilemma of having to
32See, for example, Roy B. Kester, Accounting Theory 
and Practice (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1925),
pp. 416-17.
adhere to (or at least there seems to be a compulsion to 
rely on) legal concepts and principles in financial state­
ment presentations. At the same time, it is recognized 
that assets and liabilities exist, in addition to those 
legal, enforceable rights, which are relevant financial 
information and which, as a consequence, must be presented 
to stockholders.
CHAPTER III
ADEQUACY OF CURRENT THEORY OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
The current theory of executory contracts relies 
heavily on the concept of performance under contract. The 
present chapter examines the adequacy of the existing con­
cept of performance as a basis for the recognition or non­
recognition of executory contracts as assets and liabilities. 
It is shown that the generally accepted accounting principles 
for handling executory contracts enunciated in the previous 
chapter are not always applied to the treatment of all exe­
cutory contracts. In addition, subsequent discussions sug­
gest that if the existing concept of performance is to be 
used as the sole theoretical basis for handling executory 
contracts, it must be further explored and related to over­
all objectives of accounting and financial reporting. In 
addition, it seems that the issue of executory contracts 
must be examined in terms of the basic purposes and objec­
tives of accounting, before an adequate theoretical base 
can be developed.
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Corporations1 Use of Contracts
Contracts are made frequently and have become such an 
integral part of the day to day operations of business enter­
prises that one often fail’s to realize when they are made, 
when they are performed and their large numbers. One writer 
has very aptly described the modern day corporation as a 
"bundle of contracts."'*' Accordingly, the activities of any 
"going-concern" are characterized by the innumerable con­
tracts into which the corporation has entered. This bundle 
of contracts includes contracts, both oral and written, for 
the purchase and sale of goods and servicer; contracts for 
the lease of both real and personal property, employment 
contracts, bond contracts, and all the other myriad types 
and varieties of contracts that will be found to be in 
force in any dynamic enterprise. These contracts can cover 
any period ranging from a few short minutes to the entire 
life of the corporation.
Pearson Hunt, Charles M. Williams, and Gordon 
Donaldson, Basic Business Finance; Text and Cases (Home­
wood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, Incorporated, 1961), 
p. 37.
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Accountants1 View of Contracts
From among the wide range of contracts that a cor­
poration customarily becomes a party to, the accountant 
recognizes some, but not others. For example, some con­
tracts are recognized upon execution of the agreement or 
upon entering into the contract. Examples are: the variety
of sales contracts (ranging from a sale on account to con­
ditional sales contracts), bond contracts, stock subscrip­
tion contracts, and contracts for pensions and retirement.
On the other hand, the accountant has ignored other corporate 
contracts which are just as legally binding as those men­
tioned above. Included in this group are some leases, 
employment contracts, long-term construction contracts and 
purchase commitments. These different practices lead to one 
of the primary issues of this study, which is a determina­
tion of the basis or bases for either the recognition or 
nonrecognition by the accountant, of contractual commitments 
or executory contracts.
Classification of Contracts
Why are some contractual commitments recognized while
40
others are not? Is there any logic or consistency to the 
treatment accorded these contracts by the accounting profes­
sion? Just as the auditor would expect consistency in the 
application of principles from one period to the next, so 
also, the theorist has a right to expect consistency in the 
treatment of all executory contracts. One would expect there 
to be a basic theory of executory contracts as a whole, rather 
than simply being satisfied with a different, but consistent 
treatment of particular contracts from one period to 
another.
In an attempt to provide an answer to these and other 
questions and to give some indication of present practice, 
perhaps it would be useful to classify contracts into the 
following categories:
(1) those recognized by the accountant in the 
accounts,
(2) those recognized by the accountant in foot-
i.
notes,
(3) those not recognized by the accountant until 
they cease to be contracts.
Accordingly, the following tabulation is a list of contracts 
which are commonly encountered by business firms. The list
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is obviously not exhaustive and, as might be expected, some 
contracts fall into two categories because they are given 
recognition in both the accounts and footnotes. Bonds are 
an example of this type situation. Some contracts, such as 
leases, fall into all three categories, since sometimes they 
are recognized in the accounts; at other times only in the 
footnotes and most often not at all.
Contracts Recognized in the Accounts
(1) Sales contracts— ranging from an oral sale 
• on account to sales under various types of
conditional sales contracts extending over 
long periods of time.
(2) Short term purchase contracts— i.e., regular 
purchases on account and then only if title 
has legally passed.
(3) Stock subscription contracts.
(4) Pensions.
(5) Contracts for product guarantee.
(6) Some lease contracts— only those that can be 
considered installment purchases.
(7) Bond contracts and other types of negotiable
instruments.
(8) Patents.
Contracts Recognized in Footnotes
(1) Leases.
(2) Some purchase commitments— for inventory, sup­
plies, real estate, and so forth; generally 
only to the extent of stating no material 
loss on such contracts is anticipated.
(3) Various employee benefit contracts— including 
such contracts as annuities, bonuses', deferred 
or contingent compensation, incentive compen­
sation, pensions, profit sharing agreements, 
retirements, stock bonuses, stock options, 
stock purchase plans, and similar type con­
tracts.
(4) Long-term construction contracts— including 
public and government contracts with the 
corporation as either the buyer of construction 
or the contractor.
Contracts Not Recognized in Footnotes or Accounts
(1) Leases— most leases fall into this category.
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(2) Purchase contracts— for investments, inven­
tory, supplies, real estate and other fixed 
assets.
(3) Management employment contracts.
(4) Guaranteed annual wage contracts.
(5) Research and development contracts.
(6) Long-term construction contracts.
(7) Advertising contracts.
(8) Maintenance and service contracts.
Accounting for and Reporting Executory Contracts
It would be well to examine a few contracts from each 
classification to determine if there is a sound theory which 
can be applied to their treatment with any degree of con­
sistency. The sheer number and dollar value of the con­
tractual commitments just listed dictates that a solid 
theoretical and practical basis is necessary for the hand­
ling of these contracts. Prior to such an investigation, 
however, the current accounting principles and reporting 
practices with respect to executory contracts should be set 
forth as a basis for subsequent discussion.
According to the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, executory contracts should be treated 
in accordance with the statement from Opinion No. 5, pre­
viously quoted in Chapter II. In brief, unperformed por­
tions of executory contracts are not recognized as assets 
and liabilities, but disclosure of such contracts in foot­
notes or separate schedules is required if their omission 
would tend to make financial statements misleading..
The SEC position on contractual commitments is, in
substance, the same as that of the American Institute of .
Certified Public Accountants, i.e., it is essentially a
disclosure requirement. S-X Regulations provide in Rule 3.18
(a) If material in amount the pertinent facts rela­
tive to firm commitments for the acquisition of 
permanent investments and fixed assets and for the 
purchase, repurchase, construction or rental of 
assets under long-term leases shall be stated 
briefly in the balance sheet or in footnotes 
referred to therein.3
Other official pronouncements have been made by the
2Accounting Principles Board, Reporting of Leases in 
Financial Statements of Lessee, Opinion No. 5 (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Septem­
ber, 1965), p. 30.
^Code of Federal Regulations, Title 17— Commodity 
and Security Exchanges (Washington: U. S. Government Print­
ing Office, 1967), Part 210— Form and Content of Financial 
Statements, Section 18-A, pp. 136-37.
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American Institute of Certified Public Accountants on parti­
cular types of executory contracts (e.g., pensions and long­
term construction contracts), but, they: (1) are concerned
primarily with revenue and expense recognition, and (2) do 
not set forth principles which are intended to have general 
applicability to executory contracts. Indeed, this is the 
problem in the first place.
The preceding are the "official" rules, guides or 
principles governing the accounting treatment to be accorded 
executory contracts. There are basically two concepts 
involved: (1) performance, and (2) a potentially mislead­
ing effect. The application of these concepts to a few 
selected contractual commitments should be examined.
—  Extent of Performance
Examining the results of applying generally accepted 
accouhting principles to the three categories of contracts 
listed previously yields some interesting results. Appar­
ently, generally accepted accounting principles dictate 
that a corporation should recognize assets and liabilities 
in connection with executory contracts to the extent that 
the corporation under consideration has performed under
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the contract. In other words, the issue is one of extent 
of performance, or in the case of nonperformance, whether 
the omission of the contract would tend to make the state­
ments misleading. Contracts, then, are to be recorded in 
the accounts to the extent-that the parties have performed. 
Some contracts are fully performed in one act, while others 
require several or a series of acts to complete. It would 
seem that if either of the parties to the contract had 
fully performed, while the other party had not performed 
at all, the total contract should be recognized by both par­
ties as an asset and liability.
Sale or Purchase on Account
Presumably, a regular sale on account would give rise 
to an asset because the selling corporation has completely 
performed in delivering the merchandise to the customer. 
Likewise, a regular purchase on account by the same corpora­
tion would give rise to an asset and liability because the 
other selling corporation has performed by delivery. In 
other words, the contract has, in each of the above cases, 
been fully performed by one of the parties. For this reason, 
the contract is recognized in the accounts of both the
parties, in full, as an asset and liability.
In the case of most sales, there is a tendency to 
equate performance with delivery. Two cases can be cited.
The first case concerns an order for a special product, 
placed under contract, where the manufacturer has produced 
a portion of the goods, thereby justifying, according to some 
accountants, the recognition of a portion of the revenue 
under the contract. If such performance by the manufacturer 
gives rise to assets and corresponding revenue, so also, the 
same performance should give rise to corresponding assets and 
corresponding liabilities by the other party to the contract 
(purchaser). However, this does not take place in practice 
because delivery has not taken place and legal title has 
not passed. The extent of performance is, in effect, dif­
ferently recognized and valued by each party.
The second case also assumes an order (contract) is 
received by a manufacturer to sell a product. The order is 
not accompanied by a cash payment. According to generally 
accepted accounting principles, the order is not recorded 
as an asset and corresponding revenue or liability amount 
because the order can generally be cancelled prior to 
delivery. In addition, if the manufacturer has performed
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no service, he has no claim on the cancelling company. In 
terms of information communicated, this policy can be very 
costly. For example, Sears, in their annual report for 
fiscal 1966 had $1.2 billion of merchandise on order and in­
transit. This fact was not’ disclosed in either the finan­
cial statements or its accompanying notes. Certainly, not 
even a material amount of these orders will be cancelled.
One author suggests that the economic event of
obtaining an order or contract constitutes performance which
should be recorded.^ This might be especially true where
the sales effort in connection with the order is substantial
and may, in fact, be the major economic even.t or "critical
event" in the production of income. At one point, this
author states the crux of the matter.
It is true that the selling company has not yet 
performed in a manner to benefit the purchaser 
(except possibly to inform him of the virtues 
of the product being sold), but an economic func­
tion— namely, obtaining an order— has been per­
formed, and this should be recorded.^
^Harold Bierman, Jr., Financial Accounting Theory (New 
York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), p. 169.
Sibid.
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What this writer is calling an economic function, how­
ever, may be performance under an executory contract.
Clearly, the contract involved is not the sales contract 
under discussion, since the performance involved took place 
prior to the formation of the sales contract. Such per­
formance does give rise to legal rights and obligations, 
and may constitute performance: (1) under ah employment
contract between the manufacturer and one of its salesmen, 
or (2) under a security contract between the corporation and 
its stockholders. The sales effort required to acquire the 
order in question might be viewed as performance by the 
corporation under the executory contract between the corp­
oration and its stockholders, whereby the corporation in 
return for invested capital, agrees to carry on certain 
activities in the interest of stockholders.
A Narrow View of Performance
Possibly accountants are taking too narrow a view, 
or have taken what might perhaps be called a "compartment­
alized" view of performance under executory contracts. 
Activities conducted to create one contract can constitute 
performance under another contract. If a very broad approach
is taken and a corporation is viewed as a "bundle of con­
tracts, " probably all activity performed by a corporation 
or its agents can be construed as being performance under 
an executory contract.
Whether or not accountants consider the rights and 
obligations arising as a result' of either the salesman's or 
corporation's performance (in the last example) to be assets 
and liabilities respectively, will, of course, depend upon 
what one considers an asset and liability to be. What con­
stitutes performance in the ordinary or economic sense is 
not necessarily performance in the legal sense, and thus 
may not give rise to a legal claim or asset. This fact 
would have to be determined under the law. The question 
for accountants however, becomes: is accounting concerned
with performance only in the legal sense, i.e., only that 
performance creating legal rights and obligations supported 
by the law, or is accounting also interested in reflecting 
performance in the economic sense of activity which has eco­
nomic value?
Particularly when revenue is involved, accountants 
have long recognized economic performance, in spite of the 
fact that an asset has not been created by legal contract.
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For example, Chapter 4 of Accounting Research Bulletin
No. 43 states:
It is generally recognized that income accrues 
only at the time of sale, and that gains may not 
be anticipated by reflecting assets at their 
current sales prices. For certain articles, how­
ever, exceptions are permissible. Inventories of 
gold and silver, when there is an effective 
government-controlled market at fixed monetary 
value, are ordinarily reflected at selling prices.
A similar treatment is not uncommon for inventories 
representing agricultural, mineral and other prod­
ucts, units of which are interchangeable and have 
an immediate marketability.^
Clearly, the accountant recognizes more than the 
legal facts of transactions. In effect, Accounting Research 
Bulletin No. 43 permits recognition of assets and revenue 
prior to the formation of a sales contract. Production 
prior to sale can hardly be construed as performance under 
a sales contract since technically, a sales contract does 
not yet exist. Such treatment of the above contracts might 
justify, in turn, recording of inventories at selling prices 
when a firm order for the goods or a purchase contract is 
received. Certainly, this procedure could not be objected
6Accounting Research Bulletin N o . 43 (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1961), 
p. 34.
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to on the basis of failure of performance.
Legal Point of View
When considering, performance under executory con­
tracts, it should be noted that a contract is a legal object, 
i.e., it is created under the law. In a sense then, when 
one speaks of executory contracts, he is immediately and 
completely within a legal domain, which in turn invokes or 
brings into play, all the legal concepts and principles of 
rights and obligations under the law. If assets are equated 
with these legal rights, and liabilities are equated with 
these legal obligations, there would seem to be no diffi­
culty in applying legal principles to determine the existence 
of assets and liabilities under executory contracts. In 
other words, assets and liabilities would be created under 
executory contracts when the legal right or obligation was 
created. The valuation of these assets and liabilities 
would, of course, be a separate, independent matter.
Should one then take this approach, it would seem 
that balance sheets would have to be limited to assets and 
liabilities under the law, i.e., the balance sheet would be 
essentially a legal determination. However, it is a
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well-accepted fact that accounting seeks more than this 
legal objective, i.e., by definition it, seeks to communi- . 
cate more than legal information and does not choose to 
ignore the other aspects of financial transactions. The 
equity method of carrying investments in subsidiaries is 
an illustration of this fact.
Capital Stock Subscription Contracts
In the case of capital stock subscriptions, stock is
sold under subscription contracts which require payment by
the subscriber at a later.date. When stock is sold by means
of subscriptions, a person wishing to become a stockholder
signs a subscription blank or a subscription list on which he
subscribes to a certain number of shares and agrees to pay
for the stock, either in one amount or in installments. When
the subscription is accepted by the corporation, it becomes 
7
a contract. Generally, the stock is not issued to the
^In the case of an agreement to take shares, upon 
acceptance of the offer by the corporation, the subscriber 
becomes a shareholder. The shareholder, pursuant to the 
assent of the corporation, is under obligation to pay the 
subscription price of the shares. In contrast, an agree­
ment to subscribe to shares in the future does not in itself 
imply acquisition of corporate membership, and therefore, in 
case of breach of the subscription contract, the corporation,
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subscriber until the subscription contract has been fully- 
paid. Following the traditional treatment, the subscription 
contract is regarded as an asset by the corporation and is 
recorded as a debit to an account, "subscriptions receiv­
able." Accordingly, "subscriptions receivable" is treated, 
as a current asset on financial- statements. Some objection . 
to this procedure is raised, as noted by Montgomery, however,
Q
the support is apparently for treating it as an asset. Such
treatment is due first, to the fact that the "subscriptions
receivable" is a realizable asset but secondly, and probably
more importantly, because subscriptions are recognized as
9assets by the laws of most states. According to current
as a rule, may claim damages, but, may not sue for specific 
performance. See A. B. Levy, Private Corporations and Their 
Control (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1950), pp. 392-93.
®Norman J. Lenhart and Philip L. Defliese, Mont­
gomery 1s Auditing (eighth edition; New York: Ronald Press
Company, 1957), p. 186.
^Walter B. Meigs, Charles E. Johnson and Thomas F. 
Keller, Intermediate Accounting (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Incorporated, 1963), p. 651. See also American 
Jurisprudence Pleading and Practice Forms Annotated (Roches­
ter, New York: The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company,
1959), p. 455, and American Jurisprudence (second edition; 
Rochester, New York: The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing
Company, 1964), p. 813.
theory, this contract is an asset since it represents a legal 
claim against subscribers, and also, because the corporation 
intends to collect the subscriptions within a definite period 
of time.10 If it is not intended that the contract be col­
lected, or if the time of calling for payment is indefinite, 
the subscription is not an asset, according to Hendrikson. 
However,
. . . a valid commitment to invest and a reasonable 
expectation that the amounts will be paid into the 
corporation in due course should be sufficient to 
consider the subscriptions as permanent invest­
ments.
In this connection, two points should be considered: (1) if
accountants were to recognize executory contracts on the 
basis of legal claims or rights, they would recognize many 
more than they do presently, since under all contracts legal 
rights or claims arise, and (2) the generally accepted 
accounting principles of extent of performance and poten­
tially misleading efffect, which were enunciated in Opinion 
No. 5 of the Accounting Principles Board, are not being
•^Eldon S. Hendrikson, Accounting Theory (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Incorporated, 1965), p. 419.
•^Ibid.
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applied to stock subscription contracts. Such a contract 
can be executory as to both parties and still be classified 
as an asset, i.e., neither party has to have performed for 
the subscription contract to be treated as an asset. Like­
wise, as a basis for recognition as an asset, no mention is 
ever made of the potentially misleading effect if the sub­
scription contract is not recorded as an asset or reported 
in footnotes.
If stock subscription contracts were treated in 
accordance with current generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples governing executory contracts, it would seem that if
neither party has performed under the contract, there is
--neither an asset nor a liability on the part-of either party. 
This rule is not applied to stock subscription contracts. 
Rather, according to Hendrikson, the basis used to justify 
a recording becomes one of the existence of a valid or legal 
claim or contract and the expectation or anticipation of
performance under the contract.
Contracts to Invest
The line of reasoning used to justify recording of 
subscription contracts as assets on the books of the issuing
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corporation, suggests that the subscriber, especially where 
the subscriber is another corporation, show an asset and 
corresponding liability for the contract. This treatment 
would also seem to require that commitments to invest in 
other corporations, in forms other than subscription con­
tracts (such as commitments to purchase bonds or advance 
funds under notes), be recognized as assets and correspond­
ing liabilities. No instances of such a practice could be 
found in the 1966 edition of Accounting Trends and Tech­
niques, published by the American Institute of .Certified 
Public Accountants.
-Performance Concept as Developed 
Via Lease Controversy
If leases are examined as executory contracts, or, in 
terms of generally accepted accounting principles for execu­
tory contracts, additional questions are raised concerning 
the nature of performance. It will probably be useful in 
subsequent analysis and discussion, to take the liberty of 
classifying all leases as either "operating" or "financial," 
as was done in Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 7. 
Further, it will be useful to equate financial leases with
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leases which are, in substance, installment purchases and 
thus, should be capitalized according to Accounting Princi­
ples Board Opinion No. 5, and to equate the operating lease 
with leases which are not, in substance, installment pur­
chases.
The capitalization of leases is advocated on at least 
three different bases by several noted authorities. Myers 
incorporates the performance concept under executory con­
tracts into his reasoning and conclusions with respect to 
leases. He is careful to note that in recognizing the 
financial lease in the balance sheet, he is recognizing the 
lease contract only to the extent performance has taken 
place. He considers that the lessor has fully performed in 
making the leased property available for use. The lessee, in
turn, has acquired an asset in the form of the right to use
1 9of the property. On the other hand, Myers does not think 
the lessor has performed simply by making the leased asset 
available in the case of an operating type lease, since he
12John H. Myers, Reporting of Leases in Financial 
Statements, Accounting Research Study No. 4 (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1962), 
pp. 40-41.
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must continue to provide services, such as maintenance,
insurance, property taxes, heat, light, and elevator ser- 
13vice.
Arthur Andersen & Co. however, suggests that the pro­
fession go a bit further than capitalizing only the financial 
type lease:
. . . because the similarity of the rights and 
obligations of the lessee under 'all' (emphasis 
added) leases for property and equipment, irre­
spective of period or purpose it follows that 
there is no logical basis except relative imma­
teriality for omitting any of the lease rights 
and obligations from the balance sheet of the 
lessee. Thus, where in the aggregate the lease 
obligations and the related property rights would 
constitute amounts that were material in relation 
to the financial position of the lessee, they 
should be shown as assets and liabilities in the 
lessee's balance sheet.
As noted, Arthur Andersen & Co. takes the position
that all leases should be capitalized because the lessee
acquires a "valuable asset in the form of the agreed rights
15to use the leased property." Apparently, they see no
•^ I b i d ., p. 5.
■^Arthur Andersen & Co., Accounting and Reporting 
Problems of the Accounting Profession (second edition? 
October, 1962), p. 28. ‘
15Ibid., p. 27.
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distinction in the extent of performance under the financial
1 6versus operating type lease as does Myers.
In Opinion No. 5, only leases in which a material 
equity exists/ i.e., those which are, in substance, install­
ment purchases, whould be reflected as assets and liabilities 
in financial statements of lessees. Leases which convey 
merely the right to use property, without an equity accruing
to the lessee, are executory contracts, i.e., the lessor has
17not performed by delivery of the leased asset. In con­
trast, leases which are, in substance, installment purchases 
should be capitalized because a material equity has accrued 
to the lessee. It should be noted that lack of performance 
under an executory contract is used as the theoretical basis 
for arguing that the operating type lease should not be capi­
talized. On the other hand, this same theoretical basis is 
not explicitly used to support capitalization of the 
financial type lease. It seems evident that had the Account­
ing Principles Board attempted to support its decision not
l^Ibid., p. 30.
Opinion No. 5, "Reporting of Leases in Financial 
Statements of the Lessee," American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (September, 1964), p. 30.
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to capitalize some leases, on the basis that they are execu­
tory contracts, it would have been confronted'with the knotty
issue of determining just what constitutes performance under
18
an executory contract. Such an approach would also seem 
to require a demonstration that (in spite of the fact that 
under all leases the leased property is always made com­
pletely available to the lessee) under some leases per­
formance has been completed by delivery, while under others 
it has not.
The preceding comments on leases suggest that the 
performance concept, under present generally accepted account­
ing principles with respect to executory contracts, has not 
been utilized in any substantial way to support the recog­
nition or non-recognition of leases as assets and liabili­
ties. The various treatments suggested for leases do not 
seem to rest upon well-formulated, comprehensive concepts 
for dealing with executory contracts. Rather than con­
sistently applying current generally accepted accounting 
principles for executory contracts to support or destroy the
18
James E. Hellier, "Reporting of Leases" in Letters 
to the Journal, The Journal of Accountancy (May, 1965), 
p. 25.
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capitalization of lease contracts, various other principles 
have been employed in both official pronouncements and other 
current literature.
Extension of Lease Principles to 
Other Executory Contracts
Another important conceptual problem is raised, if one 
attempts to extend the "theory of executory contracts" con­
tained in the discussion of leases just presented. In the 
case of leases, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 5 
allows a deviation from generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples, with respect to executory contracts:
On the other hand some lease agreements are essen­
tially equivalent to installment purchases of 
property. In such cases the substance of the 
arrangement rather than the legal form should 
determine the accounting treatment . . .
The principle stated here, that the "substance," 
rather than legal form of contracts should be controlling, 
has application to other types of executory contracts. For 
example, one recent article shows that long-term purchase 
contracts are being used to achieve the same purpose as a
■^Accounting Principles Board, pp. cit., p. 30.
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bond issue, but which, according to current practice are not
20reflected m  financial statements. The following example
will serve to illustrate the point.
In 1957, Time Inc. and Crown Zellerbach Corporation 
jointly formed the St. Francisville Paper Company to 
build and operate a groundwood pulp and paper mill 
in St. Francisville, Louisiana. This operation is 
financed with an investment by both Time and Crown 
and by first mortgage bonds sold to outside invest­
ors. Time and Crown each own 50% of the stock and 
the investment of each company is about $7 million.
The first mortgage bonds issued by St. Francisville 
amount to about $17 million. Time and Crown report 
their investment on a non-consolidated basis.
As security for the bonds, Time and Crown have 
executed long-term purchase contracts whereby each 
company is obligated to purchase paper produced 
during 50% of the total available operating time 
of the paper machines . . . .
. . . these purchase contracts are . . . gene­
rally in effect for a specified period ending not 
-earlier than the maturity date of the bonds and 
. . . the contracts are not subject to termination 
without the consent of the lenders. Also, the high 
credit companies (Time and Crown Zellerbach) waive 
any rights to claim damages or terminate the con­
tract because of the borrower's (St. Francisville) 
default.21
The point to be noted is that recording the substance
^Ojoseph s. Burns, Robert K. Jaedicke and John M. 
Sangster, "Financial Reporting of Purchase Contracts Used 
to Guarantee Large Investments," The Accounting Review 
(January, 1963), p. 1. The material in parentheses has been 
added for purposes of clarity.
21Ibid., p. 3.
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of transactions would have extremely wide application not 
only to executory contracts, but to all accounting trans­
actions, and that a principle such as this should be adopted 
cautiously. The substance of the contract described above 
is that Time and Crown Zellerbach have a firm obligation to 
make periodic payments to St. Francisville, which in no way 
are dependent upon additional performance by St. Francisville. 
Whether St. Francisville produces or not, the payments must 
be made to guarantee that St. Francisville will be able to 
service the $17 million debt.
In addition, this analysis points to the question of 
whether or not executory contracts, such as, purchase commit­
ments are, or can be considered to be assets and liabilities 
in financial statements. The writers in the above article 
think purchase commitments are similar enough to debt to 
justify their capitalization.
Are Purchase Commitments Assets According to 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles?
Consider long-term purchase commitments which are not 
recorded presumable because the supplier has not performed 
or delivered merchandise, and hence, no asset or liability
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has been created. Generally accepted accounting principles
allow the recording of losses on these contracts, according
to Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43.
Accrued net losses on firm purchase commitments 
for goods for inventory, measured in the same way 
as are inventory losses, should, if material, be 
recognized in the accounts and the amounts thereof 
separately disclosed in financial statements.22
It is an unenviable position where one will consent to recog­
nize losses on assets when he will not admit the existence 
of those assets in the same financial statements. Perhaps 
one can say that in the case of purchase commitments, as in 
the case of other forms of contractual commitments, the issue 
of performance was pushed into the background or ignored in 
-favor of other bases of recording. This procedure can be 
tolerated if one admits the existence of an asset in the form 
of a contract right to be recorded, but then, innumerable 
contract rights would have to be capitalized. The procedure 
of recording losses on purchase commitments would seem to 
be more reasonable, if one admits the- commitments are assets 
and liabilities in the form of contract rights and obliga­
tions— but then, innumerable other contract rights and
2^Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43^  (New York: Amer­
ican Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1961), p. 34.
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obligations would have to be recognized in a similar man- 
23ner. J
Possible Ways to View the Concept of Performance
A comprehensive statement has never been made.regard­
ing the concept of performance under executory contracts.
It would seem that if this concept is to serve as a founda­
tion for the accounting treatment of executory contract, it 
will require a more detailed study and analysis.
There are all sorts of questions which can be posed 
regarding this concept. For example, if one is inclined to 
agree that under the financial lease substantial performance 
--has taken place, whereas, under the operating lease, sub­
stantial performance has not taken place, what is the extent 
of difference in performance? Professor Myers is the only 
writer who even attempts to answer this question. In his 
view, due to the fact that the additional services, such as 
maintenance, insurance and the like, have to be rendered on 
a continuing basis, substantial performance has not taken
23por example, see Alfred Rappaport, "Lease Capitali­
zation and the Transaction Concept," The Accounting Review 
(April, 1965), p. 375.
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place, i.e., the contract is executory. This is an arguable 
point of view. Whether one is speaking of a building (under 
a financial type lease), or an automobile, computer or other 
equipment (under the operating type lease), delivery of the 
leased asset does seem to be a substantial part of perform­
ance, while the additional services can be of rather minor 
importance in many cases.
Consider another case. For example, it is not uncom­
mon for the entire production of an oil or gas well for 
twenty years or thirty years or so, to be sold under purchase 
contracts at fixed prices, or prices determined by specified 
indices. In this type situation, the purchaser's pipe lines 
are attached to the well. The only additional performance 
required by the seller is that he turn on the valve to let 
the oil or gas flow. The only reason the purchaser does not 
use the entire production of the well in one period is prob­
ably because the oil is not needed. If the purchaser was 
in a position to need the entire production of the well in 
a single period, his demand would be met by a simple turn 
of the valve.
Examining the question further, it might be argued
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that under a purchase commitment for say, manufactured 
goods, all inventory has not been delivered, and therefore 
is not available for use .^  Several points can be raised. 
First, perhaps the most significant aspect of performance is 
not the delivery of assets, but rather, that aspect which 
gives rise to assets and liabilities whether they be legal 
or economic, i.e., that aspect of performance which gives 
rise to the right of delivery, or obligation to discharge 
liabilities.
Secondly, one cannot use or derive all the economic 
benefits to be received ,under a long-term lease contract in 
the current period— only so much economic benefit can be had 
from the lease or only so much economic benefit can be 
drained from the property during any time period. Likewise, 
in the current period, a firm may not need all the inventory 
it is committed to purchase under a long-term contract.
Thus, availability of the asset service beyond that needed 
for current operations, may not be necessary to receive, 
practically speaking, the full benefit of the asset during
^According to Accounting Principles Board Opinion 
No. 5, neither "availability for use" nor "right to use" 
alone can create assets and liabilities.
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the current period. If performance is thought of as 
delivery of the economic service potentials (assets) of the 
contract, such performance need not be complete in order to 
receive the full benefit of the contract needed during the 
current period. Thus, the fact that the total economic 
service potentials purchased under a particular contract are 
not available for use during the current period, may not 
be a compelling reason for not capitalizing the contract.
A third point is that performance, in and of itself, 
does not give rise to assets. One can perform under a con­
tract and if the result of that performance, or if what is 
received in exchange for that performance has no future 
~ economic value or service potential ho the given party, no 
asset has ensued or has been acquired. At the same time, 
however, while performance need not necessarily produce an 
asset, perhaps an asset cannot be received without perform­
ance.
Performance is simply activity or inactivity in 
accordance with a contract which may give rise to rights 
(assets) in a legal sense, but not necessarily in an eco­
nomic sense. Whether or not an asset results from perform­
ance depends upon the definition of an asset. This point is
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treated in a later chapter.
The last point to be noted in this section is that 
the concept of performance, as most other concepts, has sev­
eral dimensions. There are all sorts of qualifying adjectives 
which can be used— physical performance, economic performance, 
legal performance, substantial performance. Also, perform­
ance would even seem to have a time dimension. One might 
even attempt to apply a sort of critical event concept to 
performance. Accountants seem to have focused essentially 
on the legal aspects of performance, or at least one may 
infer that their operational definition is essentially legal.
The Major Problem
The concept of performance does not seem to lead to 
any broader purpose or objective. If this concept is to be 
used, it must be further explored and related to the object­
ives of accounting. Any accounting theory for executory con­
tracts should directly relate to the function and purpose of 
accounting, rather than leading simply to a legal concept, 
wherein, extent of performance is a guide to achieving the 
objective of determination of damages,to be awarded for 
breach of contract, and to settle contractual disputes, i.e.,
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to determine the dollar amount of legal liability. Account­
ants should not conform their reporting function to such a 
purpose or report so as to facilitate such an objective.
The major problem present in the current theory of executory 
contracts is the same as- the problem present in major por­
tions of current accounting theory. Bedford described it in 
this fashion:
The organized discipline does not present a uni­
form consistent pattern of thought throughout its 
theory. In fact/ theoretical expressions that are 
contradictory and inconsistent are more typical of 
accounting theory than supporting and consistent 
utterances. Varying conditions, interests and 
beliefs have resulted in a number of variations 
in the theoretical conditions and environment 
from which each theory was d e v e l o p e d . 25
— The preceding discussion of conceptual difficulties 
demonstrates that very important point that if used alone, 
the performance concept, as presently defined and under­
stood, may be an inadequate theoretical basis for the treat­
ment of executory contracts. Considering these difficulties 
and Bedford's comments above, it appears a broad approach is 
required. Executory contracts must be examined in light of
^Norton Bedford, Income Determination Theory: An
Accounting Framework (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, Incorporated, 1965), p. 4.
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whether or not an executory contract represents a trans­
action in the technical accounting sense, and therefore, an 
event which should be recorded. It must be determined 
whether or not the signing of a contract prior to legal 
performance gives rise to assets and liabilities, and whe­
ther or not such an event is relevant financial information 
worthy of being reported.
Framework for Subsequent Discussion
On the basis of the.preceding discussion, it might be 
stated that generally accepted accounting principles, with 
respect to leases and other executory contracts, have been 
studied in a vacuum. The solution to the executory con­
tract problem lies in a determination of whether or not 
rights and obligations arising under executory contracts 
give rise to assets and liabilities. It is submitted that 
whether such rights arid obligations can be considered assets 
and liabilities, respectively, is a definitional problem, 
i.e., it depends upon the definition of assets and liabili­
ties. The conception of assets and liabilities on the other 
hand, is, or should be, dependent upon what the accountant 
is attempting to achieve with his financial statement
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presentations.
What accountants are attempting to achieve with 
financial statements is based upon the overall objectives 
of accounting, and the principles deemed necessary to accom­
plish those objectives. Afty well formulated, long-standing 
solution must fit into this broad theoretical framework. 
Thus, the relationship of executory contracts to the objec­
tives of accounting and the means or principles used to 
accomplish those objectives, will be the subject matter of 
the next two chapters.
CHAPTER IV
OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING MODEL
Chapters IV and V consist of a discussion of a finan­
cial reporting model, which can be used to accomodate the 
needs of users of published financial statements. The 
model presented in these two chapters is basically a combi­
nation of the 1966 AAA Statement of Basic Accounting Theory
1
and Accounting Research Study No. 3 by Sprouse and Moonitz. 
The AAA Statement supplies the overall objectives of 
accounting while, Accounting Research Study No. 3 supplies 
-the operational definitions or concepts needed to achieve 
these objectives. These two statements are modified to form 
an integrated financial reporting model designed to include
^Committee to Prepare a Statement of Basic Accounting 
Theory, A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory (Evanston, 
Illinois: American Accounting Association, 1966), p. 100.
Robert T. Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz, A Tentative Set of 
Broad Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises, Account­
ing Research Study No. 3 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 1962), p. 87. The first 
reference will be referred to as the “AAA Statement" in the 
remainder of this study.
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executory contracts. This chapter can be viewed as a pre­
sentation of the objectives of accounting and financial 
reporting, along with a discussion of several executory con­
tracts which show their relationship to these objectives. 
Chapter V supplies the remaining elements of the model— the 
theoretical means (operational definitions of assets, lia­
bilities and the like) which should be used to accomplish 
these objectives. As integrated in the next two chapters, 
the above-mentioned statements constitute a theoretical frame­
work or model which may be utilized in satisfying, or coping 
with the executory contracts issue.
Objectives of Accounting
A sound approach to theory requires that the objec­
tives of accounting must first be defined. Devine agrees 
wholeheartedly that when any attempt is made to construct a 
theoretical system for any function, especially a service
function, it is necessary to establish the purposes and
2
objectives of that function. However, he further notes
2Carl T. Devine, "Research Methodology in Accounting 
Theory Formation," The Accounting Review (July, 1960), 
p. 399.
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that objectives and purposes "shift through time, but for
3
any period they must be specified." Such specification
yields a logical framework which permits one to "investigate
and conduct research in terms of carefully constructed 
4objectives." Thus, before determining the proper treatment 
which should be accorded executory contracts, the objectives 
of accounting must first be established.
\fJhen the generally accepted accounting principles 
currently governing the treatment of executory contracts 
were first established, perhaps, in terms of the objectives 
of accounting conceived at that time, reporting of executory 
contracts was not necessary to accomplish these objectives.
It will be recalled from Chapter II that the current theory 
of executory contracts was derived almost totally from the 
treatment suggested for purchase commitments and leases by 
such writers as Canning, Sprague, Kester and Montgomery 
during the 1920's and 1930's.
Executory contracts may not have been within the domain 
of accounting in the past, but such may no longer be the case.
3Ibid.
^Ibid.
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Rather, there seems to be nothing inherent which dictates 
that they be excluded from consideration in the accounting 
discipline. In addition, it might be said that the previous 
chapters suggest there is a pressing need to consider the 
place of executory contracts in the accounting information 
system. In this respect, it should be noted that one of 
the primary concerns of this study is to establish the place 
of executory contracts in financial accounting. Therefore, 
when the objectives of accounting in general are sought, it 
should be borne in mind that the objectives of financial 
accounting (as opposed to managerial accounting, cost account­
ing, auditing, and the like) are being sought.
The Nature of Accounting
Perhaps the broadest and most recent approach to 
accounting was that taken by the Committee to Prepare a 
Statement of Basic Accounting Theory of the American Account­
ing Association:
The committee defines accounting as the process of 
identifying, measuring, and communicating economic 
information to permit informed judgments and deci­
sions by users of the information.5
^AAA Statement, op.. cit., p. 1.
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One committee member subsequently interpreted this defini­
tion to mean that the accounting discipline is “essentially,
an information system— a process for developing and trans-
6
m i t t m g  information." Accounting is conceived of "as a
part of the general information system of an operative entity
and as part of a basic field bounded by the concept of infor- 
7
mation." This casts accounting in a newer and broader role 
which dictates a broader theoretical structure which will 
enable accounting to "measure and communicate data on past, 
present and prospective activities of all types in order to
8
improve control methods and decision-making at all levels."
The AAA Statement takes a deductive approach that is 
in direct contrast to both the approach of Paton and Little­
ton, who sought the "weaving together (of) current practices
into a coherent whole, and Grady's method of inventorying
9
practices and then justifying them." This deductive
g
Norton Bedford, "The Nature of Future Accounting 
Theory," The Accounting Review (January, 1967), p. 82.
^Ibid., p. 83.
®Ibid., p. 84.
Q
Robert R. Sterling, "Statement of Basic Accounting 
Theory: A Review Article," Journal of Accounting Research
(Spring, 1967), p. 96.
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approach also differs from the AICPA ' s former method of 
treating only controversial issues as they arose in practice. 
In fact, the emphasis in this chapter and the next is on two 
deductive statements: the AAA Statement and Accounting 
Research Study No. 3. Accordingly, these two chapters take 
the point of view of attempting to establish what accounting 
treatment should be accorded executory contracts, rather than 
what treatment is. presently accorded these contracts.
The preceding description of accounting reflects the 
recent idea that accounting encompasses more than what 
might be called the traditional areas of accounting (i.e., 
financial, managerial, auditing, and so forth). The account­
ing discipline should be expanded to take on the numerous 
social objectives of the modern corporation. If the corpo­
ration is recognized as having these social obligations or 
objectives, such recognition dictates that the informational 
needs required to accomplish these objectives must be assumed 
by accounting. In other words, since the modern corporation 
is conceived of as having multiple and diversified goals, in 
addition to income generation, accounting must respond, in 
terms of increased information, to this expansion of goals. 
Such additional goals include: stabilization of employment,
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advances in productivity, contributions to general economic 
growth, innovation, and enlargement of public services. The 
expanded theoretical and informational frameworks required of 
accounting to accomodate these social objectives are begin­
ning to appear in the literature."^ However, this study is 
not interested directly in this expanded social framework of 
accounting. These expanded social objectives are mentioned 
only because of the potential importance of executory contract 
data in accomplishing these objectives by expanding the range 
of data reported. Rather, the areas of concern are limited 
to those of financial accounting in this study. In short, 
no attempt is made to relate executory contracts to the 
-expanded social concept of accounting.
Objective of Financial Accounting or 
Financial Reporting
Several writers have charged that, in spite of the 
fact that financial accounting or financial reporting is 
generally recognized as providing a service, little attention
■^See for example, Thomas R. Prince, Extension of the 
Boundaries of Accounting Theory (Burlingame, California: 
Southwestern Publishing Co., 1963), p. 213.
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or research has been directed to investigating what the
nature of this service is, or should be. In short, what are
or what should be the objectives of financial reporting.
According to Rappaport, attempts to answer this question in
the accounting literature have two primary deficiencies:
(1) they are presented in such vague terms that
little or no direction is offered to the further
development of a system of theory or (2) they are 
presented in more specific terms, but the under­
lying criteria and rationale for the stated objec­
tives are not apparent .-L-*-
Furthermore, Rappaport points out that the urgent need to
establish these objectives is demonstrated by the current
research attempts of the AICPA and the accounting profession
as a whole, to formulate acceptable statements of accounting
12postulates and principles.
Recent research has begun, however, to lay the founda­
tion for a broader and more explicit presentation of finan­
cial reporting objectives. In fact, Rappaport is helpful 
in bridging the gap between the social objective of
■^Alfred Rappaport, "Establishing Objectives for Pub­
lished Corporate Accounting Reports," The Accounting Review 
(October, 1964), p. 952.
12Ibid., p. 962.
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accounting mentioned earlier and the objective of financial 
reporting. He proceeds by examining the "relationship be­
tween the corporation and the fundamental ideals or values 
of society" which should afford "the accounting profession
a framework for selecting both an appropriate audience and
13an improved concept of information." Accordingly, four 
basic objectives for external reporting are suggested by 
the examination of social values:
(1) The managements of large business corporations 
have a reporting obligation to those segments of 
society affected by their decisions, i.e. investors, 
employees, consumers, suppliers, local communities, 
and the public at large.
(2) Those groups with a legitimate interest in the 
corporation should be provided with information
-essential to arriving at rational judgements con­
cerning the equitable sharing of corporate benefits.
(3) In the interest of economic progress, those 
groups which are responsible for allocating resour­
ces in our economy should be provided with informa­
tion which will promote efficient allocation.
(4) In the interest of sustaining our basic values, 
information which is likely to influence socially 
desirable behavior and discourage undesirable be­
havior should be reported; e.g. calling attention 
to monopoly profits to preserve pluralism in the 
industrial sector of our economy.-*-4
13Ibid., p. 953.
14Ibid., p. 958.
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As mentioned by its author, the above is only one 
particular formulation of financial reporting objectives. 
Other alternative interpretations should prompt an authori­
tative statement by the AICPA or AAA on corporate reporting 
objectives.
Although the preceding is excellent and a refreshing 
discussion of the objectives of accounting, it is largely 
unexplored to date. For that reason, a more traditional 
framework of objectives is adopted in this paper. Hendrikson 
puts forth these objectives of financial accounting as well 
as anyone to date:
1. Financial accounting should provide the rele­
vant information necessary for the making of eco­
nomic decisions by persons or entities outside of 
the reporting enterprise or entity. These inter­
ested parties include primarily stockholders, other 
investors, and creditors: secondarily, they
include employees, customers and the public. The 
government is also an interested party, but gener­
ally it does not rely only on the published finan­
cial statements; it requires that the usual state­
ments be supplemented by special reports for 
specified purposes.
2. The information presented should be directed 
toward aiding in making the following types of 
decisions: (a) investment decisions including the
purchase and sale of stock or other ownership shares;
(b) decisions requiring an evaluation of the effi­
ciency of management by the stockholders and others;
(c) financial decisions requiring an estimate of the
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ability of the enterprise to pay current or future 
debts as they mature; and (d) decisions regarding 
the fairness of resource allocation.
3. For use in making the above decisions, account­
ing should provide the relevant information that 
can be expressed in financial terms and other infor­
mation that is necessary for a proper interpretation 
of the financial data. The objective of 'fairness' 
is relevant in this presentation.
These objectives answer the questions (1) to whom 
is financial accounting directed; (2) for what pur­
poses are accounting statements prepared; and
(3) what types of information should be included 
in accounting r e p o r t s .
Users Must Be Identified
The objectives of financial reporting emphasize pro­
viding information relevant to the user. If broad general 
statements are permitted, it might be said that the basic 
objective of financial reporting is to communicate to the 
interested user, those elements of economic or financial 
information vital to his purpose or necessary to his deci­
sion. To recognize the needs of the user as being the 
controlling factor in financial reporting (and there 
seems to be a consensus that this is the approach which
l^Eldon S. Hendrikson, Accounting- Theory (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Incorporated, 1965), p. 82.
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should be taken) is one thing, but to identify the users and 
to determine their informational needs may be quite another 
matter. Both Rappaport and Hendrikson have shown apprecia­
tion for this problem and have attempted to specify users 
and their needs. Moonitz,’ recognizing the potential of a 
user-oriented approach, warns that:
. . . anyone who stresses 'usefulness1 as a cri­
terion, in accounting or elsewhere, must answer 
the two pointed question— useful to whom and for 
what purpose? And herein lies the danger. We 
could easily be trapped into defining accounting 
and formulating its postulates, principles and 
rules in terms of some special interest, such as 
the business community, or the regulatory' agencies, 
or investors, or tax collectors.16
It is not difficult to determine who uses external financial 
reports, since almost every source which discusses the objec­
tive of financial reporting, lists the users. For example, 
the following is as good a list as can be found in the 
current literature: present and potential investors, credi­
tors, employees, stock exchanges, governmental units, cus­
tomers, security analysts, .trade association, credit rating 
bureaus, trade union officers, regulatory commissions, tax
l^Maurice Moonitz, The Basic Postulates of Accounting, 
Accounting Research Study No. 1 (New York: American Insti­
tute of Certified Public Accountants, 1961), p. 4.
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17authorities, and representatives of all these users.
Needs of Users
/'
Once users have been identified, the crucial questions
are: what decisions do these various parties make, and what
information will best enable them to make these decisions?
The needs of the user should be the controlling factor but
all users do not need the same information and accounting
18
cannot report all information. As some have pointed out, 
accountants have not sought to satisfy specific purposes or 
needs of users. Rather, various users (stockholders, credi­
tors, employees, and so forth) have been offered general 
purpose statements designed to satisfy very generalized 
needs
Devine offers three alternatives to the problem of 
determining what information should be presented in the
l^AAA Statement, op. cit., pp. 20-21.
18Devine, pp. cit., pp. 17-21.
19Davxd Solomons, "Discussion Comments: Measurement
in Accounting: Scope and Setting," in Robert K. Jaedicke,
Yuji Ijiri and Oswald Nielson (editors), Research in Account­
ing Measurement, American Accounting Association, Collected 
Papers, 1966, p. 62.
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20 . external reports. First, a “smorgasbord of information"
could be presented which would allow the reader to make his 
own selection of relevant data. Second, the accountant 
could "search for and weigh recurring patterns" of needs, and 
employ the results as guides for selecting and reporting 
information. A third alternative is to embark upon an edu­
cational program designed to educate users to the use of 
information in different decision contexts. There seems to 
be a consensus that the profession will proceed according to 
the second alternative. Devine seems to favor the second 
alternative, while others comment that this is, indeed, the 
approach the profession is currently taking.2^
Also, Vatter indicates that alternatives one and
22three might not be very desirable. He charges that few 
people who receive published financial reports are well 
enough informed to be able to select relevant information
20Devine, ojd. cit., p. 19.
21Solomons, ojd. cit., p. 62.
22William J. Vatter, "Obstacles to the Specification 
of Accounting Principles," in Robert K. Jaedicke, Yuji Ijiri 
and Oswald Nielson (editors), Research in Accounting Measure­
ment, American Accounting Association, Collected Papers,
1966, pp. 77-78.
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and that attempts to educate users will be very difficult.
It seems that readers do not even understand what might be
23
considered basic data. Vatter cites a study sponsored 
by the Financial Executives Research Foundation which 
indicates that 90% of the stockholders were unable to give 
even a partial definition of some elementary terms (e.g., 
Funded Debt, Cash-flow, Paid-in-surplus). More than half
could not define such terms as Working Capital, Deprecia-
. . 24
tion, Subsidiary, or Assets. Thus, it seems the accountant
is in the position of specifying what information is useful
to users.
The AAA Statement has put forth standards by which to 
-evaluate potential accounting information, or rules for jud­
ging the usefulness of accounting information. In the view 
of the authors of the AAA Statement, the utility of account­
ing information Mlies in its ability to reduce uncertainty
25
about the actual state of affairs of concern to the user." 
Adherence to the standards of relevance, verifiability,
2  *3*JAAA Statement, op,, cit., p. 4, supports these con­
clusions.
2 4 Vatter, pp. cit., p. 78.
2 RAAA Statement, op. cit., p. 8.
freedom from bias, and quantifiability should substantially
reduce this uncertainty, and thereby serve or "constitute a
basis for inclusion or exclusion of data as accounting infor- 
26illation." These standards are to be the basis for inclu­
sion or exclusion of executory contract data. Executory 
contract data which does not meet these standards are unac­
ceptable accounting information. In contrast, executory . 
contract data which meet these criteria must be considered 
for reporting.
Executory Contract Data Meet Standards
In a chapter on "Accounting Information for External 
-Users," the Committee to Prepare-a Statement of Basic Account­
ing Theory takes the point of view that executory contracts 
present one of the currently troublesome problems in account­
ing, and proceeds to make some rather specific recommendation. 
It is apparent in the following quotation, that at least some 
executory contracts meet the standards for accounting infor­
mation to the satisfaction of the authors of the AAA Statement
II. Executory contracts. Accounting at present
recognizes most market transactions involving 
goods, services, or money as one of the elements
26Ibid.
of the transaction. Present accounting also 
generally ignores, except in special circumstan­
ces, transactions involving an exchange of a 
promise for a promise. Leases, purchase commit­
ments, executive and other-labor contracts are 
generally denied recognition until the services 
or goods specified in the contract are either used, 
delivered, or paid for.
Many of these contracts meet the standards of veri­
fiability, freedom from bias, and quantifiability 
at least as well as other reported events.
Generally a contract specifies amounts that allow 
verification and quantification. For contracts of 
long duration, a valuation problem in terms of 
present values exists, but this problem is no 
greater than in other problems involving accounting 
judgment, such as estimation of collectibility of 
receivables. These contracts also do not appear- 
to contain any biases. The only reason for exclu­
sion, where the other standards are met, must be 
based on relevance. The committee feels that short­
term contracts or contracts that are essentially 
renewed periodically in equal amounts may justi­
fiably be ignored on the grounds that information 
about such commitments does not possess sufficient 
relevance to justify inclusion in accounting 
reports. Perhaps a better way of stating the above 
conclusions is that in such cases deferring recog­
nition of such events until the services or goods 
are used or delivered does not do much harm. This, 
however, cannot be said about contracts extending 
over long periods that are material or that are 
not repetitive. Information about such contracts 
is clearly relevant to a host of decisions invol­
ving stewardship, changes in management, credit 
extension, and investment decisions. Recording of 
these events would also result in greater uniform­
ity of reporting essentially similar events where 
the only difference lies in the form of obligation 
assumed. Therefore, the committee recommends the 
reporting of all long-term leases, material and
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non-repetitive purchase commitments, pension plans, 
and executive compensation contracts including 
stock options or deferred payments and the like 
in dollar terms in the regular framework of the 
statements.
This does not imply that all useful accounting 
information must be incorporated in the double­
entry structure; at the same time, maximizing what 
is recorded in that system is a useful means of 
avoiding errors of omission in reporting of rele­
vant information.27
This rather unique statement by the AAA committee on 
executory contracts represents a significant departure from 
the generally accepted accounting principles discussed in 
the earlier chapters. Two points in particular bear very 
heavily on our present discussion. First, executory con­
tracts, by definition, involve events which have not taken 
place, and attempts to reflect such future transactions in 
published financial statements are, in reality, attempts to 
incorporate.predictive events in those statements. To what 
extent is this a valid approach or objective which account­
ing should undertake? To rephrase the question, should 
expectations or predictions be incorporated in published fi­
nancial statements? Second, as specified by the committee,
27Ibid., pp. 32-33.
92
relevance is the primary criterion for judging the useful­
ness of information on executory contracts. In what ways, 
then, is information on executory contracts relevant to 
users' decisions, and how can this relevancy be demonstrated? 
These two points will be d'iscussed in that order in the fol­
lowing paragraphs.
Incorporating Expectations in Financial Statements
The stewardship function has always held an important 
place in determining or assessing the effectiveness of 
management. It is often claimed that accounting is essen­
tially historical in nature. But probably what is meant 
by this statement is that accounting seeks to measure past 
events or past transactions. However, this interpretation 
in no way denies the orientation of the accountant to the 
future. History often has little value except as a guide 
for the future. A major role of accounting is admittedly, 
to perform the stewardship function, or to report on past per­
formance. However, the primary reason for such reporting 
is to give some guide to reducing uncertainty about the 
future. The accountant has always recognized the need to 
supply statement readers with information which will help
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them to predict the future. Furthermore, this recognition 
of information for the future is not a recent objective of 
accountants. Such a conclusion is explicit in the list of 
major uses of financial accounts or financial accounting 
listed by George 0. May:
(1) A report of stewardship
(2) A basis for fiscal policy
(3) A device to determine the legality of dividends
(4) A guide to wise dividend action
(5) A basis for the granting of credit
(6) Information for prospective investors in an
enterprise
(7) A guide for price or rate regulation
(8) An aid of Government supervision
(9) A basis for price or rate regulation
(10) A basis for taxation^8
With the exception of numbers 1, 3 and possibly 10, in the 
above list, it can be said that all of these uses or pur­
poses involve a future decision, i.e., the reason for col­
lection of the information is to provide a basis for a future 
decision. In particular, the accountant's measure of income 
provides a basis for future decisions. In fact, income 
is essentially a predictive device as noted by Hendrikson:
George 0. May, Financial Accounting (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1943), p. 3.
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However, most of the decisions of creditors and 
investors, including the stockholders of large cor­
porations, require a prediction of the future flow 
of income. Historical income is water over the 
dam; the important decisions regarding the purchase 
or sale of stock or bonds of the firm or the making 
of a loan to the firm require expectations regard­
ing the future.^
Certainly, two of the primary users of published corporate
reports are creditors and investors. Their primary need, in
terms of information, is for data which will enable them to
formulate sound expectations regarding the future performance
of the given company.
Whether he cares to admit it or not, the accountant
seeks to incorporate expectations or predictions into both
30the income statement and balance sheet. The currently 
accepted concept of assets as expected future economic bene­
fits, or as future service potentials, is a reflection of this
31
tendency to include expectations. The point to be noted
29
Hendrikson, 0£. cit., p. 101.
30Moonitz, op., cit., pp. 33-36.
31For a discussion of this concept, see American 
Accounting Association Committee on Concepts and Standards, 
Accounting and Reporting Standards for Corporate Financial 
Statements and Preceding Statements and Supplements (Colum­
bus, Ohio: American Accounting Association, 1957), p. 3.
95
in connection with these definitions of assets, is that they 
represent attempts to incorporate a quantification of future 
expectations into the balance sheet, and rightly so, since 
the relevant concept of assets is one that will enable 
readers to have some basis for the future decisions.
Additional evidence, to. support the contention that 
recording of expectations is in the domain of the account­
ant, is supplied by noting the recent trend toward inclusion
32
of probability estimates in financial statements. In 
effect, these measures are attempts to include expectations 
or predictions in financial statements. It should also be 
noted that the accountant has a history of recording expec­
tations. For example, the valuation of marketable securities 
or inventories at market value is really the recording of an 
expected value. The valuation of accounts receivable by 
use of an allowance for uncollectibles, is an attempt to 
state receivables at their net realizable value or their 
expected value.
In summary, the incorporation of expectations into
O  O
See Harold Bierman, Jr., Financial Accounting 
Theory (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 13-14.
See also Devine, op,, cit., p. 22, and AAA Statement, o p . 
cit,., p. 29.
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financial statements, or- attempts to achieve some measure of 
predictability in published financial statements, is certain­
ly not new in accounting. This orientation to the future has 
been summed up very well in the following quotation from the 
AAA Statement:
Although accounting has often been thought of as 
essentially historical in nature, it is important 
to recognize that emphasis upon those accounting 
techniques that deal with future plans and expec­
tations has been increasing, and that this trend 
may be expected to continue. Furthermore, the 
historical record is kept, as all history studied, 
for its lessons to be used as a guide to the 
future, this is another way of saying that the 
informational demands upon accounting are the 
requirements of the decisions in which it is used, 
and that these almost always have an orientation 
to the future.^
In connection with reporting to external parties, the same
AAA Statement reports that "most decisions based on account-
34ing information involve some kind of prediction." Some 
examples are future earnings forecasts, repayment of debts, 
and anticipated managerial effectiveness.
On the basis of the preceding discussion, it might be 
concluded that accountants recognize the need to provide
33AAA Statement, op.. cit., pp. 5-6.
^4Ibid., p. 19.
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information to predict the future, but are very reluctant 
to incorporate predictive type data, as such, into the 
balance sheet and income statement. Accountants have 
always recorded expectations, particularly when expense and 
revenue accruals were involved. The problem at hand seems 
to be one of how far accountants are willing to go in 
recording expectations in published financial statements, 
i.e., how much or what degree of predictability should be, 
or is, tolerated by accountants?
Predictability or expectations being included in finan­
cial statements seems to be a direct function of the account­
ant's concept of objectivity. The most important reason 
for failing to record expectations has been the difficulty
of measuring objectively, or achieving a satisfactory degree
. . . 35
of objectivity about expectations or predictions. It has
been shown that the present concept of objectivity is, at
36best, a vague and ill-defined concept. The concept must be
35
R. J. Chambers, "Measurement and Objectivity in Ac­
counting," The Accounting Review (April, 1964), pp. 264-74.
36
Harold E. Arnett, "What Does Objectivity Mean to 
Accountants?," The Journal of Accountancy (May, 1961), pp. 
63-68. See also, Edward J. Burke, "Objectivity and Account­
ing," The Accounting Review (October, 1964), pp. 837-849.
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expanded to cope with advances in measurement techniques and
new informational requirements of the users of financial 
37statements. These informational requirements, it is sub­
mitted, include data on executory contracts, i.e., such data 
should be included in published financial statements, as 
will be shown in later paragraphs.
Relevance to Users1 Decision Models
The definition of "accounting as the process of iden­
tifying, measuring and communicating economic information to
permit informed judgments and decisions by users of the infor-
38
mation" points directly to the notion of relevance. Whether 
or not information on executory contracts is relevant must 
be related to the users' decision model. But the problem 
lies precisely in this relationship. While "the committee 
advocates the reporting of all information that is believed 
to be relevant to the judgments and decisions of any sub­
stantial group of users" establishing relevance becomes a
37Paul E. Fertig, "Current Values and Index Numbers:
The Problem of Objectivity," in Robert K. Jaedicke, Yuji 
Ijiri, and Oswald Nielson (editors), Research in Accounting 
Measurement, American Accounting Association, Collected 
Papers, 1966, pp. 137-49.
38AAA Statement, op., cit., p. 1.
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39different and difficult matter. It can be argued at some 
levels, that the ability of the accounting function to trans­
mit information is limited. Accounting obviously cannot 
provide all information. However valid this argument, it 
is not relevant to the pre.sent level of analysis. Reporting 
of executory contract data could hardly be thought of as 
straining the reporting capacity (in terms of quantity of 
data) of accounting as an information system. As Sterling 
correctly points out, accounting should be concerned pri­
marily with the value of the data or information.^
Assessing the value of data' to users requires a look 
at their various decision models to determine informational 
needs. Such a task presents several difficulties to a study 
on executory contracts. First, as was pointed out earlier, 
most users do not know their needs, or are themselves not 
familiar with their own decision models. Second, the infor­
mational needs of users are heavily influenced by the data 
that are transmitted. As Sterling has noted:
39Ibid., p. 22.
40Robert R. Sterling, "A Statement of Basic Account­
ing Theory: A Review Article," Journal of Accounting
Research (Spring, 1967), p. 105.
100
He (the accountant) cannot be neutral because his 
transmissions will be a major factor in determin­
ing what the future generations consider relevant.
The very definition of information is dependent 
upon previous information; it is a cause of desires 
in an on-going process as well as an effect of the 
present desires.
For this reason I am suspicious of the simplistic 
idea of polling the receivers. In the present state 
of accounting, I have no doubt that a poll would 
improve our current reporting but it does not even 
approach a satisfactory solution.41
Accounting has not developed to the stage where it has
successfully defined the decision models of external users
of financial statements. The possible decision models of
external users, having wide varieties of purposes, are too
numerous to even list. In some of these decisions executory
“ contract data will be relevant; in others not relevant.
Again, Sterling has captured the crux of the problem:
The major problem of accounting is to develop a 
general information system. By this I mean a system 
that supplies relevant data to both specific and 
unspecific decision models. The point can best be 
illustrated by the committee's programmed- 
unprogrammed matrix (p. 44). If we have a production 
process with a variable material mix, there is a 
unique solution by a linear programming model. The 
capital budgeting model will provide a yes-no solu­
tion to simple investment problems. These models 
clearly specify the relevant data . . . .  The
41
Ibid., pp. 107-108.
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relevance problem is trivial in such cases . . . .
It is in the unprogrammed areas that difficulties 
are encountered. There the decision models are not 
well defined; indeed the problems are often unknown.
It is this area of internal reporting that inter­
sects with external reporting. External reporting 
also has programmed data requirements, e.g., the 
revenue code specifies the relevant data in tedious 
detail and thus there is no relevance problem. The 
difficult task is to make measurements that are 
relevant to the unprogrammed decisions. Since the 
problems which give rise to unprogrammed decisions 
are likely to change over time and since the per­
ceived problems are (partially at least) a function 
of the information received, it is unlikely that a 
final solution can ever be found.42
Since the formulation of decision models for outside 
users' (even for major users, such as creditors and investors) 
is a mammoth undertaking, this task of formulation certainly 
cannot be undertaken in the present study. However, the 
needs of external users in their respective decision models 
is the key to the treatment which should be accorded exe­
cutory contracts in published financial statements. As a 
result, one is forced to relate executory contracts to the 
general information system mentioned by Sterling. To the 
extent that future research demonstrates that executory 
contract data is not relevant to the decision models of
42Ibid., p. 107.
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particular external users, any subsequent recommended treat­
ment of executory contracts may not be applicable. Such a 
limitation does not appear to be very serious, however, since 
executory contracts can be shown to be relevant to the 
generally accepted or conventional decisions which users of 
published financial statements must make. A number of 
specific examples are discussed at the end of this chapter 
to support this conclusion. It is important that this limi­
tation be clearly understood. In this paper, the traditional, 
existing, and somewhat general decision models of external 
users are accepted, and no attempt is made to prove or 
disprove these models, nor to derive new and different 
models.
Information Required by External Users
Although decision models for each and every external 
user of accounting data cannot be constructed, it is pos­
sible to specify, in a general way, some of the decisions 
which these users face, and to set forth their informational 
needs. For many of these decisions and needs, executory con­
tract data are crucial. Speaking first of stockholders and 
potential stockholders, there, are four decisions which must
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be made. Existing stockholders must decide to maintain 
their investments or terminate them. Potential investors 
must consider investing or not investing. In addition, an 
investor may occasionally face the problem of holding stock, 
or converting it into some form of security. The factors 
which will bear on these decisions will be past and pro­
jected earnings of the firm, as well as the firm's ability 
to pay dividends and expand, through internal and external 
generation of funds. The predicted effectiveness of manage­
ment will usually be given considerable weight. Obviously, 
ability to predict future costs and revenues will be crucial 
to earnings predictions.
Creditors and prospective creditors must determine 
the firm's ability to meet annual interest payments, as well 
as any sinking fund requirements and repayments at maturity. 
Other creditors, such as banks and suppliers, must decide on 
lines of credit, whether to increase or decrease loans, the 
types of security which should be required, and whether or 
not the firm's plans for growth are feasible.
Customers are, of course, primarily concerned with 
the company's ability to produce the desired quality and 
quantity of a product at reasonable costs. They must
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determine whether or not the company can service, replace 
and develop equipment. As pointed out by the AAA State­
ment,
. . . in those situations where customers con­
tract to buy major amounts of products or ser­
vices over long periods of time, their relation­
ship takes on the characteristics of that of a 
creditor.43
Other external users' needs must be. met by the same 
general type information. As noted previously, these users 
include employees, governmental units, stock exchanges, 
financial and statistical information services, and the . 
like.
By employing ratio analyses, trend analyses and simi­
lar techniques, these users evidence an interest in predict­
ing or in eliminating some of the uncertainty associated with 
the following general measurements:44
(1) Costs, Revenues and Earnings
(2) Dividends and Market Prices of Shares
(3) Financial Position
(4) Liquidity and Debt-Paying Ability
(5) Growth
43AAA Statement, op., cit., pp. 21-22.
44Ibid., pp. 23-25.
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(6) Fund Flows
(7) Effectiveness of Management
All the above information is required, precisely because 
the particular user is involved in decisions. Investors, 
creditors and others must not only obtain this information 
for a given company, but the same information on a com­
parable basis must be available for other companies. Execu­
tory contract data becomes particularly relevant in this 
regard since it: (1) reduces some of the uncertainty in
the above measurements, and (2) because executory contracts 
are often substituted for asset ownership (e.g., leasing 
versus outright ownership of assets, and use of purchase 
contracts instead of carrying inventory). These two points 
will be further illustrated and discussed in the next 
section.
Relevance of Executory Contracts—
Some Practical Examples
Almost without exception, the reporting of executory 
contract data is relevant to users as an aid in predicting, 
forecasting, or if one prefers, understanding, the future 
course of business for given corporations. This general
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conclusion is supported in the subsequent discussion, which 
consists of an examination of the influence, or potential 
influence on investors' and creditors' decisions, of report­
ing a few types of executory contracts. Unfortunately, it is 
not possible to report on every type and variety of executory 
contract. Hopefully, future research efforts will be 
directed toward investigating, in more detail, other specific 
types of contracts, to which the principles or alternatives 
examined in this study, should be applicable.
Leases
Leasing is being used in some form by almost all 
large companies, and accounting and reporting for such execu­
tory contracts have been one of the major problems facing 
the accounting profession for the past several years. One
writer reports that the first important sale and leaseback
45agreement was executed in 1936, by Safeway Stores. Since 
then, Safeway has increased its use of the lease, and, in its
45A. Tom Nelson, The Impact of Leases on Financial 
Analysis, Occasional Paper Number 10 (East Lansing, Michi­
gan: Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Michigan
State University, 1963), p. 4.
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1960 annual report, the company reported 2904 property 
leases, with maximum annual rentals of approximately $43 
million. In 1966, although Safeway's total number of leases 
had declined to 2503, the minimum annual rentals on these 
leases had increased by some $18 million to a total of $61 
million. Sears Roebuck & Company is another famed user of 
the sale-leaseback transaction. In 1946, Sears sold some 
Wisconsin stores to the Northeast Mutual Insurance Company, 
and subsequently leased them back. In its current annual 
report, Sears discloses minimum fixed annual rentals of $24 
million. Fruehauf trailers,, service stations, Greyhound bus 
terminals, Crucible Steel warehouses, new plants for the 
Continental Can Company, restaurants for Howard Johnson fran­
chises, a wide variety of trucks, auto fleets and machinery
are among the types of property commonly involved in the
46financial type lease transaction.
Investors, particularly institutional investors, are 
beginning to attach-great weight to leases. The usefulness 
of information on leases is well documented in a study
46J. Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Managerial 
Finance (2nd edition; New York: Holt, Rinehardt arid Winston,
1966), p. 375.
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conducted by Vancil and Anthony. In a rather extensive
survey of financial analysts in major financial institutions 
in the United States and Canada (insurance companies, com­
mercial banks, investment bankers, trustees of pension 
funds and college endowments, credit and bond-rating ser­
vices) , some 256 analysts responded to the questionnaire 
designed to determine how financial analysts treated lease 
contracts. In analyzing financial statements, 1 1 %  of the 
respondents capitalize lease payments, treat them as fixed 
charges, or follow both procedures. Eighty-one per cent of 
the respondents regard long-term lease obligations as com­
parable to debt.
If lease contracts are capitalized, the result is a 
tremendous increase in assets and corresponding liabilities. 
Even though capitalization procedures are illustrated in Chap­
ter VI, an extreme example might be used here to demonstrate 
their effect. For example, Safeway Stores' total assets 
($640,673,000) would nearly double (liabilities would increase 
by an equal amount) if their outstanding leases were
47 .Richard F. Vancil and Robert N. Anthony, “The 
Financial Community Looks at Leasing," Harvard Business 
Review (November-December, 1959), pp. 113-30.
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discounted at 6% and capitalized, as of December 31, 1966.
Some indication of the extent of disclosure of long­
term leases by lessees can be obtained by examining the 
following table.
TABLE I 
DISCLOSURE OF LEASES
Year
Co.'s referring to, or 
indicating leases
As a %  of 600 
Co.'s surveyed
1950 78 14.9
1955 214 35.7 •
1960 223 37.2
1966 292 48.6
Source: Accounting Trends and Techniques, 5th, 10th, 15th
and 21st editions (New York: American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants).
An examination of the statements of lessees for 1950 
reveals that 78, or 14.9%, of the 600 companies surveyed indi­
cated or made reference to long-term leases, with varying 
degrees of disclosure, in their annual reports. The above 
table reflects that these figures increased to 292, or 48.6%, 
of the 600 companies reporting in 1966. Of these 292 com­
panies, 26 reported leases which were treated as purchases
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of property/ or as sale-and-leaseback transactions. A sub­
stantial number/ but not all of these 26 companies, capita­
lized the leases as assets and as liabilities. The exact 
number of companies that followed capitalization procedures 
is not available from the data given in Accounting Trends and 
Techniques. The other 266 companies usually disclosed the 
information in the footnotes to financial statements.
In addition, Professor Myers has also set out in
48
detail some of the information required by investors. He 
indicates that a significant number of ratios, which reflect 
the ability of the corporation to pay its debts, are affected 
when lease payments are considered to be debt and long-term, 
financial leases are capitalized in financial statements. 
Among the ratios affected are: times-interest earned, debt
to total capitalization, debt to equity, debt to net plant, 
working capital to plant, and plant to sales. Myers also 
indicates that throughout the course of his study, all pro­
fessional analysts with whom he had contact "felt a strong
John H. Myers, Reporting of Leases in Financial 
Statements, Accounting Research Study No. 4 (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1962), 
pp. 16-18.
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need to include lease obligations m  a cash-flow analysis."
Myers also notes that these analysts "want to know (on a
year-by-year basis for at least the next few years) the
amount of the cash outlay required under existing contracts,
50be they bond, lease or other." In addition, investors 
demand all other sorts of information on lease contracts, 
ranging from options at maturity and default provisions, to 
restrictions against further leasing or debt.
Clearly, information on lease contracts is having a 
significant influence on the decisions of investors. In 
fact, users of published reports, including corporate manage­
ments, commonly capitalize leases to improve key financial 
51
ratios. The informational value of lease contracts can 
hardly be disputed. The misleading and erroneous conclusions, 
which result from their omission as assets and liabilities in 
published financial statements, is well known and has been
^ I b i d ., p. 18.
50Ibid.
C l
3 A. Tom Nelson, "Capitalizing Leases— The Effect on 
Financial Ratios," The Journal of Accountancy (July, 1963), 
pp. 49-58. Also see "Another Look at Leasing," Conference 
Board Business Management Record (November, 1963), pp. 49- 
50.
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adequately discussed and presented in the literature and does
52
not need to be presented again here. Indeed, footnote 
disclosure of leases has been inadequate even though it has 
increased in recent years.
Purchase Contracts
Compared with reporting of leases which is criticized 
as inadequate, the reporting of other types of executory 
contracts is very scant. Purchase commitments are a type of 
executory contract whose financial impact may be just as 
significant to investors' and creditors' decisions as are 
lease contracts. The financial reporting of purchase com­
mitments is, at best, meager. In fact, the 1966 edition of 
Accounting Trends and Techniques shows that, of the 600 
companies surveyed, the following were the results for three 
comparable years:
52
See for example Donald R. Gant, "Illusion in Lease 
Financing," Harvard Business Review (March-April, 1959), 
pp. 121-42. A very complete description of the financial 
impact of almost all aspects of leases is contained in a 
series of six articles published in the Harvard Business 
Review from 1955 to 1963. These articles are available 
in reprint form under the title of "teasing Series."
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TABLE II
DISCLOSURE OF PURCHASE COMMITMENTS
Year
No. of Companies Referring 
to Purchase Commitments
1965 38
1960 22
1955 16
Source: Accounting Trends and Techniques, 10th, 15th and
-21st editions (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants).
The above companies, indicating the existence of purchase 
commitments, customarily disclosed this information in notes 
to financial statements or in the president's letter. It is 
obvious, from the above statistics, that most companies fail 
to give any information on purchase commitments in their 
annual reports. In addition, the financial impact of. pur­
chase contracts may require that they be capitalized as 
assets and liabilities. Footnote disclosure, even if 
utilized, may not be sufficient. It can be seen in the 
following examples, that to omit purchase commitments from 
asset and liability totals, may be to omit them from con­
ventional financial statement analysis.
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In the case.of the classic purchase agreement between
the Tennessee Valley Authority and Peabody Coal Company,
assume for purposes of discussion that Tennessee Valley
Authority is a private corporation. Tennessee Valley
Authority has invested $100,000,000 in a steam-electric
generating plant, on the strength of a contract with Peabody
to supply 65,000,000 tons of coal, worth $191,750,000 over a
53
period of 17 years, from a nearby mine. TVA's basic reason 
for locating the plant next to the Peabody mine is the favor­
able purchase commitment negotiated for the coal. The cost 
of the coal is only $2.95 a ton, one fourth less than TVA 
pays on the average for coal for its other steam plants.
The contract obviously has some provision for price escala­
tion because of its long duration, but the escalation 
clauses are also restrictive. Clearly, the information on 
such a contract is relevant. The value of the steam genera­
ting plant may not be the same with, as without, the favorable 
purchase commitment. Perhaps it can be argued that the con­
tract has no value, since it may be possible to purchase the
Dean S. Amer, Materials Management (Homewood, Illi­
nois: Richard D. Irwin, Incorporated, 1962), p. 84.
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same raw materials at the same price in the ordinary market, 
as under the contract. However, if such were the case, the 
contracting firm would not have entered into the contract 
in the first place, unless it did so erroneously. The more 
logical presumption is that the same raw materials were 
not available in the ordinary market place, which in turn 
made it necessary for the firm to enter into the purchase 
agreement.
The knowledge of similar contracts for the purchase 
of other raw materials, such as gas, oil, timber and the 
like, enables the interested investor or creditor to:
(1) obtain better predictions of future costs and therefore, 
future profits, (2) obtain better predictions of future cash 
flows and cash requirements, and (3) improve his evaluation 
of the effectiveness or success of management in negotiating 
such contracts. Furthermore, this type contract, if included 
among the assets and liabilities, may improve financial 
ratios and measurements.
Another type of commitment, which is becoming more 
common, is the "take or pay" type contract between a pur­
chaser and a wholly or partially owned supplier. Examples 
of this type contract are discussed in Chapter III. A
contract of this sort is reported by Interlake Steel Cor­
poration in its 1966 annual report. Interlake reports, in 
notes to its financial statements, that it has interests in 
various ore mining and pelletizing projects. The Company is 
required to take its ownership proportion of the pellets and 
concentrates produced, for which it is, in turn, committed to 
pay its proportionate share of the costs of operating these 
projects, either directly, or as part of the price of the 
product purchased. The minimum amount payable annually by 
Interlake is $2,250,000, for approximately 20 years. These 
minimum payments must be made, regardless of the quantity of 
ore received from these suppliers. In other words, these 
annual payments are fixed obligations. Their similarity to 
debt payments is obvious and their financial impact identi­
cal in terms of demands upon the cash and other resources 
of the company. The duration of the contract is known, its 
annual cost, as well as its aggregate cost, are known.
Equally important, however, is the fact that the contract 
assures Interlake of an available supply of raw materials. 
Clearly, the contract represents debt and probably should 
be capitalized as such. Although not specifically noted 
by Interlake, contracts of this type, which specify minimum
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annual payments, are often used as security for long-term 
54debt. In effect, these contracts achieve the same general 
purpose as a bond issue, but they are reflected in footnotes 
rather than in the financial statements or accounts.
This same type contract is used to purchase raw 
material, capital equipment, electric power, and to finance 
such things as ships and pipelines. The seller uses the 
agreement as security for debt issues by obligating the pur­
chaser, under the purchase contract, to make annual payments 
in an amount sufficient to cover debt service. Thus, the 
purchaser has more than a mere contingent liability. If the 
purchaser owns stock in the borrower (seller under the pur­
chase contract), the stock investment is usually carried at
55
cost on an unconsolidated basis. Under this treatment, the 
debt is omitted from the purchaser's balance sheet and
54This type contract and methods of reporting it, are 
thoroughly discussed in Joseph S. Burns, Robert K. Jaedicke, 
and John M. Sangster, "Financial Reporting of Purchase Con­
tracts Used to Guarantee Large Investments," The Accounting 
Review (January, 1963). See also, Ralph L. Gustin, Jr., 
"Financing by Contract and by Lease— Some Considerations," 
paper read before the Association of Life Insurance Coun­
sel, Tuesday, December 10,1957, at the Plaza Hotel, New 
York, New York.
^Burns, Jaedicke and Sangster, op,, cit., p. 5.
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the fixed costs in connection with the purchase contract are
omitted. These elements, in turn, are omitted from all
types of financial analysis and ratio analysis. Also, the-
investors and creditors of the purchasing firm are not
receiving a "true picture of the assets, debt and fixed
charges," when such commitment's are not capitalized in the
purchaser's balance sheet and the accompanying fixed charges
56
are not reported m  his income statement.
Another class of purchase commitments involves pur­
chases and sales of merchandise inventory items. For 
example, Sears Roebuck and Company, in the "financial review" 
section of their 1966 annual report, lists merchandise on 
order and in transit amounting to $1.4 billion, as of year 
end. Inventory was $1,048 billion at the same date. The 
other parties to these contracts correspondingly have a back­
log of unfilled orders. These contracts, both as purchase 
commitments and as backlogs of orders, can be very relevant 
financial information. On a comparative basis, these figures 
provide an indication of expected sales volume and volume of 
purchases. Also, they may give some indication of the
56Ibid., p. 4.
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efficiency of production in the case of a backlog. For 
example, Bailfield Industries, Incorporated, in the "finan­
cial highlights" section of their 1966 annual report, indi­
cates that the Company has a backlog of some $40,252,000 
in orders, with reported n’et sales for the year of only 
$31,328,000. In other words, the backlog of orders was 
greater than the reported sales for the year. Information 
on backlogs reduces the uncertainty of sales forecasting 
considerably.
In failing to capitalize their purchase commitments
as current assets and liabilities, Sears, in effect, is
able to omit these items from their statements permanently,
in the amount of $1.4 billion. These purchase commitments
may be substitutes for carrying inventory. If so, Sears'
current position or current ratio is substantially improved
by not capitalizing these items. A recent survey indicates
large increases in the use of purchase commitments or "con-
57tract buying." This survey provides a basis for concluding 
that if these contracts are permanent substitutes for current
57John Greenberg, "More P.A.'s Turn to Contract Buy­
ing," Purchasing Magazine (February 23, 1967), pp.46-49.
120
assets and current liabilities in financial statements, the 
extent of such substitutions is much more prevalent than 
realized.
The following statement, from the president's letter 
to stockholders of Puget Sound Power & Light Company (1966 
Annual Report), further illustrates the importance to stock­
holders, of both order backlogs and contracts to purchase 
capital equipment.
Revenues received from industrial accounts increased 
15% during the year. Our largest such customer is 
the Boeing Company which presently has a backlog of 
over $5 billion in orders for commercial jet air­
craft. The aerospace firm's continuing contribution 
to our State economy also is strengthened by the 
selection of its design for America's supersonic 
transport, as well as numerous space and military 
contracts. Under a 20-year agreement signed in 1966,
Puget will supply all of Boeing's power needs at 
both present and future plants within our service 
area.
The impact of the above information on stockholders is to 
give them some basis for predicting the future profits and 
progress, as well as some degree of certainty about those 
predictions. The operations of Puget, Boeing, and the govern­
ment's space and defense operations are obviously linked to 
and heavily dependent upon the executory contracts mentioned 
above. This type contract may not only meet the so-called
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minimum standards for relevance, but may, in fact, be among 
the most relevant type information presented in the annual 
reports.
A final example will illustrate the use and importance 
of purchase contracts. Frequently, companies purchase fixed 
assets or capital equipment through purchase commitments.
For example, Eastern Airlines' 1966 annual report reveals 
commitments to purchase 80 fan-powered jet aircraft to be 
delivered in 1967 and 1968. The cost of these aircraft is 
in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Nearly two pages 
are spent in describing the financing arrangements under­
taken, as well as those proposed for the aircraft. The 
importance of these contracts is signified b y  the attention 
devoted to their discussion in an unaudited section of East­
ern 's report.
Perhaps purchase commitments represent relevant infor­
mation, which should be incorporated into financial state­
ments, if the -user of the statements is to receive a fair 
presentation of all assets and obligations of the firm under 
consideration. The monetary magnitude of most purchase com­
mitments and the extent of their use, suggests that present 
methods of reporting purchase commitments in footnotes may
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not be adequate. Perhaps their full impact will only be 
.realized when they are capitalized and thus have a greater 
probability of being incorporated into financial statement 
analysis. At the same time however/ it would seem that even 
if purchase contracts were capitalized/ supplementary foot­
note data would have to be presented to enable the reader to 
independently assess the usefulness of information on such 
contracts.
Management Employment and Guaranteed 
Annual Wage Contracts
Executory contracts may often represent a "major 
• -event" in terms of the informational needs of users and, 
therefore, should be reported. Consider the following 
statements:
Many have asked with Professor Sorter why accountants 
treat the purchase of a glue pot as a recordable 
transaction and deny explicit recognition to a near- 
fatal coronary of the chief executive, who as a 
result now devotes his efforts to staying alive 
rather than furthering the interests of his organi­
zation. One factor is the accountants' traditional 
reluctance to make major estimates of this kind.
This reluctance may be understandable, but these 
'major' items are precisely the ones that need to be 
measured and reported. Many non-accountants, as well 
as practitioners, have encouraged the profession to 
re-evaluate these procedures and assign more
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importance to faster and more specific reporting 
of major changes in expectations.58
Perhaps, if the contract with the executive in the above 
example had been recorded as an asset in the first place, his 
heart attack would have shown up as a decrease in assets and 
liabilities. Consider another aspect of this example. If 
the loss of the executive is considered such a financial 
tragedy, perhaps the employment contract was an asset which 
was worth reflecting in the financial statements. In particu­
lar, consider the capitalization of a contract between a cor­
poration and one of its executives, whereby the executive 
agrees to serve in a particular capacity for a given period 
of time for specified compensation. Professor Shillinglaw 
discussed this type of contract and recommended that it be
capitalized, although for different reasons than are set
59
forth m  this study. Assuming the executive is very
C O
Carl T. Divine, "Some Conceptual Problems in Account­
ing Measurements," in Robert K. Jaedicke, Yuji Ijiri, and 
Oswald Nielson (editors), Research in Accounting- Measurement, 
American Accounting Association, Collected Papers, 1966, 
p. 20.
59Gordon Shillinglaw, "More on Doubtful Areas m  
Lease Capitalization," National Association of Accountants 
Bulletin (November, 1962), pp. 9-13.
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talented and of substantial notoriety, the reflection in 
financial statements, of this sort of contract, could be the 
most relevant of all information to some users. Creditors 
may lend money, stockholders may invest, customers may enter 
into supply contracts, and so on, simply on the basis of 
this information. To fail to report such evidence or infor­
mation, which is substantiated by the existence of a con­
tract, is to omit important, relevant information from 
financial statements. The financial reporting of most employ­
ment contracts is virtually nonexistent— a fact that is well 
known in most accounting circles. This practice is due to 
the difficulty of measuring and accounting for intangibles, 
such as managerial ability. Such difficulties should not 
be overlooked or minimized when considering capitalization 
of management employment contracts.
Corporations not only purchase executives' services 
for given periods of time at specified prices in specified 
jobs, they also purchase labor in similar fashion. For 
example, contracts covering 632,000 United Automobile Workers 
will expire September 6, 1967, and new ones are currently
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coming up for negotiation. United Automobile Workers
president, Walter Reuther, is demanding a guaranteed annual
income for autoworkers. Reuther views the substance of the
guaranteed annual wage as follows:
It's about like saying to General Motors that when 
a guy punches his time clock, you haven't got a con­
tract to pay him for one hour. You have a contract 
to pay him a whole year's salary because that's the 
way you pay your corporation executives.
Perhaps the accountant should view labor contracts in the 
same fashion. The consequences of the contracts may be even 
more far reaching and of greater importance than management 
employment contracts in terms of competitive position, 
future costs and hence, future profits. The substance of 
these plans is to assure the covered workers a minimum 
weekly, monthly, or yearly pay check. Skillfully negotiated 
contracts of this type could mean tremendously increased 
profits, while poorly negotiated contracts of this type 
could spell a financial tragedy. The existence of guaran­
teed annual wage plans in one industry, which do not exist
60John Dotson and Tom Nicholson, "Contract Time in 
Detroit: Collision Course," Newsweek (July 17, 1967), p. 76.
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in another, can very well bear on the investor's decisions. 
The existence of labor contracts makes labor costs more 
predictable and labor is frequently a high proportion of 
total costs in many industries. The existence of a con­
tract gives some assurance that production will be uninter­
rupted, an event which could drastically affect costs, prof­
its, dividends and debt-paying ability. In contrast, if the 
firm is a party to an unfavorable labor agreement, investors 
should be made aware of that fact.
If management employment contracts, guaranteed annual 
wage contracts or other forms of labor contracts could be 
recorded in some meaningful way in the accounts (as assets 
and liabilities) at the going market price, it would cer­
tainly be a step toward quantifying the service potential 
of management and employees— one of the corporation's most 
vital and valuable assets. Such recording gives the investor 
and other users an objective basis (market values) for 
assessing the corporation's ability to purchase the ser­
vices of management and employees. After these assets and 
liabilities have been capitalized, they can be charged to 
income as used, in the same way as other assets are charged 
against revenue. These assets and liabilities have been
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completely ignored in conventional financial statements and 
their accompanying footnotes because, as previously noted, it 
is difficult to obtain meaningful measures of them.
Construction Contracts
Another highly significant form of executory con­
tracts are those used in connection with capital expenditure 
programs for plant expansion and construction, moderniza­
tion, and the like. The drain on future resources, as well 
as the contributions or benefits expected from such programs, 
is entirely obvious, and is evidenced by the fact that com­
panies seem compelled to mention capital expenditure pro­
grams, and the means of financing them, in their annual 
reports. Information on such contracts is relevant, and, in 
fact, is critically important to almost any user of financial 
statements. These contracts must be included in any substan­
tive analysis of financial statements, including projected 
cash flow and fund flow analysis.
Financial Reporting of Executory Contracts
Almost all executory contracts are relevant account­
ing information— subsequent discussions reinforce this
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conclusion. Thus, it becomes clear that the pertinent issue 
is not one of whather executory contract data are relevant 
information which should be reported. Rather, the issue 
becomes where and how should such contracts be reported, and 
how should their value be determined? Many executory con­
tracts are already disclosed somewhere in annual reports, 
though often they are not covered by the auditor's opinion. 
The critical fact is that the present reporting of many 
executory contracts is inadequate. Even the reporting of 
leases, probably one of the best reported executory con­
tracts, is sparce.- Reporting statistics on some of the more 
important executory contracts from Accounting Trends and 
Techniques are presented in this chapter.
The preceding discussion suggests that executory 
contracts should be reported in published financial state­
ments, and that they should be covered by the auditor's 
opinion. Subsequent chapters demonstrate the usefulness of 
reporting such contracts. Further, Chapter IV supports the 
conclusion that rights to service potentials or expected 
economic benefits (assets) and obligations (liabilities) 
arise under executory contracts. Their manner of presenta­
tion now becomes the paramount issue.
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The two methods usually adopted for the reporting of 
accounting information have been to record the items and 
amounts in the accounts, or to disclose them in footnotes. 
Footnote disclosure, although better than none at all, is 
a poor substitute for capitalization of assets and liabili­
ties and should only be used to amplify or further explain
62items and amounts in financial statements. Further, since 
it is shown in the next chapter that executory contracts 
(with few exceptions) represent assets and liabilities, it 
might be recommended that they be capitalized in financial 
statements. However, this recommendation must still be sub­
ject to the four constraints that executory’ contract data 
must be: (1) relevant information, (2) free from bias,
(3) quantifiable, and (4) verifiable. In addition, execu­
tory contracts, if capitalized in financial statements, 
would seem to require further explanation in footnotes (and 
perhaps supplementary schedules), aimed at providing the 
reader with sufficient information to enable him to use the 
data in a meaningful way in his particular decision.
fi OJames E. Walter, "The Treatment of Footnote Lia­
bilities," The Accounting Review (January, 195.5), pp. 95, 
102.
CHAPTER V
FINANCIAL REPORTING MODEL-OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
This chapter discusses whether or not executory con­
tracts meet the criteria for assets and liabilities under 
generally accepted asset and liability concepts. Some opera­
tional definitions for the financial reporting model are 
investigated and developed. In other words, it would seem 
appropriate to consider how currently accepted concepts of 
assets and liabilities must be expanded, changed or inter­
preted, so as to accomodate executory contracts.
The purpose of this chapter must be clearly under­
stood. Executory contracts may be demonstrated to be use­
ful in practice, i.e., useful to users of published annual 
reports. Such a demonstration is crucial support-for any 
suggestion that they be incorporated into financial state­
ments. At the same time, however, executory contracts must 
be theoretically acceptable, i.e., accounting theory and 
principles must be applicable to executory contracts. In 
fact, the function of theory is to describe a wide range of 
practice. If it is useful in practice to consider executory
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contracts to be assets and liabilities which should be 
reflected in financial statements, they must be incorporated 
into an existing, or new body of accounting theory.
Asset Concept Used
There seems to be a concensus that the concept of 
assets which should be used is one of "rights to future ser­
vice potentials." Sprouse and Moonitz state the concept 
very concisely:
Assets represent expected future economic benefits, 
rights to which have been acquired by the enter­
prise as a result of some current or past trans­
action.^"
These authors rely on and cite the long history of the 
future service potential concept of assets, to show that it 
has been utilized by such writers as Sprague, Paton and Little­
field, Vatter, and more recently, the AAA Committee on Con-
2cepts and Standards m  their 1957 statement. In addition, 
Canning has defined assets as follows:
^"Robert T. Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz, A Tentative 
Set of Broad Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises, 
Accounting Research Study No. 3 (New York: American Insti­
tute of Certified Public Accountants, 1962), p. 20.
2
Ibid., pp. 19-20.
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An asset is any future service in money or any 
future service convertible into money (except 
those services arising from contracts the two 
sides of which are proportionately unperformed) 
the beneficial interest in which is legally or 
equitably secured to some person or set of per­
sons . ^
Interestingly, in connection with the above definition, Can­
ning did feel that the definition would be improved, or made
more useful to all concerned, if the parenthetical material 
4
were removed. The implication is, of course, that executory 
contracts should also be included in the definition of assets.
In this study, the concepts and principles presented 
by Sprouse and Moonitz in Accounting Research Study Number 
3, are used as a basis for the operational definitions for 
"the financial reporting model. However, there must be 
several modifications, clarifications or changes in inter­
pretation of these definitions before they can be said to 
accomodate executory contracts satisfactorily. Needless to 
say, professors Sprouse and Moonitz would not necessarily 
agree with these changes in meaning.
3
John B. Canning, The Economics of Accountancy (New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1929), p. 22.
4Ibid.
133
Classification of Terms
Three points or elements in the asset definition 
enunciated in Accounting Research Study No. 3 are relevant 
to the present discussion,- and set the stage for the modifi­
cation of the asset definition. In connection with the 
definition of assets, as rights to future service potentials, 
there are at least three elements of this definition which 
may or may not be entirely obvious:
(1) expected future economic benefits or service 
potentials,
(2) rights to those service potentials, and
(3) a current or past transaction.
These three elements will be considered in this order in
the following paragraphs.
Degree of Uncertainty in Assets
The authors of Accounting Research Study No. 3 note 
that the adjectives "expected" and "future," as used in 
their definition, are to be interpreted as indicating that
there is always some degree of uncertainty as to whether or
not the economic benefits or service potentials will actually
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5
result from the asset. The phrase, "economic service poten­
tials," is to be interpreted in the same fashion. Note that 
the asset is really a potency, potential or expectancy. 
Although it will not be used in this chapter, some writers 
make an important distinction between service potentials 
of an asset and the expected service potentials or economic 
benefits— unless the user can abstract services from an
g
asset, it has no value, regardless of its potential. This 
expectancy or potential is easily seen to be present in 
the case of executory contracts where the delivery of 
merchandise under a contract is awaited, the receipt of 
employees' services under a labor contract is anticipated, 
or there is the expectation of using leased equipment, build­
ings or land. The accountant has no alternative but to 
assume these contracts will be carried out, and that benefits 
or service potentials will, actually, result under contract.
This same expectancy attaches to the benefits to be 
derived from assets, other than those which arise under
5Sprouse and Moonitz, pp. cit., p. 20.
6Norton Bedford, Income Determination Theory: An
Accounting Framework (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, Incorporated, 1965), p. 77.
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executory contracts. That is, some doubt is always attached 
to the benefits to be derived from any asset. There does 
not seem to be a substantial difference in the degree of 
uncertainty attached to the benefits expected to be derived 
from property which is leased as, opposed to that which is 
owned outright. Likewise, there may be as high a degree of 
uncertainty attached to the collection of an account receiv­
able, as is attached to the delivery of raw material under a 
purchase contract, or the receipt of employees services under 
a labor contract.
The preceding discussion of uncertainty and expecta­
tion is very closely related to the traditional concept of 
the "going concern." Grady described this concept as fol­
lows :
The complexities of present-day business operations, 
with their high degree of technology, require long- 
range planning and research. Operating facilities 
with long-lived usefulness must be acquired, often 
by incurring long-term debt. Labor contracts with 
long-term benefits, such as pensions, must be nego­
tiated to assure the necessary manpower for opera­
tions. All of these factors support the basic 
proposition that business managements, assume, and 
properly so, the indefinite continuation of opera­
tions . . . .
. . . I t  (going concern) is nevertheless a unifying 
force behind a whole array of accounting practices 
and procedures in the so-called 'normal' case.
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'Going concern' implies indefinite continuance. . . 
Indefinite continuance means that the business will 
not be liquidated within a span of time necessary 
to carry out present contractual commitments. . . .
This view makes the concept one of tentative judg­
ment/ subject to revision in the future as contrac­
tual agreements are changed and plans and expecta­
tions with respect to operations shift.^
The above concept applies to all business entities, not only 
the entity under consideration. Unless there is evidence to 
the contrary, an assumption is made that all business enti­
ties, with whom the firm under consideration is contractually 
or otherwise related, will, in fact, carry out all commit­
ments. The accountant has no alternative but to assume 
that executory contracts will be carried out, executed or 
performed, and that the economic benefits or service poten­
tials will, actually, accrue to all parties under the con­
tract. Investors or creditors may, of course, take a differ­
ent point of view in their financial analyses.
Rights and Service Potentials
With regard to the rights to future service-potentials
^Paul Grady, Inventory of Generally Accepted Account­
ing Principles for Business Enterprises, Accounting Research 
Study No. 7 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, 1965), pp. 27-28.
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which must be present for the enterprise to have acquired an 
asset, it need only be noted that the service potential of 
an object, person, institution and the like, may be present, 
but if the enterprise is to have an asset, it must also have 
a right (not necessarily a legal right) to those service 
potentials. An enterprise may-possess service potentials, 
but if it has no right (legal, economic or moral) to those 
service potentials— as in the case of an illegally possessed 
object— it has no asset. This distinction in the service 
potentials and the rights to those service potentials will 
be referred to in a later section of this chapter, dealing 
with the existence of assets prior to their manufacture or 
physical existence.
Current or Past Transactions
Sprouse and Moonitz interpret the phrase "current or 
past transaction" as the event which brought the asset into 
the enterprise; this event is the "transaction." Future 
events or transactions are excluded from assets by use of
Q
the words "current" and "past." To clarify this
8Sprouse and Moonitz, op. cit., p. 20.
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interpretation, an example is presented, in which a piece of 
equipment already acquired is an asset, while a piece of 
equipment which the enterprise intends to acquire next year 
is not an existing asset, but merely a budgeted asset. That 
this elaboration is intended to, or would, exclude executory 
contracts as assets, is not entirely clear. The act of 
entering into an agreement, under which no performance has 
taken place, is not considered to be a transaction, accord­
ing to traditional accounting theory. Thus, Accounting 
Research Study No. 3 would probably exclude executory con­
tracts, since no transaction has taken place which would give 
rise to an asset. It is precisely at this point that asset 
definition of Accounting Research Study No. 3 must be 
expanded, changed or interpreted differently.
Traditional Concept of an Accounting Transaction
The concept of an accounting transaction lacks pre­
cise definition. However, there does exist what might be 
called the traditional view of an accounting "transaction." 
This traditional view suggests that a transaction is basi­
cally an exchange. For example, Paton and Dixon define an 
accounting transaction as: "any occurrence, process,
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condition/ or decision that results in an immediate change
9
in the asset or equity elements of an enterprise." These 
authors are careful to exclude the entering into an execu­
tory contract as an accounting transaction: " . . .  decision
to purchase an asset sometime in the future is not a trans­
action; even the placing of an order is not a transaction."'*'® 
Husband and Schlatter interpret the tern "transaction," as 
applying to "those business experiences in which there is an 
economic exchange of equal values."^ Husband and Schlatter 
also exclude executory contracts specifically from the cate­
gory of an accounting transaction.
Expanded Concept of an Accountincr Transaction
Alvin shows that Professor Moonitz, in Accounting 
Research Study No. 1, has considerably expanded the concept
9 .William A. Paton and Robert L. Dixon, Essentials of 
Accounting (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), pp. 61-
62.
~*~®Ibid., p. 62.
■^George R. Husband and William J. Schlatter, Introduc­
tory Accounting (New York: Pitman Publishing Corporation,
1949), p. 25.
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12of an accounting transaction. Alvin presents a very con­
vincing case, in order to show that, upon entering into or 
executing a lease agreement, an accounting transaction has 
occurred, which should be recorded in the accounts. If 
Moonitz's B-2 Postulate and his transaction concept are ac­
cepted, leases "will be recorded and formally presented in the 
financial statements at the time the lease arrangement is 
signed." Moonitz's Postulate B-2 states: "Accounting data
are based on prices generated by past, present, or future
exchanges which have actually taken place or are expected 
13
to." Further, in Moonitz's view, accounting transactions
are "instances of financial events (transactions) involving
14at least two accounting entities." Basically, Alvin's rea­
soning is that two accounting entities are usually involved 
in the lease agreement and the mutual promises exchanged in 
a lease agreement may represent a past or present exchange,
■^Gerald Alvin, "The Execution of the Nonfinancial 
Lease— An Accounting Transaction?," National Association of 
Accountants Bulletin (November, 1963), pp. 39-46.
13 .
Maurice Moonitz, The Basic Postulates of Accounting,
Accounting Research Study No. 1 (New York: American Insti­
tute of Certified Public Accountants, 1961), p. 37.
14
Ibid., p. 28.
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and certainly do represent a future exchange which is
15expected to take place. Particularly in the case of
leases, other writers, notably Rappaport, would agree that
the exchange of promises, which are legally enforceable,
does give rise to assets and liabilities under the transac- 
1 fition concept. Rappaport's analysis suggests "that the pre­
vailing transaction concept be extended to accomodate the
r
recognition of lease contracts and other comparable com­
mitments . "17
Vatter lends strong support to the preceding conten­
tion that the execution of the lease agreement is a record­
able accounting transaction. Says Vatter:
The lease is a complete transaction. The relations 
established by the contract are positive and speci­
fic; even though certain acts are unperformed, the 
arrangement is incomplete only in the sense that it 
involves future time. Although performance and 
compensation are extended over a time period, no 
special event or action is required to make the 
arrangement effective, nor is there any cancellation 
by offset, or termination by conditional events.
There are definite obligations created by the contract;
•^Alvin, o p ., cit. , p. 43.
16
Alfred Rappaport, "Lease Capitalization and the 
Transaction Concept," The Accounting Review (April, 1965), 
pp. 373-76.
17Ibid., p. 373.
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these, since they can be enforced in the same way 
as other business commitments, have all the attri­
butes of liabilities.
The counterparts to those liabilities are perfectly 
valid assets. The lessor's right to compensation is 
an enforceable money claim, which is unquestionably 
an asset.-1-®
Unquestionably, in Vatter's view, the execution of a lease 
contract involves an exchange of property rights, which gives 
rise to assets and liabilities under the transaction concept. 
Vatter does not have to strain to arrive at this conclusion, 
but rather works within the framework of the relatively simple 
concept that an accounting transaction is an exchange. Vat­
ter 's analysis seems to be applicable to other types of 
executory contracts.
Additional Support for Expanded Transaction Concept
• Additional support can be found in Bedford's writings
to show that entering into a contract involves an exchange of
economic rights, which fulfills the requirements of being an
19
accounting transaction. The preceding analysis suggests
18Wi lliam J. Vatter, "Accounting for Leases," Journal 
of Accounting Research (Autumn, 1966), p. 135.
"^Bedford, q£. cit., pp. 114-19.
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that the relevant question is really one of when to recog­
nize the existence of assets and liabilities, or when to 
recognize the acquisition of the services of these assets 
and the resulting obligation to pay for them. The 
exchange of promises (at the signing of the contract) repre­
sents an exchange of rights to. future service potentials, 
and so, may be a valid point at which to recognize assets 
and liabilities.
According to Bedford, "a transaction takes place as
20
the result of a 'deal' with an outside person.1' Further,
economic activity, the subject matter of accounting, is a
continuous process whereas transactions are "discrete
01points" in this continuous process. "Transactions are
specific points in this process, loosely categorized as an
acquisition (purchase), a disposition (sale or scrapping)
22, or an exchange." He notes further, m  connection with 
the relationship of the accrual process to the transaction
20Norton M. Bedford, "The Need for an Extension of 
the Accrual Concept," The Journal of Accountancy (May, 1965), 
p. 31.
21
Ibid., p. 30.
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concept/ that the accrual process bridges the gap between the
"acquisition of a fixed asset (the initial transaction) and
the disposition or sale of the fixed asset (the final trans-
23
action) . . . The problem/ in the case of executory
contracts/ is determining <when the initial transaction takes 
place, or when the asset is acquired. A good argument can 
be presented that the rights to future service potentials 
arise at the point of signing the contract. This is the 
point at which the relevant transaction takes place, or the 
relevant exchange (of promises or rights to future service 
potentials) takes place.
Bedford makes another very important point, that the
transaction (a discrete point) is often confused with the
activities leading up to the transaction:
For example, the process of acquiring material, 
labor and other resources and using them to make 
a shoe has been defined as the one transaction of 
making a shoe. Another illustration of this same 
confusion is the tendency to treat all work per­
formed by one employee, until he has been paid, as 
one transaction. In its most realistic form this 
concept of a transaction would consider all activity 
(planning, ordering, receiving and storing) involved 
in acquiring an item of merchandise as a transaction.
23Ibid.
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This concept considers a transaction an activity
rather than an e x c h a n g e . 24
Using Bedford's explanation of the transaction concept, it 
may be argued convincingly that the signing of a contract 
and the exchanging of mutual promises is, actually, the 
first discrete point (in the time sequence involving the 
acquisition of an asset) at which an asset should be recog­
nized in the accounts in the form of rights to the per­
formance of services arising from the contract. The subse­
quent performance and rendering of services under the 
contract, merely change slightly, the form of the asset 
and corresponding liability. For example, in terms of a 
long-term purchase contract, the right to the service 
potentials of the goods under the contract could be treated 
as an asset receivable by the purchaser, with a correspond­
ing long-term liability. As the goods purchased under the 
contract are received by the purchaser, that asset form is 
converted from being merely goods or merchandise receivable, 
to an inventory account. The corresponding long-term lia­
bility becomes a current liability to the extent of the goods 
delivered.
—  ■ ■ ■ I I ■ I. —  .............  | |
24Ibid., p. 31.
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When to Recognize Assets
The issue is clear. When should the acquisition of
the asset (goods or services) acquired under contract be
recognized? Bedford considers several possible points at
which the asset might be considered as having been 
25acquired. Conventionally/ accountants have restricted 
themselves to three dates for recognition of the acquisi­
tion of assets. These dates are: (1) the date title passes,
(2) the date the goods or services are physically received, 
and (3) the date cash is paid for the goods or services.
There is no reason why accountants should restrict them­
selves to these dates. Rather, as noted by Bedford, goods 
or services should be recognized as having been acquired 
as soon as sufficient evidence is available to indicate the 
goods or services will be used by the enterprise. This 
early recognition of goods and services results in a more 
complete presentation of accounting information in published
25
Norton M. Bedford, Income Determination Theory: An
Accounting Framework (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, Incorporated, 1965), pp. 114- 
19.
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reports. A more complete record is certainly a more useful
26and more informative record. To omit transactions because
they do not coincide with one of the above arbitrary dates,
is to omit "significant information on resources effectively
acquired," and results in failure to disclose, as fully as is
27possible, the anticipated future actions of the enterprise.
In addition to leases, Bedford cites another illustrative 
case, where an asset would properly be recognized upon enter­
ing into a contract.
For example, mere discussion of the desirability 
of acquiring a certain type of machine would not 
be sufficient evidence to recognize that services 
in the machine were going to flow into the use of 
a specific business firm. On the other hand, the 
placing of an order for the machine might be suf­
ficient evidence, for accounting purposes to war­
rant treating the services in the machine as having 
been acquired.
Bedford, and at least one other current writer, have stated 
the principle that the acquisition of services and goods 
should be recognized as soon as the acquisition cost is
26Ibid., pp. 114, 117. 
27
Ibid., p. 116.
2^Ibid., pp. 114-15.
29
known or measurable. In addition:
One might contend that acquisition cost is known 
as soon as the contract for the acquisition is 
accepted by both parties to a purchase and sale 
of services, and that this date should be used 
to recognize services acquired.
. . .  An early recognition of service acquisition 
is desirable. It permits a determination of 
several types of operational income. This does 
not mean that all services so recognized must be 
disclosed on the balance sheet. There may be 
reasons why, for balance sheet purposes, another 
recognition point may be appropriate for the 
determination of assets.
It would seem that an early determination of total 
assets and liabilities would also be desirable in terms of 
giving investors and creditors a more complete picture of 
financial position. It would give them a more accurate 
reflection of the total economic services available for use 
during the succeeding periods, as well as the total demands 
on company resources to meet the corresponding obligations.
The preceding discussion suggests that the present
st
concept of accounting transaction not only can, but perhaps
29See Robert C. Mogis, "Do Undisclosed Liabilities 
Distort Financial Statements?," National Association of 
Accountants Bulletin (February, 1961), p. 50, and Bedford, 
op. city, p. 117.
•an
Bedford, ojd. cit., pp. 117-18.
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should be expanded or interpreted to include the signing of 
a contract as a transaction which gives rise to the record­
ing of assets and liabilities. With this modification (or 
explanation, in case this is the correct interpretation 
intended by Accounting Research Study No. 3), the Sprouse/ 
Moonitz definition of assets is accepted without further 
qualifications, for purposes of this study. The conclusion 
might also be inserted at this point, that whether one takes 
a pragmatic approach or a definitional approach (i.e., con­
structing operational definitions for theoretical concepts), 
he arrives at the same point. That is, that executory con­
tracts should be reported if they represent useful, rele­
vant information to users of the data.
Liability Concepts
The preceding discussion lays the groundwork and 
makes acceptance of the Sprouse/Moonitz liability definition 
an easy matter. With the previously discussed interpreta­
tion of an accounting transaction, the following definition 
is used with no further qualifications in this study.
The liabilities of a business enterprise are its 
obligations to convey assets or perform services, 
obligations resulting from past or current
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transactions and requiring settlement in the 
future. The term 'obligations' connotes a claim 
or series of claims against the business enter­
prise, each of which has a known or reasonably 
determinable maturity date and an independent 
value which is known or reasonably measurable.31
Bedford's principle of a known acquisition cost or value is 
also operative with liabilities, i.e., the value of the lia­
bility must be known or reasonably measurable, before 
recording it in the accounts is justified.
Relationship of Transactions to Assets
The whole transaction concept should be related to 
the idea of the service potential concept of assets. This 
relationship results from the principle that an asset should 
be reported, whenever it possesses a measurable economic ser­
vice potential. An asset usually has a measurable economic 
service potential when an exchange takes place or a trans­
action occurs. Admittedly, it is not always possible, prac­
tically speaking, to determine the precise moment at which 
an asset comes into existence. But, it is logical to state, 
on the basis of the preceding discussion, that the point at
31Sprouse and Moonitz, op., crt. , p. 37.
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which the parties enter into a contract— the point at which 
there is an exchange of promises (transaction) giving rise 
to economic, legal and moral rights and obligations— -is the 
point at which rights to economic service potentials arise. 
The point at which this transaction or exchange takes place 
may thus be used to recognize the acquisition of assets and 
liabilities arising under a contract. The operational prin­
ciple previously mentioned, states that an asset can be 
recorded if it possesses a measurable economic service 
potential or measurable future economic benefit. In the 
case of executory contracts, these benefits must first be 
shown to exist, before taking up their measurability.
The Existence of Service Potentials 
or Economic Benefits
The first argument which might be presented to show 
that future service potential exists in an executory con­
tract, is the very obvious fact that an enterprise would not 
enter into a contract, unless there were rights or benefits 
received under that contract. Unless there was some expected 
value or benefit to entering into an agreement, or expected 
value received under the agreement, there would seem to be
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no need for a contract. In fact, the contract and the rights 
under the contract should be thought of as being identical. 
These rights can be seen in a negative way. A company, that 
was not able to operate at full capacity because it failed 
to enter into a contract which would guarantee supply, can 
easily appreciate the economic benefits which arise under 
the contract. So also, the company that does not produce 
as a result of a labor strike could hardly argue that a 
labor contract (if they had one), or the rights received under 
the labor contract, provided no value or benefit. Measuring 
the value of these rights is, of course, another problem to 
be discussed in Chapter VI.
The asset value of rights received under a contract 
can also be seen from the viewpoint of the liabilities which 
arise in connection with the acquisition of these rights.
One could hardly argue that the company entering into a 
contract does not incur any obligation or liability to pro­
vide future service or benefits. The existence of these 
obligations is readily apparent, even though contingent upon 
the receipt of goods and services. Such obligations are 
simultaneously, service potentials or economic benefits to 
the other party to the contract.
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In terms of executory contracts, the rights to service 
potentials received under the contract are the rights to the 
goods, services or other resources to be rendered by the 
other party to the contract. The enterprise of course, 
simultaneously assumes obligations in return for the other 
party's services. The value of the service potentials 
acquired need not be equal to the value of the obligation 
to render service potentials. The obligation may be dis­
charged at a rate different from the rate at which an asset 
is consumed. In sum, every executory contract changes the 
total economic rights acquired by the enterprise and changes 
the total of the economic obligations assumed by the enter­
prise. An asset's service potential lies in its ability to 
enhance the future operations of the enterprise, whether 
that be in the form of increasing the income stream of the 
enterprise or in the form of aiding in the achievement of 
some other objective of the enterprise.'
Contract Rights Versus Rights to Service Potentials
The rights received under a contract are precisely 
rights to service potentials of the object of the contract. 
The rights received under contract and the rights to the
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service potentials are one and the same set of rights. How­
ever, sometimes the contract' itself is thought to have a 
service potential distinct from the service potential which 
is the object of the contract, and is received under the con­
tract. For example, a lease and almost any other contract 
can be sold. This lease contract is considered to be dis­
tinct from the right to the service potentials of the leased 
asset. This same analysis can be applied to stock options 
or purchase contracts, wherein it is argued that the con­
tracts themselves are assets (called indirect service poten­
tials) apart from the stock (direct service potentials) which 
can be acquired by exercise of the option, and apart from the 
merchandise (direct service potentials) which can be ac­
quired under the purchase contract. The argument used to 
support this contention or analysis is the fact that a 
lease contract, stock option contract, purchase contract or 
any other contract, for that matter, can be sold for a price 
above or below the price fixed in the contract. Birnberg 
explains it in this fashion:
The direct service potentials arise from changes in 
market conditions that make the terms of the con­
tract either more or less desirable. A price rise 
subsequent to the time of a purchase agreement makes 
the agreement, like a stock option, take on value
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approximately equal to the difference between the 
market price and the agreement's price. Similarly 
should the price fall subsequent to the agreement, 
its service potential would be negative.32
This analysis might be challenged for at least two reasons.
Negative Service Potential'— An Impossibility
First, Birnberg's analysis permits the agreement (a 
supposed asset and therefore service potential) to have a 
negative service potential. However, "negative service 
potential" is a phrase and concept which may be difficult to 
comprehend. An object has service potential when its use 
will increase the income stream of the enterprise. Thus, 
service potential is the expectation of a positive use 
being abstracted from the object. The terms "negative" 
and "asset," or "negative" and "right to future service 
potentials" are mutually exclusive, i.e., by definition, 
one term or concept excludes the other. Use of both these 
terms in describing the same concept is analogous to attempt­
ing to represent a mathematical series or statistical uni­
verse, as being both finite and infinite at the same time. 
Such a state is obviously impossible, for the states of
o o
Jacob Birnberg, "Reporting Executory Contracts,"
The Accounting Review (October, 1955), p. 817.
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finiteness and infinity are, by definition, mutually exclu­
sive. In the sense that a state of finite-infinity is impos­
sible, so also, is "negative service potential" an impossi­
bility.
Also relevant to the present discussion is the idea 
that all assets, by definition, must have a positive value. 
One can argue about the value of service potentials, or the 
value of rights to service potentials, or how that value 
should be measured. In other words, one can think of the 
existence of assets as being distinct from the valuation of 
those assets, as long as they have a positive value. It 
should be noted, however, that this distinction is possible 
only for purposes of theoretical analysis. Concepts, such 
as "asset" and "zero valuation," are mutually exclusive.
One can, of course, argue about the magnitude of the values 
involved. Rights to "economic benefits" or "service poten­
tials" (assets) imply some positive value. There is no 
asset when its value is zero.
In sum, service potential, by definition, is something 
positive. Thus, negative service potential is really an 
absence or lack of service potential. Therefore, it is dif­
ficult to imagine that a buyer is willing to purchase this
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lack, or absence of, service potential (i.e., negative ser­
vice potential) at any price. Thus, Birnberg's analysis 
permits a contract which lacks, or has no service potential, 
to have a positive price or value.
Contract Is a. Verbal Description and Has No Service Potential
Second, a contract is a written or verbal description 
of the right to the service potentials of theobject of the 
contract, and has no service potential. All rights to service 
potentials (assets) acquired by an enterprise are acquired 
under contract. In Chapter III, the corporation was con­
ceived of as a "bundle of contracts." In this same sense, 
all assets are acquired under one contract or another. When 
a corporation makes a cash purchase, it is acquiring the 
right to the service potentials of theobject of the con­
tract, in spite of the fact that a written contract has not 
been made. The contract is evidence of the existence of the 
corporation's right to the service potentials of a particular 
good, resource, person, but is not, in fact, that service 
potential or does not itself possess service potential, 
apart from a particular good, resource, person, and such, 
which is the object of the contract.
The object of an executory contract cannot be viewed
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or thought of as being apart from the agreement or contract. 
One would not purchase a lease contract for its own value—  
it has no economic benefit, apart from the object or asset 
to be used under the lease. It becomes difficult to think 
of a purchase contract as 'having any value, apart from the 
merchandise that is the subject of the contract. All ser­
vice potentials under executory contracts are direct service 
potentials. What Birnberg calls indirect service potentials 
(the value of the contract itself) seem to be holding gains 
and losses. Holding losses are what Birnberg calls negative 
service potentials.
In a sense, a contract is a tool for describing the 
acquisition of rights to service potentials. The reason 
executory contracts, such as leases, purchase contracts and 
stock options, to name but a few, can be sold at a price 
above or below the contract price is that the market has 
reappraised the value of the direct service potentials 
(stock, under a stock option contract, u'se of the leased 
asset under a lease contract, the goods under a purchase 
contract) and finds that their value is higher or lower than 
the value fixed in the contract by a previous exchange or 
transaction— which the contract describes. For this reason,
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the difference between the market price and the contract 
price does not indicate the existence of indirect service 
potentials, but rather, indicates the existence of holding 
gains or losses arising from the holding of rights to 
service potentials.
An Example
If two companies, which can be considered to be iden­
tical in all respects (A and B), enter into a contract where­
by B is to purchase 100 units of X product from A, for $150, 
the contract relationship might be depicted as follows:
Contract
SP
Co. A Co. B
SP
SP = Service Potentials
100 units of X = SP-^  is an asset to B and a liability to A
$100 cash = SP2 is an asset to A and a liability to B
What Birnberg is calling the value of the contract or indi­
rect service potentials, is really a change in value of SP^
relative to SP . Assume, that prior to delivery to B and 
because of an unforeseen scarcity of product X type resource, 
the value of 100 units of X rises to $150. In short, Birn­
berg would attribute the $50 relative change in the value of 
SP-^  to the contract. Anyone (for example Co. C) wishing to 
purchase these same 100 units, 'will have to pay $150 to B. 
Birnberg would be forced to say that C is paying $50 for 
the contract and $100 for the 100 units of X product— an 
obviously weak position. In this example, the contract may 
be thought of as an inert device or tool for describing the 
acquisition and disposition of the rights to service 
potentials.
The preceding discussion supports the conclusion that 
the rights to service potentials involved in an executory 
contract lie in the rights to the service potentials of the 
object of the agreement. The rights received under a con­
tract are identical with the rights to the service potentials 
of the object of the contract. Thus, the asset acquired 
under an executory contract to lease a piece of equipment, 
is the right to the service potential of the equipment. The 
asset acquired under a contract to purchase raw materials is 
the right to the service potentials of the raw materials.
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These rights have no value, apart from the service potentials 
of the object of the contract under which they are acquired.
Thus, the original question becomes: to have acquired
an asset is it necessary to have immediate availability of 
the use of the object's service potential? In terms of the 
asset definition being used in this study, this availa­
bility for immediate use does not seem to be a required 
element. The two requirements of future service potentials 
and rights to those future service potentials can be 
present, whether or not the object of the contract exists.
In the case of intangibles, the argument cannot be 
made that they are not assets because they have no physical 
existence. The service potential of intangibles lies in 
the fact that people or institutions will act, or refrain 
from acting, .in a certain manner which will, in turn, alter 
or affect the income stream or other objectives of the 
enterprise. The service potentials, as well as the rights 
to service potentials, of intangibles, exists then, only 
in the minds of men. Hence, service potentials can exist 
prior to, and independent of, the physical existence, i.e., 
it can exist in the minds of men.
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In the case of tangible assets, if it is argued that 
the service potentials of the object of the contract must 
be available for immediate use for an asset to exist under 
an executory contract, another interesting question arises. 
That is, it is an inescapable fact that one can never be 
certain that service potentials will flow from an object 
until the services are actually abstracted from the object 
or asset. Thus, one could never be certain of the existence 
of an asset until the actual service is derived from the 
object of the contract. It should.be emphasized that "ser­
vice potentials" are not "actual services." The asset defi­
nition used in this study does not require that actual ser­
vices be present, only service potentials. Focus on the 
word "potential" in the asset definition, and it is not 
inconceivable that the service potential of an uncreated 
object may be no less real or no less certain than the ser­
vice potential of a created object.
Existence of Service Potentials Prior to 
Existence of the Object of the Contract
The question arises as to whether or not an asset is 
derived from an executory contract wherein the object of the
contract does not yet exist. For example, if a firm signs a 
contract to lease a building or have a building constructed, 
can the lessee, or purchaser, be said to have acquired an 
asset under the contract, if the building has not yet been 
constructed? A clear distinction in the elements of an 
asset is necessary to the investigation and discussion of 
this question. An asset was defined as consisting of future 
service potentials and rights to those service potentials.
The future service potentials of the building, which is the 
object of the executory contract mentioned above, consists 
of the ability of that building (object) to increase the 
income stream of the enterprise, or further other objectives 
of the enterprise. It must be conceded that an enterprise 
cannot use the services of a building which does not yet 
exist. However, the future service potential of the contract 
is not the building (tangible object), but rather the ser­
vices or functions which are expected to flow from this 
building. The asset, then, consists of the rights to the 
future service potentials which are expected to flow from 
the building (object of the contract). If fine distinctions 
are permitted, it might be argued, that whether or not the 
building (object of a contract) is capable of providing
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services now, is not relevant to the question of whether or 
not an asset exists under the lease contract or construction 
contract. Actually, the future service potential of the 
building may be unaffected by the fact that the building 
does not presently exist. The difference between a build­
ing which is on the drawing boards, and one which is already 
constructed, is that the service potentials are closer to 
realization in the case of constructed building.
This problem can be approached in another way, since 
it may be difficult for some to accept these mental gymnas­
tics, and difficult to see how an asset can exist under a 
contract (to purchase inventory or to construct a building, 
for example) when the object of the contract (merchandise, 
or building) has no physical existence at the date the 
contract is negotiated. It can probably be stated that, 
whether or not the merchandise or building in the above 
type contracts exist, is not relevant or can be ignored 
safely, as long as the right to these objects has been 
acquired and the creation and delivery of these objects 
has been promised. In other words, if the going concern 
concept is brought into the picture, it is suggested that 
the accountant must, of necessity, assume (unless there
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is evidence to the contrary) that the object will, in fact, 
be created. It has never been considered unrealistic for 
the accountant to rely on the going concern concept when 
the necessary degree of certainty is present. The case 
of executory contracts may simply be another instance in 
which it can be deemed useful for the accountant to rely 
again on the going concern concept.
Capitalization of All Expectations
If one would consent to capitalize all executory con­
tracts, why not capitalize all expectations, i.e., why stop 
with the occasion of the contract, for recognition of assets 
and corresponding liabilities? In other words, why not 
capitalize the expected future sales or earnings of the 
company, as predicted by the company's president, or why 
not capitalize, as assets and liabilities, the company's 
proposed capital budget. The company's capital budget 
might be capitalized even prior to the letting of contracts 
or perhaps, even prior to its acceptance by the appropriate 
budget committee or other company executives. There are 
several reasons for not capitalizing prior to the existence 
of or signing of a contract.
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First, the signing of, or entering into the written 
contract/ is an objective manifestation of the commitment 
of the firm. ' In fact, it is even a legally binding commit­
ment. In other words/ the contract serves as concrete evi­
dence, particularly when coupled with the going concern 
concept, as discussed earlier, of the fact that the firm 
has acquired promises of future economic benefits which are 
expected to be derived from, or abstracted from, the object 
of the contract. This same objective type evidence is fre­
quently not present prior to the formation of the contract. 
Such is the case with capitalizing future sales, or earn­
ings, or the proposed capital budget mentioned earlier.
In this same context, however, it should be noted 
that, in those cases where either or both parties have no 
intention of fulfilling, or an inability to fulfill the 
contract, or there is evidence to indicate that the going 
concern assumption is not valid, no asset has been acquired, 
no liability has been incurred, and none should be recorded 
or reported, in spite of the existence of a contract. There 
can, of course, be legal complications where one party has 
performed. This would also be the case where one of the 
parties has already performed on the contract and performance
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cannot be reversed. Ignoring these legal problems, in this 
simple case where no performance has taken place, the asset 
and corresponding liability and revenue amounts should be 
removed from the accounts, when the contract is not to be 
fulfilled.
Second, the contract serves as evidence that another, 
independent party to the contract has also committed itself 
to the transaction, and has agreed to do whatever is neces­
sary to fulfill the contract for the acquisition of service 
potentials. In other words, when the other party, outside 
the corporation, becomes a part of the contract, an exchange 
of promises or a transaction (according to one interpreta­
tion of the transaction presented earlier in this chapter) 
has taken place. Prior to the formation of the contract, 
there is only the intention of one or both parties to be 
committed, which in the absence of each party's legal com­
mitment, might generally be considered insufficient evi­
dence to indicate an exchange has taken place or a trans­
action has occurred.
In addition, generally, with the formation of the 
contract also comes the,establishment of exchange prices for 
the assets and corresponding liabilities involved in the
contract. Prior to exchange of the rights and service 
potentials under the contract/ most assets would not be 
easily measurable by a particular firm. At the same time, 
it should be noted that at some time in the future it may 
be feasible to incorporate into financial statements/ expec­
tations or future transactions' which have not been verified 
by an exchange or by contract. The usefulness of such 
information in future predictions and decisions would be 
advocated by some and disputed by others— this is a matter 
which must be settled by research. However, in the absence 
of objective evidence to substantiate these expectations, 
they cannot be recommended for inclusion in published finan­
cial statements.
In the context of the preceding discussion, it might 
also be asked why not capitalize economic commitments? If 
it is to stay in operation, the company must purchase or is 
committed to purchase the services of utilities and other 
such common asset services. There are at least two reasons 
for omitting economic commitments. First, no contract has 
been formed, and so, no exchange or transaction has taken 
place. But, in addition, these services are readily 
available to all users in the market, and thus, information
on such economic commitments is probably irrelevant to the
decisions of most users of financial statements. If these
common service potentials were to be purchased via some
long-term agreement or contract, their reporting might be 
«
relevant, since the firm: (1) may have been speculating,
which necessitated entering into a fixed commitment at fixed 
prices, or (2) may be substituting executory contracts for 
assets, as in the case of purchase commitments for inventory 
Barring the existence of such a contract, however, the 
investor or other users would assume that these readily 
available service potentials or assets will have to be 
purchased, if the firm is to continue in operation.
The Effect of Executory Contracts on 
The Income Statement
It should also be noted that recording executory con­
tracts is essentially a balance sheet problem, or one of 
correctly presenting the financial position of an enterprise 
If the view is taken that profit is the result of measuring 
net assets at two different points in time, it appears that 
recording of most executory contracts will not affect income 
in the period first recorded, unless of course, replacement
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cost or other current cost used, changes substantially. 
Admittedly, the value of the asset and liability recorded 
can be different, but this is a measurement problem to be 
discussed in Chapter VI. In short, since net income or 
net profit is defined as the increase in net assets, profit 
does not seem to arise as a result of recording most execu­
tory contracts in the accounts and financial statements.
In the case of a contract which is completely executory, 
very often net assets will not have changed as a result of 
the recording, and for that reason, profit has not been 
created. Thus, there is no need to get heavily involved in 
income measurement or revenue recognition in this chapter.
The framework used in—Accounting Research Study No. 3 
for presentation of the income statement is accepted in this 
paper as an adequate income reporting model for executory 
contracts. The general concepts to be used in determining 
income in connection with executory contracts are adequately 
described in Accounting Research Study No. 3 and need not be 
elaborated in detail, here. The following quote, which sets 
forth only the broadest operational concepts used, should 
suffice:
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Net profit (earnings, income) or net loss for an 
accounting period is the increase (decrease) in 
owners' equity, assuming no changes in the amount 
of invested capital either from price-level changes 
or from additional investments and no distribution 
to the owners.. Revenue is the increase in net 
assets of an enterprise as a result of theproduc- 
tion or delivery of goods and the rendering of 
services. Expense is the decrease in net assets 
as a result of the use of economic services in 
the creation of revenues or of the imposition of 
taxes by governmental units. Gains are increases 
in net assets other than those resulting from 
additions to invested capital or from revenues.
Losses are decreases in net assets other than 
those resulting from reductions in invested capital 
or from expenses.^3
The matter of such things as holding gains and losses is 
relevant to a discussion of executory contracts. However, 
this is largely a measurement problem, and as such, will be 
taken up in Chapter VI. Likewise, the fact that reported 
income is often related to total assets or total equity as 
a measure of performance, suggests that the income state­
ment is indirectly affected by executory contracts. This 
problem will also be considered in Chapter VI.
Summary
The previous chapter demonstrated, by reference to
33Sprouse and Moonita, op.. cit., p. 9.
172
several types of contracts# that executory contract infor­
mation is relevant financial information to typical users 
of published financial reports. The future economic bur­
dens or benefits# as the case may be# of pensions, leases# 
purchase commitments# various employee benefit contracts—  
to name but a few contracts— are often reported in finan­
cial statements, but only in footnotes or in other sections
34
of the report not covered by the auditor's opinion.
In this chapter, executory contracts were examined 
in light of basic theoretical accounting concepts, to- 
determine whether or not existing concepts and definitions 
can accomodate such contracts# and also to determine the 
extent to which these concepts and definitions must be 
changed or modified so as to be descriptive of executory 
contracts, as well as existing accounting practice. 
Generally, it is accepted that all assets (future economic 
benefits) and all liabilities (future economic burdens) of 
the enterprise constitute relevant# useful information to 
users of external reports. Not only is executory contract
34James E. Walters# "The Treatment of Footnote Lia­
bilities," The Accounting Review# January# 1955# p. 95.
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information relevant, but, theoretically, executory contracts 
may qualify as assets and liabilities which should be 
recorded in the accounts. Executory contracts, even within 
the context of present concepts of assets and liabilities, 
i.e., on the basis of theoretical definition, seem to qualify 
as assets and liabilities. If, in addition to the rele­
vance standard, executory contracts meet the standards of 
verifiability, freedom from bias and quantifiability, there 
may be no compelling reason why executory contracts should 
not be recorded in the accounts, amplified in footnotes, 
and thus, readily incorporated into all conventional finan­
cial statement analysis by external users.
CHAPTER VI
THE EFFECT OF CAPITALIZATION ON 
SELECTED FINANCIAL RATIOS
This chapter is primarily an attempt to illustrate 
how executory contracts might be capitalized, as well as the 
effect of such capitalization on selected financial ratios. 
Application of replacement cost (current cost) and price- 
level changes are also treated briefly, along with a dis­
cussion of how the concept of holding gains and losses 
might be modified somewhat by capitalization of executory 
contracts. Also, the use of other reporting procedures, 
such as a funds statement and supplementary schedules, are 
discussed, briefly. With respect to the effect of capitali­
zation of executory contracts on financial ratios, the 
objective of this chapter is to determine the extent to 
which the selected ratios change and more importantly, to 
determine the extent to which their interpretation is 
changed and made more or less meaningful.
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Replacement Cost and General Price Level Chancres
It would seem that replacement cost and price level
adjustments could be applied to the valuation of executory
contracts. As pointed out* by Sprouse and Moonitz, the use
of each of these concepts overcomes an important deficiency
present in using historical cost (contract price in the case
of executory contracts). In the case of general price level
changes: .
Changes in the dollar itself . . . are not reflected 
at all at any time, so that their effect is confused 
and mixed in with the effect of changes in specific 
prices. Some portion of what is reported as profit 
(loss) should actually be classified as a restate­
ment of capital resulting from a change in the measur­
ing unit.^-
In the case of replacement cost:
Changes in the specific prices of individual items, 
such as inventories, or plant and equipment, are 
not recorded until 'realized.' The total profit 
is reflected in the period of realization and not 
apportioned to the periods during which the profit 
accrued.2
■^Robert T. Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz, A Tentative 
Set of Broad Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises, 
Accounting Research Study No. 3 (New York: American Insti­
tute of Certified Public Accountants, 1962), p. 16.
2Ibid.
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Use of replacement cost (current cost) and general price 
level changes would overcome these difficulties in the valua­
tion of all assets, including executory contracts. Thus, it 
would seem that these concepts are just as useful in valuing 
executory contracts as they are in valuing any other asset 
or group of assets, and as a consequence, detailed lists of 
advantages and disadvantages of these two valuation concepts 
need not be presented here. Such lists have been adequately 
presented in current accounting literature. However, it 
might be pointed out that perhaps market prices of particu- • 
lar executory contracts may be more difficult to obtain than 
are market prices for most other assets. In other words, a 
ready market does not exist for most executory contracts and 
thus, the implementation of current cost for such contracts 
may be more difficult. This may be somewhat of a unique 
problem in valuing executory contracts at replacement cost.
In contrast, there would also seem to be a unique 
advantage to recording executory contracts in the accounts 
and subsequently valuing them at replacement cost. Holding 
gains and losses arise in connection with the use of replace­
ment cost or current cost. Full implementation of the 
concept of replacement cost, and hence the recognition of
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holding gains and losses requires that all executory con­
tracts containing fixed prices (or a way of fixing prices 
in the future, which will allow them to differ from replace­
ment cost) be recorded in the accounts at the date the 
agreement or contract is negotiated or signed. Conceivably, 
a second procedure could be utilized, whereby the holding 
gains and losses could be reflected by a specific adjusting 
entry, without recording the contract itself in the accounts. 
Both procedures would accomplish the same objective of record­
ing the holding gain or loss in the period in which it occurs. 
However, the latter procedure would have the disadvantage 
of recording holding gains and losses on assets which do 
not appear in the accounts or financial statements. Such a 
practice may be confusing to users of the statements. All 
of the preceding discussion requires further explanation.
When assets are purchased and held by a company while 
the specific prices of these assets change, holding gains and 
losses occur. "Holding gains" arise when the current cost 
or replacement cost of the asset held rises above historical 
cost. "Holding losses" arise when the current cost or 
replacement cost of the asset held falls below historical 
cost. The objective in reporting holding gains and losses
178
is to separate profits or losses arising through normal 
operations, from profits or losses resulting from the holding 
of assets during periods of changes in their specific prices. 
For example, assume an item of inventory was purchased for 
$50, at the beginning of period one. Assume further that 
its replacement value at the end of period one was $70, and 
when sold in period two for $100, its replacement value was 
$85. Conventional income reporting would reflect an 
operating gross profit of $50 ($100-$50). In reality, how­
ever, there was a gain from holding the asset, at the end of 
period one, of $20, and during period two, a holding gain of 
$15 and an operating gross profit of $15.
Although some writers would say that the holding gain 
of period one of $20 is unrealized, others see no useful 
purpose in distinguishing realized and unrealized holding
3
gains and losses. Edwards and Bell would say the $20 g a m
i
was unrealized, and Sprouse and Moonitz would probably agree.
3 .....
Eldon S. Hendrikson, Accounting Theory (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Incorporated, 1965), p. 164.
4Edgar 0. Edwards and Philip W. Bell, The Theory and 
Measurement of Business Income (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1961), p. 111.
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However, Sprouse and Moonitz would state that "no useful
purpose is served by delaying recognition of holding gains
5and losses until realized." Unless it is proposed that 
holding gains and losses be ignored until realized through 
the use of assets in the production of revenue, executory 
contracts should probably be recorded to give effect to 
such gains and losses.
In terms of executory contracts, assume inventory is 
purchased under a contract in which its price is fixed at 
$50 in period one. To be able to recognize any holding 
gains or losses which arise during the time the inventory 
is purchased and sold, the contract might be capitalized. 
Changing the previous example slightly, assume the inven­
tory purchased under a purchase contract in period one, 
is delivered and paid for in period two. The merchandise 
has a replacement value at the end of period one of $70 
and when sold in period two for $100, its replacement value 
was $85. Unless the purchase contract was capitalized as 
an asset in period one, it would be difficult (unless a 
memorandum entry is used) to give effect to, or recognize
C
Sprouse and Moonitz, op., cit., p. 17.
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the $20 holding gain as, part of income in period one.
Thus, any time the price of the executory contract is
fixed, it permits holding gains and losses to be measured
and reported. If no asset is recorded until the contract
is partly, executed or performed (delivery or payment is 
made), several periods hence, there is a presumption that 
the price paid say in period two (fixed by contract in period 
one) is the current price. Therefore, all the holding gain 
is recognized in period two and none in period one. Because 
of this, all executory contracts, in which fixed prices 
have been established for the future service potentials, 
can be recorded to permit the proper recognition of holding 
gains and losses as they occur period by period.
Holding gains and losses might be computed on all 
assets, including executory contracts, to serve as a basis 
or indication of management's effectiveness in acquiring 
or negotiating for future service potential. Such a compu­
tation not only allows the separate evaluation of manage­
ment's ability to use (yielding operating profits) assets 
versus their skill in acquiring assets (yielding holding 
gains and losses), but also permits the determination of 
managerial effectiveness at a much earlier point in time.
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That is, the date a contract is entered into, versus the 
date(s) performance takes place by delivery or making pay­
ment, may be separated by a considerable time period, during 
which holding gains and losses are occurring and going 
unnoticed. • •
As a concluding note to this section, it should be 
mentioned that, while many theoreticians are advocating the 
separation of holding gains and losses from regular operating 
income, this is not now being done in practice. The practi­
cal application of the concept of holding gains and losses 
may involve so many practical difficulties, that a meaning­
ful implementation of the concept may not be impossible.
An Illustration
The next section of this chapter is basically an 
attempt to capitalize five types of executory contracts, 
along with an examination of the effect of these contracts 
on financial ratios and financial analysis. In addition, 
methods of reporting, other than capitalization, are treated 
very briefly. Both the discounted and undiscounted amounts 
of selected contracts are presented in journal entries and 
capitalized in financial statements. . The effective market
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rate of interest is used as the discount rate. When con­
tracts other than leases are discounted, entries are 
required in each subsequent period to add a like amount to 
both the asset and corresponding liability accounts (equal 
to the effective market rate of interest times the balance 
in the account). In this way, the present value of the cost 
of the asset can be shown without affecting the reported 
income, by the recording of both interest income and interest 
expense.
In Accounting Research Study No. 3 (page 39),
Sprouse and Moonitz suggest that liabilities calling for 
settlement in cash, be valued at the present, discounted 
value of future payments or its equivalent. In measuring 
the liability they suggest further that "if the creditor 
will not or cannot accept cash now in discharge of the 
liability, the appropriate amount is that sum which, if 
invested now (e.g., in a sinking fund), will provide the 
sums needed at maturity, even though in fact no explicit 
sinking fund or other investment device is actually used." 
This statement leads one to question whether or not the 
effective market rate of interest should be used as the dis­
count rate. The sum which must be invested now, would seem 
to depend upon the rate at which this same amount can be 
invested by the debtor-firm. Thus, to achieve the measure­
ment suggested by Sprouse and Moonitz may require that the 
earnings rate of the debtor-firm rather than the effective 
market rate of interest (earnings rate of the creditor), be 
used as the discount rate. However, at the present time, 
use of an earnings rate as the discount rate, would seem to 
present almost insurmountable measurement and reporting 
difficulties.
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After journalizing the capitalization of contracts/ 
the subsequent discussion of ratios is presented in terms of 
undiscounted amounts. It will be noted that there are only 
slight changes in the ratios when undiscounted versus dis­
counted values are used. Hence, the discussion could have 
been presented in terms of either value. The most important 
aspect of this illustration is the very marked change in 
financial ratios and their possible interpretation or mean­
ing as a result of capitalizing executory contracts. In 
sum, this section serves as a simple illustration of what 
financial statements would look like, and how traditional 
ratios and their interpretation, as well as acceptable norms 
for these ratios, might change as a consequence of capitaliz­
ing executory contracts.
Ratios and Contracts Selected
In addition to a discussion of working capital, five 
ratios selected for analysis are as follows:
(1) Current Ratio
(2) Debt to Equity (and Total Debt to Total Assets)
(3) Net Income to Total Assets (Rate of Return 
on Investment)
(4) Cash Flow to Total Debt
(5) Working Capital to Total Assets
These ratios were chosen for examination primarily because
they are commonly used in financial statement analysis and
are significantly affected by capitalization of executory
contracts. Also, a recent and rather extensive empirical
study strongly supports the conclusion that of all ratios
these five are the best indicators of the failure of firms
7
during a period five years before failure. The study 
classified ratios into the following groups: (1) Cash Flow
Ratios, (2) Net Income Ratios, (3) Debt to Total Asset 
Ratios, (4) Liquid Asset to Total Asset Ratios, (5) Liquid 
Asset to Current Debt Ratios, (6) Turnover Ratios (inappli­
cable here). Each of the five ratios selected above was 
found to be the most reliable in each of these groups. That 
is, of some thirty ratios computed for 79 failed companies 
and 79 comparable nonfailed companies, these five ratios 
were among the best six (the sixth is inapplicable) on the 
basis of having the lowest percentage of error in predicting
^See William H. Beaver, "Financial Ratios as Pre­
dictors of Failure," in a supplement to the Journal of 
Accounting Research titled Empirical Research in Accounting: 
Selected Studies, 1966, pp. 71-111.
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the failure of firms. The study provides empirical support 
and verification for the usefulness of financial ratios (and 
thus, the underlying accounting data) in terms of their pre­
dictive ability. In addition, the author of the paper sug­
gests that the study perhaps understates the usefulness of 
the ratios:
If the ratios are used to detect the financial 'ill­
ness ' of a firm, there may be many firms whose ill­
nesses were detected before failure occurred. In 
these cases, the proper treatment was applied, and 
the firms did not fail . . . .  An important piece of 
information is missing— how many firms were saved 
from failure because their problems were detected in 
time through the use of ratios? Such information 
would be difficult, if not impossible to obtain.®
The capitalization of executory contracts may improve finan­
cial analyses and permit the signs of financial "illness" 
to appear in the statements at a much earlier date. This 
point has been made by others in somewhat indirect fashion:
Finally, the balance sheet— as presently constitu­
ted— affords an incomplete statement of assets and 
liabilities. Impending outlays associated with 
pension obligations, lease agreements, and purchase 
and construction commitments frequently remain 
unspecified. To the extent that the omitted items 
affect the current position, analyses which stress
8Ibid., p. 101.
186
Q
working capital fall even shorter of their mark.
Perhaps this quote should be expanded to state that if execu­
tory contracts are omitted, not only working capital, but 
all financial analyses are incomplete.
It should be emphasized at this point that statement 
users, as noted in Chapter IV, are interested in more than 
predictions of failure. Relative profitability, managerial 
effectiveness, growth, and so forth, are of great importance 
to statement users and can be very significantly affected 
- by executory contracts. Therefore, the present chapter is 
not testing the usefulness of executory contract data for 
these types of measures.
The previously mentioned ratios are used in analyzing 
Sample Manufacturing Company, both before and after capital­
ization of the following types of executory contracts:
(1) Lease Contract
(2) Purchase Contract
(3) Construction Contract
(4) Stock Options
9James E. Walter, "Determination of Technical Sol­
vency," Journal of Business (January, 1957), p. 32.
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(5) Labor Contract 
Note that the terms and amounts of these contracts have 
been kept extremely simple for purposes of this illustra­
tion. Data on these contracts are given in the next sec­
tion, followed by entries -to record these contracts, 
together with financial statements before and after capital­
ization. Both discounted and undiscounted amounts are 
shown and discussed. It is assumed in this illustration 
that the effective market rate of interest on all contracts 
is 4%.
Recording the Contracts
Lease Contract— The Company leases operating equip­
ment and facilities on a long-term basis. Aggregate rentals 
for the next 13 years due under the lease amount to 
$3,000,000 annually. This lease, might be recorded as 
follows:"^
■*■^ (000 omitted from all amounts in both columns).
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Undiscounted Discounted
Amounts Amounts
Rights to Leased Property 39,000 29,958
Liability for Leased Property—
Current 3,000 2,884
Liability for Leased Property—
Long-Term 36,000 27,074
Purchase Commitments— Sample Company has interests in 
various production projects and is required to take its 
ownership proportion of the products produced from these 
projects, for which it is committed to pay its proportionate 
share of the operating costs of these projects, either 
directly, or as part of the purchase price of the product. 
The minimum amount which the Company is committed to pay is 
approximately $3,000,000 annually over the next 15 years, 
regardless of the quantity of product received. This con­
tract may be capitalized as follows:
Undiscounted Discounted
Amounts Amounts
Purchase Commitments— Current 3,000
Purchase Commitments— Long-Term 42,000 30,470
Liability for Purchase Com­
mitments— Current ' 3,000 2,884
Liability for Purchase Com­
mitments— Long-Term 4-2,000 30,470
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Construction Contracts— As of the balance sheet date, 
the Company has entered into contracts as part of a program 
for the expansion of major facilities. According to con­
tract terms, facilities costing $10 million will be com­
pleted by the end of next year, while another $8 million in 
facilities will be completed two years from the balance 
sheet date. The following entry capitalizes these construc­
tion contracts.
Undiscounted Discounted 
Amounts Amounts
Construction Contracts 18,000 17,012
Liability for Current Con­
struction Contracts 10,000 9,615
Liability for Construction
Contracts— Long-Term 8,000 7,397
Stock Options— A qualified stock option plan was 
approved by the shareholders in the current year. As of 
the balance sheet date, there were outstanding options for 
20,000 shares at $125 per share, all of which were exercis­
able. The Company's experience indicates that 2,000 shares 
will be exercised during each of the ten succeeding years, 
at an annual value of $250,000. The contract is recorded 
as follows:
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Undiscounted Discounted
Amounts Amounts
Receivable from Stock Options—
Current 250 240
Receivable from Stock Options—
Long-Term 2,250 1,788
Stock Under Option 2,500 2,028
Labor Contract— In December of the current year, Sample
negotiated a three-year labor contract with its employees.
Under the terms of the contract, $33 million annually in
wages are guaranteed to the employees. Employees are paid
their actual earnings each pay period, the guarantee coming
into effect only when earnings drop below the predetermined
minimum of $33 million annually. The following entry
illustrates how this contract might be recorded.
Undiscounted Discounted
Amounts Amounts
Labor Guaranteed Under Contract—
■Current 33,000 31,729
Labor Guaranteed Under Contract— ■
Long-Term 65,000 59,846
Liability for Guaranteed
Wages— Current 33,000 31,729
Liability for Guaranteed
Wages— Long-Term 66,000 59,846
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On the following pages, the financial statements for 
Sample are shown. The income statement is unchanged as a 
result of the capitalization of executory contracts. Also 
presented is the balance sheet for Sample before capitaliza­
tion of contracts and after capitalization of contracts, 
using both discounted and undi'scounted amounts. A tabulation 
of ratios computed before and after capitalization of execu­
tory contracts follows the income statement.
Working Capital
Working capital decreased $12,750, or approximately 
20% (from $63,621 down to $50,871), as a result of the capi­
talization of the five executory contracts mentioned pre­
viously. This net decrease can be attributed to the recog­
nition of current liabilities for lease payments ($3,000), 
and current payments to come due for construction in the 
next period ($10,000). This decrease of $13,000 in working 
capital was offset by an increase in working capital from 
stock options receivable ($250). In terms of a funds state­
ment, there is an additional source of working capital of $250 
and an additional use of funds of $13,000. The purchase 
contract and labor contract do not affect working capital
SAMPLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 
BALANCE SHEET 
as of December 31, 196X 
(ooo omitted)
ASSETS
Before
Capitalization
After After
Capitalization Capitalization 
(Undiscounted) (Discounted)
Current Assets
Purchase Commitments— Current 
Receivable from Stock Options—
Current
Labor Guaranteed Under Contract—
Current
total current assets
Investments
Purchase Commitments— Long-Term
Property, Plant & Equipment 
Rights to Leased Property
Other Long-Lived Assets:
Construction Contracts
Receivable from Stock Options— Long-Term 
Labor Guaranteed Under Contract—  
Long-Term
$102,177
$102,177 
$ 27,030
137,590
$102,177
3,000
250
33.000 
$138,427
$ 27,030
42.000
137,590
39.000
- 0-
18.000 
2,250
66,000
$102,177
2,884
240
31,729
$136,970
$ 27,030 
30,470
137,590
29,950
- 0-
17,012
1,788
59,846
TOTAL ASSETS $266,797 $470,297 $440,724
Before
Capitalization
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS1 EQUITY
Current Liabilities $ 38,556
Liability for Leased Property— Current 
Liability for Purchase Commitments—
Current
Liability for Cons truction Contracts
Liability for Guaranteed Wages— Current _________
total current liabilities $ 38,556
Long-Term Liabilities $ 23,431
Liability for Leased Property—
Long-Term 
Liability for Purchase Commitments—
Long-Term 
Liability for Construction Contracts 
Liability for Guaranteed Wages—
Long-Term _________
total long-term liabilities $ 23,431
total liabilities $ 61,987
Common Stock $102,728
Stock Under Option
Retained Earnings 102,082
total stockholders equity $204,810
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND 
STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY $266,797
After After
Capitalization Capitalization 
(Undiscounted) (Discounted)
$ 38,556
3.000
3.000 
10,000
33.000 
$ 87,556
$ 23,431
36.000
42.000
8.000
66.000 
$175,431
$262.987
$102,728
2,500
102,082
$207,310
$470.297
$ 38,556
2.884
2.884 
9,615
31.729 
$ 85,668
$ 23,431
27,074
30,479
7,397
59,846
$148.218
$233.886
$102,728
2,028
102.082
$206,838
$440.724
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SAMPLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 
Income Statement 
for the year ended December 31, 196X 
(ooo omitted)
SALES AND REVENUES:
Net Sales $.2.68,8.04
Other Revenues 3,232
$272,036
COSTS AND EXPENSES:
Cost of Goods Sold $199,166
Depreciation, Depletion and
Amortization 13,232
Selling and Administrative
Expenses 23,745
State, Local and Miscellaneous
Taxes 5,990
Interest and Other Costs on
Long-Term Debt 1,296
U.S. and Foreign Income Taxes 12,126
$255,555
NET INCOME for the year $ 16,481
TABLE III
TABULATION OF WORKING CAPITAL AND RATIOS COMPUTED
Computation or Ratio
Before
Capitalization
After
Capitalization
(Undiscounted)
After
Capitalization
(discounted)
Working Capital (in millions) $63.6 $50.9 $51.8
Current Ratio 2.7 1.6 1.6
Debt to Equity .30 1.3 1.0
Debt to Total Capital .23 .56 .51
Rate of Return on Investment .06 .034 .039
Cash Flow to Total Debt .47 .11 .14
Working Capital to Total Assets .23 .11 .12
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since they add equal amounts to current assets and current 
liabilities.
Current Ratio
Similarly, the current ratio decreased from 2.7 to 1 
($102,177/$38, 556), to 1.6 to 1 ($138,427/$87,556), as a 
result of giving recognition to the five executory contracts. 
The significance of this ratio may improve considerably since 
the 1.6 to 1 seems to represent a more realistic measure of 
the firm's ability (or perhaps inability) to pay its short­
term debts. The decrease is due mainly to the recognition 
of current liabilities for lease contracts and construction 
contracts. These liabilities will definitely come due in 
the succeeding period and thus, have been appropriately 
accounted for and included in the financial statements.
Other factors which contributed to the lowering of the 
current ratio were the addition of purchase commitments and 
labor contracts (total $36,000), to both current assets and 
current liabilities. Additions of equal amounts to current 
assets and liabilities (when original amounts are unequal) 
has the effect of lowering the ratio.
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Debt to Equity Ratio
The debt to equity ratio has undergone drastic changes 
in the process of capitalizing executory contracts. Prior to 
capitalization, the ratio-was .30 to 1 ($61,987/$204,810). 
After capitalization the same ratio increased to 1.3 to 1 
($262,987/$207,310). This change was due to the tremendous 
impact on short and long-term debt, of lease, purchase, con­
struction, and guaranteed annual wage contracts— a total in­
crease in liabilities of $201,000. A creditor who omits any 
of these contracts from his calculations to determine ability 
to repay short or long-term debt, is seriously misled.
Debt to Total Capital
This ratio is designed to yield the same information 
as the debt to equity ratio. Prior to capitalization the 
ratio was .23 ($61,987/$266,797). This, of course, indicates 
that creditors are supplying 23% of the total capital of the 
Company. After capitalization the ratio increased to .56, 
indicating that creditors are, in reality, supplying 56%, 
rather than 23% to the Company's total capital.
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Rate of Return on Investment
Rate of return on investment is lowered considerably 
after capitalization of executory contracts. Sample Company 
had a net income, after taxes, of $16,481 for the year. Rela­
ting this income to the asset bases, before and after capi­
talization, yields rates of return of 6 % ($16,481/$266,797), 
and 3.4% ($16,481/$470,297), respectively. The decreased 
rate of return is due to the addition of $203,500 to the 
asset base.
Some may question whether or not executory contracts 
contribute to the production of earnings in the same manner 
as other assets. It may be argued that, in the same way that 
only a part of the total service potential of a building or 
inventory is used in any one period, so also, only a part of 
the total service potential of a labor contract or lease 
contract or any other executory contract, is used in one 
particular period. Thus, contracts may be as legitimate a 
part of the asset base, in computing conventional rate of 
return, as any other asset. In fact, if one defines an asset 
as rights to expected future service potentials or future 
economic benefits, it may be somewhat meaningless to
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capitalize partially completed construction and ignore other 
executory contracts. For example, a building which is 10% 
complete under contract, and 10% of which has been paid for, 
is capitalized as an asset to the extent payment has been made. 
The present' service potential of l/10th of a building is nil, 
since it cannot be used in the production process. Following 
this line of reasoning, it might be concluded that, in 
terms of direct production of revenues, there is no more 
justification for capitalizing a partially completed build­
ing than there is for capitalizing a completely executory 
building contract. This argument might be explored further 
before continuing with a discussion of the other ratios.
On most contracts, the obligation is easily seen, 
since it must be discharged by monetary means. But, it is 
difficult to see how the asset simultaneously acquired is 
used in the production of revenue, since the total service 
potential is not available for use and in some cases the 
related asset object of the executory contract does not 
exist. However, it should be pointed out that a certain 
minimum asset base is required to generate revenues. Also, 
most assets must be purchased in quantities larger than 
those needed for current operations. Thus, executory
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contracts may not have contributed directly to past earnings, 
even though they do contribute indirectly and will certainly 
contribute to future earnings— else no asset is present.
As some have advocated, perhaps this difficulty can
be overcome and the rate of return calculation made more
meaningful by computing rate of return on assets employed 
11
or used. Such a computation would dictate that most exe­
cutory contracts, partially completed construction, inven­
tory beyond a minimum needed for operation, excess cash, 
prepaid expenses and the like, be excluded from the asset 
base. It is important to note that, with respect to the rate 
of return calculation, leases differ from most other execu­
tory contracts, since they are used in the production of 
revenue and can be legitimately considered a part of the 
asset base.
There is the additional problem that firms with no 
executory contracts have a higher rate of return than those 
which have such contracts. In view of this and the pre­
viously mentioned problems, it becomes difficult to interpret
■^Jerome B. Cohen and Sidney Robbins, The Financial 
Manager (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966), pp. 205-
07.
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the meaning of this ratio/ if executory contracts are 
included in the asset base. Thus, a way to partially recon­
cile these problems is to relate earnings to average assets 
used for a period.
Cash Flow to Total Debt
Cash flow is often defined by financial analysts as
net income plus depreciation, depletion and amortization.
12This was the definition of the ratio as used by Beaver.
This ratio purports to be a measure of the firm's ability to 
generate cash with which to discharge debt. In fact, of all 
the ratios studed by Beaver, the cash flow to total debt 
was found to be the best indicator of financial failure or 
"illness." Prior to capitalization, this ratio was .47 for 
Sample Company ($29,448/$61,978). After capitalization, the 
ratio decreased considerably to .11 ($29,448/$262,978).
The decrease resulted from the recognition of additional 
debt of $201,000. Essentially, cash flow is a measure of 
the total funds available to the firm as a result of opera­
tions during a period, which can be used for asset expansion
1 2x Beaver, op. cit., p. 78-
or replacement, reduction of debt, dividend payments or 
working capital increased. This ratio, in turn, gives some 
indication of the firm's ability to reduce debt on the basis 
of the cash flowing into the business from the firm's opera­
tions. If meaningful in the first place, the ratio may be 
improved by capitalization of executory contracts since, 
while cash is not affected, the increases in debt after 
capitalization do, in fact, have to be paid in the same man­
ner as all other liabilities reflected on Sample's balance 
sheet prior to capitalization. On the other hand, while 
the numerator (cash flow) covers a one-year period of time, 
the denominator covers several years. Thus., even though 
this illustration has been restricted to testing five ratios, 
it may be worth mentioning that it may be more useful to 
relate cash flow to current debt before and after capitali­
zation of executory contracts. If these calculations were 
made, the ratio would drop from .76 ($29,448/$38,556) to 
.34 ($29,448/$87,556). Again, if this ratio is meaningful 
without executory contracts, it would appear to be a more 
accurate ratio after capitalization, since additional cur­
rent debt is included.
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Working Capital to Total Assets
This ratio decreased from .23 ($63,631/$266,797), 
before capitalization to .11 ($50,781/$470,297) after capi­
talization. Both the numerator and denominator have 
changed in this ratio, i.e., working capital decreased 
$12,840, while total assets increased $203,500. The ratio 
is presumed to indicate excesses or deficiencies in working 
capital, relative to total assets.
Analysis by Short-Term Creditors
It certainly seems that 1.6 to 1 (current ratio after 
capitalization) is a more realistic or better measure of the 
current ratio. A short-term creditor or potential short­
term creditor should recognize that:
(1) the guaranteed annual wage contract in the 
amount of $33 million must be paid in the 
current year,
(2) the purchase commitment required the purchase 
of $3 million (minimum) in raw materials 
during the coming year,
(3) the lease, payments in the amount of $ 3 million •
annually must be paid, and
(4) the construction contract in the amount of 
$10 million for the coming year, for which 
no outside financing arrangement has been 
made yet, will have to be paid.
Any creditor who omits these items from his analysis is over­
stating Sample's current debt-paying power.
It might be asked why executory contracts, which have 
no effect on working capital, should be capitalized. In 
other words, in the example under consideration, three con­
tracts have an effect on working capital, while the other two 
contracts do not affect working capital. For example, 
capitalization of the lease contract resulted in additional 
long-lived assets of $39,000, a current liability of $3,000 
and long-term liabilities of $36,000. Capitalization of the 
construction contract added $18,000 to long-lived assets, 
$10,000 to current liabilities and only $8,000 to long-term 
liabilities. The stock option contract added $250, to cur­
rent assets, $2,250 to long-lived assets and $2,500 to 
stockholders' equity. Therefore, the net effect, as 
mentioned earlier, has been a decrease in working capital 
of $12,750. In contrast, the purchase contract and labor
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contract add equal amounts to current assets and current lia­
bilities and equal amounts to long-lived assets and long­
term debt (thus, no effect on working capital). However, 
the advantage of capitalizing these amounts is that the 
current ratio is altered and hence, current debt-paying 
ability is changed considerably. In addition, the reader 
is made aware of the asset value and liability value of both 
the service potentials acquired under these contracts, as 
well as those given up in the contracts. Also, the reader 
of the statement is told that the Company has taken steps 
to secure its supply of raw materials or perhaps that manage­
ment has taken advantage of a favorable price by forward 
buying. Also, the reader is informed, as a result of the 
appearance of the labor contract, that operations are less 
likely to be interrupted by strikes over wage demands. As 
was noted earlier, guaranteed annual wages must be paid, 
regardless of the work performed by employees, and payments 
must be made under the purchase contract, regardless of the 
quantity of product received. Thus, these contracts can be 
considered as liabilities, and their reporting satisfies the 
important objective of depicting the'overall debt pattern 
of the Company— both short and long-term.
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Analysis by Long-Term Creditors and Investors
If executory contracts are treated as assets and lia­
bilities, creditors are supplying a much larger portion of 
the Company's total assets. The debt to equity ratio, it 
will be recalled, rose from 33% to 140%, while the debt to 
total assets ratio rose from 23% to 56%. These are rather 
drastic changes. However, these figures must only be com­
pared with those of other companies that have also capital­
ized their executory contracts. If companies make it a prac­
tice to capitalize executory contracts, entirely new guide­
lines v/ill develop with respect to the appropriate or 
desirable proportions of debt and equity which companies in 
particular industries should be carrying. A point to be 
made is that financial ratios, after capitalization of 
executory contracts seem to represent a more complete 
description of the total obligations of the company and 
incorporate obligations, which might take several years to 
appear or for investors and creditors to become aware of, 
under conventional accounting procedures. The increases in 
ratios relevant to investors and creditors are caused by 
recognition of long-term liabilities for leases, purchase
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commitments/ construction contracts and guaranteed annual 
wages. It is not difficult to accept that, since these obli­
gations will have to be paid in the future (if the going con­
cern is accepted), ratios which include these obligations 
might be more meaningful.
Funds Statement
It might also be meaningful to incorporate executory 
contracts into a funds statement if a broad approach, similar 
to that recommended by Perry Mason in Accounting Research 
Study No. 2, is taken to the concept of "funds." In recom­
mending this broad approach, Mason suggests that, in its 
most useful meaning, the term "funds":
. . .  is conceived of as purchasing or spending power, 
or as all financial resources, arising . . . from 
external rather than internal transactions of the 
business enterprise. In other words, it extends the 
concept to include assets or financial resources 
which do not affect or flow through working capital 
accounts.
. . . The narrower definitions, such as cash or 
working capital, have often led to the omission from 
the statement of the effect of transactions which do 
not directly affect cash or working capital, but 
which nevertheless are important items in the
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13financial administration of the business.
A funds statement which had been constructed for Sample Com­
pany on this basis, prior to the capitalization of executory 
contracts, would require that the following items be added 
after capitalization:
Additional Sources of Funds:
Increase in working capital from exe­
cutory contracts $ 36,250
Increase in long-term executory con­
tracts (liabilities) 152,000
Increase in stock options 2,500 $190,750
Additional Uses of Funds:
Decrease in working capital from exe­
cutory contracts $ 49,000
Increase in long-lived executory
contracts (assets) 167,250 216,250
Net Decrease in Funds from Executory Contracts $ 25,500
When the above transactions are included in the type of
funds statement suggested by Mason, the statement becomes
more meaningful in terms of its objective. That objective
is to report the effect of non-cash, or non-working capital
transactions which are important items in the financial
13
Perry Mason, "Cash Flow" Analysis and the Funds 
Statement, Accounting Research Study No. 2 (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1961), 
pp. 54-56.
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administration of the business. Certainly, entering into
these executory contracts are important transactions of this
type and the funds statement may be a vehicle for reflecting
these transactions in a meaningful manner. The format of
the statement could, of course, be varied to emphasize certain
transactions. For example, instead of showing increases in
long-term executory contracts (liabilities) in one total
($152,000), the following individual items could be reflected:
Increase in Leased Property $ 36,000
Increase in Purchase Commitments 42,000
Increase in Construction Contracts 8,000
Increase in Guaranteed Wage Contracts 66,000
$152,000
This type of funds statement could be a vehicle for summari­
zing the effect of all executory contracts, or for isolating 
and emphasizing certain of these contracts.
Separate Schedule for Executory Contracts
A separate schedule may be used for communicating 
information on executory contracts to users of published 
reports. The schedule has very strong appeal as a reporting 
vehicle when one considers: (1) that footnote disclosure
alone appears to be inadequate, and (2) the difficulties 
created by capitalization of such contracts. The schedule
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14
on the next page was suggested by Zises. Such a schedule 
may accomplish a reporting result which neither capitaliza­
tion nor footnote disclosure could accomplish alone. In 
addition, the existing body of accounting concepts and prin­
ciples need not be changed or revolutionized in any way. In 
fact, current generally accepted accounting principles per­
mit disclosure of executory contracts in separate schedules, 
so as to prevent statements from being misleading. The 
schedule allows for quantification and verbal description 
in schedule footnotes, and yet prominently displays and 
summarizes the total effect on the firm of all material 
transactions involving executory contracts..
Possible Correlation Analysis ■ -
Perhaps executory contracts can be used in correlation 
analyses as leading indicators of the future costs, revenues 
and earnings of the firm. By reporting executory contracts 
and having them covered by the auditor's opinion, objective 
data are provided which can, in turn, be utilized with much
•^Alvin Zises, "Disclosure of Long-Term Leases," The 
Journal of Accountancy (February, 1961), p. 45.
Schedule of Material Contractual Commitments (S-X Rules 3.18 and 3.19)
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Any pertinent information of a material nature regarding any commitment should be furnished within footnotes to the 
schedule.
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more confidence and success by management and financial ana­
lysts to predict future prospects for users of published 
annual reports. For example, inventory and labor are two of 
the most important costs in most firms and industries. Very 
often, these are purchased in advance by contract, with the 
prices of these resources fixed under the contract. In the 
case of retailing firms, purchase commitments very often*can 
be strongly correlated with sales, and can serve as leading 
indicators of future sales. In retail firms, such as Sears 
Roebuck, Safeway and similar firms, the relationship of the 
number of stores to sales volume, is probably direct. In 
the case where leases are substituted for store ownership, 
perhaps leases can be correlated with sales volume. Actual 
correlations are, however, beyond the scope of this study.
The possibility of generating the above type data suggests 
that perhaps executory contracts might be most meaningful 
when presented in separate schedules or statements.
Substitution of Assets and Liabilities
It can be argued that some executory contracts are 
more or less permanent substitutes for assets and liabili­
ties and, so should be recorded in the accounts. Considering
the contracts under discussion in the illustration/ the lease 
contract and purchase contract fall into this category. In 
the case of leasing# instead of owning the property# which 
would require the issuance of long-term debt obligations or 
equity# the firm substitutes lease contracts. If the lease 
contract is not capitalized as an asset and corresponding 
liability# operating assets and their related liabilities 
are permanently omitted from the balance sheet. The case 
of purchase commitments is somewhat similar. In other 
words# instead of carrying a three-year supply of inven­
tory, the firm may enter into a three-year purchase con­
tract. Or# perhaps# to take advantage of a favorable 
price, or to guarantee the availability of a supply of raw 
material# the firm purchases merchandise under contract 
rather than issuing stock or debt to finance the acquisition 
of a three-year supply. The three-year supply may even 
represent a permanent increase in inventory and therefore# 
a permanent increase in working capital.
There are significant trends toward contract buying 
in many industries, which cause several problems of compara­
bility in financial statements. A recent survey indicates 
the increased use of long-term purchase contracts for
15buying inventory. Contract buying has nearly doubled in 
the last five years. The survey contacted more than two 
hundred firms in twenty-one different industries. The 
results indicated that 95% of the purchasing agents con­
tacted used long-term buying agreements. Of this 95%, 12% 
of the respondents negotiate purchase contracts up to six 
months in length, 71%, up to a year in length, and 17%, longer 
than a year in length. Many of these contracts have the 
effect of shifting inventory to the suppliers. For example, 
United Airlines has shifted more than $2 million in inven­
tory (food and liquor items) to its suppliers through con- 
1 6tract buying. This increased buying on contract creates 
problems in the area of comparability of financial state­
ments. First, some companies buy on contract, while others 
do not. Ideally, identical companies should carry nearly 
identical amounts of inventory. It might be revealed by 
capitalizing purchase commitments that, where one company 
carries larger inventories, another carries much smaller
John Greenberg, "More P.A.' s Turn to Contract Buy­
ing," Purchasing- Magazine (February 23, 1967), pp. 46-49.
-^"Contract Buying Speeds Airline Supplies," Purchas­
ing Magazine (June 15, 1964), p. 65.
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inventories, but larger purchase commitments. In sum, pur­
chase contracts can significantly affect the minimum amounts 
of inventory a firm must carry.
Inventory turnover can be increased considerably by 
utilizing purchase contracts. Instead of carrying larger 
permanent inventories, purchase contracts are used to shift 
the inventory to suppliers and lower the average amount of 
inventory carried, thus increasing inventory turnover, some 
times artificially, as compared to other companies.
Companies may also be investing in inventory by buy­
ing under long-term purchase contracts, covering a period of 
time longer than that necessary so as to carry minimum inven­
tories. In effect, this procedure amounts to speculation 
in inventory or investing in purchase contracts. The
transaction is comparable to the purchase of land as an
investment or for future use. Users of published annual 
reports should be made aware that such investments have been 
made, since they certainly use up the limited borrowing 
power of any firm. Also, in the case of purchase commit­
ments, which are security for long-term debt, and under which
payments must be made even though no inventory is received, 
the essence of the transaction can be made known to users
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via capitalization of the purchase contract. The nature of 
this almost "sham" transaction should be brought to the atten­
tion of the reader by reportinf of the purchase commitments. 
Pull recognition of the liability may be made, and possibly 
some downward valuation of the asset shown, to indicate the 
probability of payments having, to be made, even though no 
asset is received, of the asset received has declined in 
market value.
In looking at a series of statements after capitali­
zation of executory contracts, it may be possible to note 
increasing substitutions of purchase commitments for inven­
tory, and leases for fixed assets. Perhaps indices such as:
Purchase Commitments „ Lease Contracts
______________________  and _________________
Inventory Carried Fixed Assets
will reveal such shifts. For Sears Roebuck & Company, the
purchase index was as follows for the years indicated:
1951 .81
1955 .98
1960 1.11
1961 1.14
1962 1.12
1963 1.16
1964 1.18
1965 1.25
1966 1.33
If this index could be correlated with the turnover of
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inventory for the same years, it might indicate why inventory 
turnover has increased, and probably would also show that 
Sears is carrying an increasing proportion of their inven­
tory in purchase commitments. Unfortunately, cost-of-goods 
sold data are not available in Sears' annual report.
The substitution of lease contracts for assets has 
been generally recognized. Gant points out very well, the 
idea that leases are merely a method of financing the acqui­
sition of assets by means other than conventional debt or 
equity issues:
Out of these inadequacies has come a curious sort 
of logic which argues that the existence of an 
asset can be determined or denied by a ledger 
entry, and that a promise to pay becomes an obli­
gation only if it is reflected in figures on a 
balance sheet.
This sort of rationalization may serve to ease the 
conscience of a management that is opposed to debt, 
or that has seen the amount of its debt climb to a 
disturbing level, but, unfortunately, it ignores 
certain basic economic facts of life. Every 
business requires certain fixed assets, and the 
choice available to it is not whether to finance 
these assets but how to finance them. Lease 
financing is one way of acquiring assets, but, 
it is a form of borrowing . . . .
Like all types of borrowing, lease obligations 
draw on the credit of the borrower, and credit is 
not a bottomless well. If it is used in one 
form, it is not available to be used again in
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another.^
The lease should be looked upon in the same way as a 
bond or other form of long-term debt. The following lists
from Nelson reveal the similarities of bond and lease obli­
gations . . .
Lease
1. Leasing is a source of capital.
2. Lease requires periodic payments for a fixed 
period of time. These payments contain two 
elements:
(a) Return ojf investment.
(b) Return on investment.
(Since the lease is normally 'net#' the
return can be calculated at a fixed rate in
advance.)
3. Leases often contain a 'rejectable offer*
clause which enables the leasee to 'retire*
the lease early.
4. The primary security behind the lease is
normally the general credit of the lessee 
rather than the value of the leased property.
Bond
1. Bonds are a source of capital.
2. Bonds require periodic payments for a fixed
period of time. These payments contain two
Donald R. Gant, "Illusion in Lease Financing," 
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 27 (March-April, 1959) , p. 
142.
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elements:
(a) Sinking fund payment or a serial maturity 
(return ojf[ investment) .
(b) Periodic interest (return on. investment).
This return can be calculated at a fixed 
rate in advance.
3. Bonds often contain a 'call' provision which 
gives the borrower the right to retire them 
prior to maturity.
4. The primary security behind a bond issue is 
also the general credit standing of the bor­
rower. Mortgage of pledged property is only 
of secondary importance.-*-®
Nelson has also made rather extensive calculations (in Chap­
ter 6) to show the impact, on fourteen financial ratios, 
of the result of capitalization of leases for eleven com­
panies. These ratios are affected substantially and, "in
all instances (where the ratios themselves are meaningful)
19the ratios are made more meaningful by capitalization."
It is submitted that the increase in information resulting 
from lease capitalization may also result from the capita­
lization of other types of executory contracts. But,
i p  •
A. Tom Nelson, The Impact of Leases on Financial 
Analysis (East Lansing, Michigan: Bureau of Business and
Economic Research, Michigan State University, 1963), 
p. 48.
19Ibid., p. 93.
220
before recommending capitalization of executory contracts 
on the basis of more meaningful financial ratios, consider­
able additional research will have to be conducted, which 
should be aimed at investigating other types of ratios and 
capitalization procedures. In addition, other methods for 
communicating information on executory contracts, by means 
other than capitalization (such as supplementary schedules), 
seem to be very v/orthy of additional investigatipn.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY
The problem of accounting for executory contracts is 
receiving increased attention, primarily because of the cur­
rent controversy over leases. It is thought by some that 
capitalization of lease contracts may also require that 
other types of executory contracts be capitalized. The 
same principles applicable to leases may, in fact, be appli­
cable to other executory contracts. Recent literature 
indicates that the accounting profession is becoming 
increasingly aware of the problem posed by executory con­
tracts. The American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, Accounting Research Study No. 4, and the 
American Accounting Association all have recognized the 
existence of the problem posed by executory contracts as 
well as the need to study it.^ In investigating the
■^Accounting Principles Board, Reporting of Leases in 
Financial Statements of Leases, Opinion No. 5 (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Septem­
ber, 1965), pp. 29-30. See also, John H. Myers, Reporting 
of Leases in Financial Statements, Accounting Research Study
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problem this study has attempted to accomplish five major 
objectives:
(1) To determine the present theoretical treat­
ment of executory contracts and to trace the 
development of this theory.
(2) To examine the adequacy of the current treat­
ment when current generally accepted accounting 
principles are applied to various types of 
executory contracts.
(3) To determine the objective of financial report­
ing and how executory contracts relate to that 
objective. Essentially this task amounts to 
determining what constitutes relevant, useful 
financial information to users of published 
annual reports and determining the extent to 
which executory contract data qualifies as 
such information. This task is accomplished 
throughout Chapters IV and VI.
No. 4 (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1962), p. 7., and Committee t.o Prepare a State­
ment of Basic American Accounting Theory, A Statement of 
Basic Accounting Theory (Chicago: American Accounting Asso­
ciation, 1966), pp. 32-33.
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(4) To attempt to derive a consistent theoretical 
foundation to serve as a basis for accounting 
for executory contracts, if such contracts are 
to be considered assets and liabilities.
(5) To capitalize executory contracts, so as to
investigate the effect of such capitalization 
on selected financial ratios.
These five objectives were treated in the above order in the
preceding six chapters. A summary of each chapter is pre­
sented below.
Historical Development of Current Theory 
of Executory Contracts
There are at least two official pronouncements from 
which some indication can be had, as to what the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants says are generally 
accepted accounting principles which should be followed in 
handling executory contracts. Accounting Research Bulletin 
No. 29 on "Inventory Pricing," issued in July 1949, and sub­
sequently incorporated into Accounting Research Bulletin 
No. 43, states:
Accrued net losses on firm purchase commitments for
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goods for .inventory, measured in the same way as 
are inventory losses, should, if material, be 
recognized in the accounts and the amounts there­
of separately disclosed in the income statement.3
Opinion No. 5 on reporting of leases issued in September,
1965 by the Accounting Principles Board stated that:
The question of whether assets and liabilities 
should be recorded in connection with leases of 
this type is, therefore, part of the larger issue 
of whether the rights and obligations that exist 
under executory contracts in general (e.g., pur­
chase commitments and employment contracts) give 
rise to assets and liabilities which should be 
recorded.
The rights and obligations related to unper­
formed portions of executory contracts are not 
recognized as assets and liabilities in financial 
statements under generally accepted accounting 
principles as presently understood. Generally 
accepted accounting principles require disclosure 
of the rights and obligations under executory con­
tracts in separate schedules or notes to the finan­
cial statements if the omission of this information 
would tend to make the financial statements mis­
leading. 3
These two official pronouncements regarding executory con­
tracts are probably based upon the writings of early authors
2 .Committee on Accounting Procedure, Accounting Research
Bulletin N o . 43 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, 1953), p. 34.
3 .    .
Accounting Principles Board, Reporting of Leases in 
Financial Statements of Lessee, Opinion No. 5 (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Septem­
ber, 1965), p. 30.
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such as Sprague# Kester, Canning and Montgomery. Just as
the above principles are framed, almost entirely, in terms of
leases and purchase commitments, so also, these early writers 
were concerned, almost exclusively, with leases and purchase 
commitments. The accounting principles recommended by early 
writers and those enunciated in the above quotes, are both 
heavily influenced by the legal concepts of assets, liabili­
ties, title transfer, and performance, rather than by economic 
concepts. In addition, it might be said that the current 
position of the accounting profession with respect to execu­
tory contracts is almost identical with that of writers, 
as far back as Sprague. In this sense, little progress has 
been made with accounting concepts and principles for treat­
ing executory contracts. At the same time, the accounting
profession has always-recognized that information on execu­
tory contracts is highly relevant financial information, 
which often must be presented to users of financial state­
ments to prevent their being misled.
Adequacy of Current Theory of Executory Contracts
The modern corporation can be viewed as a "bundle of 
contracts," which includes contracts, both oral and written,
for the purchase and sale of goods and services, contracts 
for the lease of both real and personal property, employ­
ment contracts, bond contracts and innumerable other con­
tracts which will be encountered in any dynamic business 
firm. Some of these contracts are recognized as assets and 
liabilities, others are not. Basically,, the generally 
accepted accounting principles governing the accounting 
treatment of these contracts, state that unperformed portions 
of executory contracts are not currently recognized as assets 
and liabilities in financial statements, but, disclosure of 
these contracts in footnotes or schedules is required, if 
their omission would tend to make the statements mislead­
ing. The primary criteria for capitalization of contracts 
is that performance must have taken place.
The adequacy of this principle of extent of per­
formance, as a basis of recognition or nonrecognition of exe­
cutory contracts, as assets and liabilities, may be ques­
tioned, due to the fact that there has never been a compre­
hensive statement of the concept of performance, and there­
fore, it seems to have been inconsistently applied as a 
principle. The lack of a comprehensive definition of the 
principle and the inconsistency of its application, have
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permitted illogical practices to exist, such as recognizing 
losses on purchase commitments while failing to recognize the 
purchase commitment as an asset, i.e., recognition of loss on 
an asset the corporation will not admit exists. If the prin­
ciple of extent of performance is applied to various contracts 
(sales and purchase contracts, stock subscription contracts, 
long-term lease contracts and long-term purchase commitments), 
the following weaknesses begin to appear.
(1) If a very broad view is taken, probably all 
activity carried on by a corporation or its agents, can be 
construed as being performance under an executory contract, 
if one views a corporation as a "bundle of contracts." Such 
a concept, could conceivably justify recording assets on the 
basis of such activity as sales effort, receipt of a sales 
order, and so forth.
(2) What constitutes performance in an ordinary or 
economic sense is not necessarily performance in a legal 
sense, and hence, may not give rise to a legal claim or legal 
asset. Accountants have applied a legal concept of per­
formance in some cases and an economic or moral concept of 
performance in others, and in the case of leases the per­
formance concept was not utilized at all. For example,
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revenue can be recognized on executory contracts to sell in 
an established market (such as with gold or silver), despite 
the fact that legally, no sale has taken place, no asset has 
been delivered and therefore, no legal performance has 
occurred. On the other hand, an ordinary contract to pur­
chase inventory is not recognized in the accounts because 
legal performance (delivery of assets) has not taken place.
(3) Performance is an activity that often spans a very 
long period of time, i.e., not often is it begun and com­
pleted in an instant. Thus, the problems of measuring extent 
of performance and determining when substantial performance 
has taken place must be dealt with.
(4) What constitutes performance under a contract 
is not clear. Very often delivery of assets has been con­
sidered to be the essential part of performance. However, 
on contracts, for example, where oil is purchased for a 
twenty year period, can the seller of the oil be considered 
to have fully performed, if the only additional performance 
required of him is to turn a valve and let the oil flow?
Or, perhaps the seller only performs as the oil is drained 
from the well. Possibly delivery is not the most important 
criteria for judging performance but rather that activity
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which gives rise to the right to delivery.
(5) Performance, in and of itself, does not neces­
sarily give rise to assets in the economic sense. One can 
perform under a contract and receive nothing of economic 
value. Thus, perhaps the concept should not be used to 
determine the acquisition of assets by the firm. Whether 
or not an asset is acquired, is dependent upon the defini­
tion of assets utilized.
(6) The concept of performance can have several dimen­
sions. There are many qualifying adjectives which can be 
used in conjunction with it, i.e., physical performance, 
economic performance, legal performance, substantial per­
formance. The concept may even have a time dimension. 
Accountants have never been clear as to what particular 
concept was being used.
(7) Last, and most important, the concept of per­
formance, as it has been applied, does not seem to lead 
directly to the function and purpose of accounting, but 
rather has been used only to fulfill the requirements of 
the law.
The preceding discussion of weaknesses supports the 
conclusion that the performance concept, as presently defined
and understood, is an inadequate theoretical basis for the 
recognition or nonrecognition of executory contracts as 
assets and liabilities. Instead of examining executory 
contracts in light of the legal concept of performance, they 
must be examined in light 6f the overall objectives of 
accounting and financial reporting. Secondly, at what point 
do executory contracts give rise to assets and liabilities 
which should be reported to users of financial statements? 
Whether assets and liabilities arise under executory con­
tracts is a definitional problem. The conception of assets 
and liabilities used by the accountant is, in turn, dependent 
upon the objectives he is trying to achieve with financial 
statements. In sum, the solution to the executory con­
tract problem lies in a determination of whether or not the 
rights and obligations which arise under executory contracts, 
give rise to assets and liabilities which it would be use­
ful to report to users of published financial statements.
Thus, a well-formulated theory of executory contracts 
requires that executory contracts be related to the overall 
objectives of accounting, and the means or principles of 
accomplishing these objectives.
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Relevant, Useful Information to Users of 
Published Financial Statements
The AAA Statement has very concisely stated the 
definition of accounting, "as the process of identifying, 
measuring, and communicating economic information to per­
mit informed judgments and decisions by users of the infor- 
4mation." Thus, it might be said that the basic objective
of financial reporting, is to communicate to the interested, 
external user, those elements of economic or financial 
information vital to his purpose or necessary to his deci­
sion. The usefulness of data in satisfying users' needs, 
is the controlling factor dictating the information which 
should be reported.
The usefulness of accounting information lies in 
its ability to reduce the uncertainty present in the deci­
sions facing users. The AAA Statement has put forth stan­
dards by which to judge the usefulness of accounting infor­
mation for this purpose. Adherence to the standards of
4Committee to Prepare a Statement of Basic Accounting 
Theory, A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory (Evanston, 
Illinois: American Accounting Association, 1966), p. 1.
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relevance, verifiability, freedom from bias, and quantifia- 
bility should reduce this uncertainty, and thus, serve as a 
guide for determining which information should be included 
or excluded from external accounting reports. These same stan­
dards may also be used in judging the usefulness of data on 
executory contracts. Further, the Committee to Prepare a 
Basic Statement of Accounting Theory has stated that many exe­
cutory contracts, not presently reported in financial state­
ments, meet these standards as well as other data reported 
currently. Generally, the AAA Statement recommends increased 
reporting of executory contracts where they meet the above 
standards, particularly the relevance standard. Specifically, 
the AAA Statement recommends the reporting of all long-term 
leases, material and nonrepetitive purchase commitments, pen­
sion plans, executive compensation contracts, including 
stock options, deferred compensation contracts and so forth.
Admittedly, relevance to users' needs should be the 
primary criterion for determining the usefulness of account­
ing information. However, there may be difficulty in estab­
lishing the relevance of, not only data on executory contracts, 
but also, any accounting data, including that currently 
reported. At least it is difficult to establish relevance
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to a decision in a scientific manner, since to do so, re­
quires that any data be related to actual users decisions 
models. Such a task has several difficulties, especially for 
a study on executory contracts. First, most users do not 
know their needs, or are themselves, not familiar with their 
own decision models. Second, the informational needs of users 
are heavily influenced by data that has been previously 
reported, i.e., users become accustomed to, and learn how 
to use, only data that has been available previously. Third, 
the accounting profession has not to date, scientifically 
derived or defined the decision models of even the major 
users, such as creditors and investors. Fourth, the task of 
scientifically formulating users decisions models is a mam­
moth undertaking and certainly has no place in the context 
of the present study. At the same time, knowledge of 
users' decision models is an important element in formulating 
a theory of executory contracts.
Because of these difficulties, the study is forced to 
relate executory contracts to a general information system 
currently advocated by some writers, which is aimed at 
satisfying v/hat has traditionally been considered to be 
the decision models of users. This limitation should be
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clearly understood. In this study, the traditional, present 
or existing and somewhat general decision models of external 
users are accepted, and no attempt is made to prove or dis­
prove these models, nor to derive new, and different models.
By employing ratio analyses, trend analyses and the 
like, external users evidence an interest in predicting or 
eliminating some of the uncertainty associated with the 
following general measurements:
Costs, revenues and earnings,
Dividend and market prices of shares,
Financial position,
Liquidity and debt-paying ability,
Growth,
Fund flows,
Effectiveness of management 
The usefulness of information on important executory con­
tracts, such as leases, various forms of purchase contracts, 
management employment contracts, guaranteed annual wage con­
tracts and construction contracts was specifically investi­
gated. Unfortunately, it is not possible to cover every type 
and variety of executory contracts in this study. Future 
research efforts in this area can investigate other specific 
contracts in greater detail. The results of this study should 
be entirely applicable to other types of executory contracts. 
This investigation supports the conclusion that, perhaps,
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most material executory contracts, but certainly those listed 
above, significantly reduce the uncertainty confronting 
investors and creditors, in connection with obtaining the 
general measurements listed above.
In addition, other general conclusions on the useful­
ness of incorporating executory contract data in financial 
statements can be drawn from discussions in Chapters IV and 
VI.
(1) One of the most important of these conclusions 
has to do with using replacement cost as a valuation method. 
Pull implementation of the concept of replacement cost may 
require that all executory contracts containing fixed prices 
(or means of arriving at fixed prices), be recorded in the 
accounts at the date the contract is negotiated or signed, 
if holding gains and losses are to be recognized in the proper 
period. If no asset is recorded until the contract is exe­
cuted in a succeeding p"eriod, there is a presumption that 
the price paid in this succeeding period is the current 
price, and all holding gains and losses are recognized in 
one period (the succeeding period). Holding gains and los­
ses computed on all assets, including executory contracts, 
can serve as an indicator of managerial effectiveness in
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acquiring assets as distinguished from using assets.
(2) Some financial ratios are greatly improved 
because they incorporate a wider range of data, when execu­
tory contracts are recorded in financial statements. The 
rate of return calculation is made almost meaningless after 
capitalization of executory contracts. In addition, data 
are reported at a much earlier date by capitalization, than 
would be the case if existing reporting practices were 
followed.
(3) Greater comparability in financial statements is 
achieved by recording executory contracts, particularly 
leases and purchase contracts. A firm which leases rather 
than owning directly, is made comparable to one which owns 
property. Firms which enter into long-term purchase con­
tracts rather than carrying higher inventories, are equated 
with firms which carry higher inventories. Firms which enter 
into long-term purchase contracts, which are used as security 
for long-term debt, can escape reflecting debt on financial 
statements. This practice is eliminated by capitalization
of purchase contracts. In sum, capitalization of executory 
contracts as assets and liabilities prevents the substitu­
tion of executory contracts for assets and liabilities in
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financial statements.
Theoretical Basis for Capitalization of 
Executory Contracts
The usefulness of incorporating executory contracts 
into financial statements may be demonstrated by relating 
executory contract data to the various decisions faced by 
users of these statements. At the same time, however, 
executory contracts must be theoretically acceptable. Since 
the function, of theory is to describe a wide range of prac­
tice, basic accounting concepts and definitions must also 
accomodate executory contracts, in addition to existing 
accounting practice. It was shown in Chapter V, that exist­
ing asset and liability concepts need only slight modifi­
cation in. order to be applicable to, or descriptive of, 
executory contracts. These modifications can be achieved 
primarily through an expansion of two concepts or elements 
contained in current definitions of assets and liabilities. 
These two concepts, or elements are: (1) transactions, and
(2) rights to service potentials.
The place of these two elements in existing account­
ing theory is seen in the asset definition suggested by
Sprouse and Moonitz in Accounting Research Study No. 3:
"assets represent expected future economic benefits, rights
to which have been acquired by the enterprise as a result
5
of some current or past transaction." This same concep­
tion of assets as rights to future service potentials, or 
rights to future economic benefits has been put forth by 
writers, such as Sprague, Paton and Littleton, Vatter and, 
more recently, the AAA Committee on Concepts and Standards
g
in their 1957 statement. Traditionally, this asset concept 
would exclude executory contracts. However, it has been 
shown in Chapter V that the act of entering into a contract 
may be considered an accounting transaction on the basis of 
the fact that: (1) a lease (one form of executory contract)
is currently accepted as being a completed transaction,
(2) a transaction is most basically an exchange between 
independent parties (thus, at the time the contract is 
negotiated or signed, the exchange by the parties to the
5
Robert T. Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz, A Tentative 
Set of Broad Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises, 
Accounting Research Study No. 3 (New York: American Insti­
tute of Certified Public Accountants, 1962), p. 20.
£
Eldon S. Hendrikson, Accounting Theory (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Incorporated, 1965), p. 193.
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contract, of rights to future service potentials meets the 
requirements of an accounting transaction), and (3) the act 
of entering into a contract (unless evidence suggests other­
wise) may be a sufficient basis for concluding that assets 
and liabilities have, in fact, been acquired by the parties 
to the contract. As a point tor recognizing the acqui­
sition of assets and liabilities in connection with execu­
tory contracts, the date of entering into the contract may 
be just as logical, and more useful than are the arbitrary 
dates now used. As pointed out by Bedford, these dates are:
(1) the date title passes, (2) the date goods or services
are physically received, and (3) the date cash is paid for
7
goods or services. The recognition of assets and liabili­
ties at the date of entering into the contract, in some 
cases, can result in a more complete and hence, more informa­
tive record of assets and liabilities as presented in finan­
cial statements.
In connection with the preceding asset definition, it 
has been clearly noted that the asset is not the tangible
7
Norton M. Bedford, Income Determination Theory: An
Accounting Framework (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, Incorporated, 1965), p. 116.
object which first comes to mind (such as a piece of 
machinery for example), but rather, the asset is the service 
potential which can be expected to flow from the tangible 
object. This becomes more apparent when one considers that 
intangible assets do, in fact, exist. Or, consider the 
situation where two firms possess identical pieces of 
machinery. Assuming the machinery has a market value of 
zero, it could be considered an asset to the firm that is 
able to use it (i.e., derive services from it), and not con­
sidered an asset by the firm that has no use for it. At 
the time of entering into the contract, the rights to the 
service potentials of the object of the contract have been 
acquired, along with the corresponding obligation to pay for 
those service potentials. In fact, the rights received under 
the contract and the rights to the service potentials of 
the object of the contract, are one and the same set of 
rights. Thus, when a "contract" is supposedly sold on the 
market, it must be kept in mind that the contract has no 
value apart from the object of the contract, or the rights 
to the services of the object of the contract. If the mar­
ket price of the contract is above or below the price fixed 
in the contract, a holding gain or loss has occurred. In
241
this sense, the contract itself has no value and can be 
thought of as a written or verbal description of rights to 
future service potentials and therefore, serves as support­
ing evidence that assets and liabilities have been acquired 
under the contract.
Once the expanded concept of an accounting transac­
tion is accepted, Sprouse and Moonitz's liability definition 
can be utilized in connection with executory contracts, with­
out further qualification. This definition is as follows:
The liabilities of a business enterprise are 
its obligations to convey assets or perform 
services, obligations resulting from past or 
current transactions and requiring settlement 
in the future.8
Two other points are worthy of mention in connection 
with the concept of future service potentials. First, 
since the asset definition does not require that the ser­
vice potentials of the object of a contract (or any other 
asset for that matter) be immediately available.for use 
or consumption by the firm, it might be concluded that 
assets can arise under executory contracts prior to the 
existence of the object of the contract. For example, a
8 Sprouse and Moonitz, op.. cit. , p. 37.
construction contract might be considered an asset and 
corresponding liability by the purchaser, even though the 
building has not yet been constructed under the contract. 
This may not be too difficult to accept, when one considers 
that according to generally accepted accounting principles, 
a purchaser who had paid 1/10 the purchase price of a 
building upon completion of 1/10 of the contract, would 
have no qualms about treating the building as an asset to 
the extent it had been paid for. This treatment is accept­
able, in spite of the fact -that the immediate availability 
for use, of the service potential of 1/10 of a building, is 
nil.
The second point has to do with the question of why 
stop with capitalization of executory contracts, i.e., why 
not capitalize all expectations of future service poten­
tials, such as the expected sales for next year. There are 
several reasons why capitalization should end with executory 
contracts, at least at the present time. First, the con­
tract serves as concrete evidence, particularly when 
coupled with the going concern concept, of the fact that the 
firm has acquired rights to future service potentials 
(assets). This same type evidence is not available in the
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case of other type expectations. Second, the contract 
serves as concrete evidence that another independent party 
to the contract has committed himself to the exchange or 
transaction, and has agreed to do whatever is necessary to 
fulfill the contract for the acquisition of service poten­
tials. In addition, generally with the formation of the 
contract, comes the establishment of an objectively deter­
mined exchange price for the future service potentials.
Such an objective determination of value is not available in 
the case of simple expectations.
The Effect of Capitalization on Financial Ratios
In Chapter VI, it was stated that replacement cost and 
price level adjustments can be used in connection with the 
valuation of executory contracts. No problems are created 
in using these two valuation techniques for executory con­
tracts, that are not also present in utilizing these tech­
niques for valuation of other assets and liabilities. Hence, 
the advantages and disadvantages of replacement cost and 
price level adjustments are not discussed at length.
However, there does seem to be a rather unique advan­
tage in using replacement cost for executory contracts. It
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was shown that full implementation of the concept of replace­
ment cost, and hence, holding gains and losses may require 
that all executory contracts containing fixed prices (or a 
method of fixing prices) be recorded in the accounts at the 
date the contract is negotiated. If no asset is recorded 
until the contract is partly executed or performed several 
periods hence, there is a presumption that the holding 
gain occurred in several periods after the negotiation of 
the contract. Thus, holding gains and losses are not 
recorded in the proper period unless the contract is 
recorded in the accounts when negotiated, or unless a 
specific adjusting entry is made to take up any holding gain 
or loss.
Most of the remainder of Chapter VI, consists of an 
illustration of the capitalization of five executory con­
tracts (a lease, a purchase contract, a construction con­
tract, a stock option contract, and a labor contract) and a 
discussion of the impact of such capitalization on working 
capital and the following five ratios:
(1) Current Ratio
(2) Debt to Equity (and Total Debt to Total Assets)
(3) Rate of Return on Investment
(4) Cash Flow to Total Debt
(5) Working Capital to Total Assets
In some cases, these ratios seem to be improved and made more 
useful and predictive as a result of capitalization of execu­
tory contracts. In addition, capitalization of executory 
contracts results in a much wider range of data being 
reported at a much earlier point in time. At the same time, 
however, executory contracts, other than leases, cannot be 
recommended for capitalization on the basis of increased 
usefulness of the ratios studied. The rate of return calcu­
lation seems to be meaningless after capitalization of exe­
cutory contracts. While it cannot be recommended that all 
executory contracts be capitalized, at the same time, the 
relevance of executory contract data to users' decisions, 
seems to be beyond dispute, and therefore, the contract data 
should be reported in financial statements. Thus, consider­
able additional research should be conducted, which will 
investigate other types of contracts, ratios and capitaliza­
tion procedures. In the meantime, supplementary schedules 
have strong appeal as a reporting vehicle for executory 
contracts, when one considers the theoretical and practical 
difficulties created by capitalization, and the fact that 
footnote disclosure alone is inadequate.
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